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“Chère Nouvelle Orléans, patrie de ma jeunesse, berceau de quelques-uns de mes
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Dieu de te protéger, de te garder, de te bénir”
-

Hélène D’Aquin Allain (1868)

(“Dear New Orleans, home of my youth, cradle of many ancestors, tomb of many
I have loved. I ask of God to protect, to preserve and to bless thee”)
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Abstract
Of the many powers granted to federal, state, and local governments through the
Constitution of the United States, eminent domain is possibly the strongest and most imposing, at
least as it relates to citizens’ property rights. This dissertation explores several large-scale public
undertakings in New Orleans during the period from 1929 to 2011 in which the application of
eminent domain was necessary to accomplish the government’s goals. This research window will
allow the analysis of eminent domain applications from the construction of the Municipal
Auditorium through the new medical center projects spurred by the flooding associated with
Hurricane Katrina. This timeframe also allows for evaluation of the interaction between
planning in New Orleans and the City’s exercises of eminent domain. By better understanding
the past uses of eminent domain and the goals and policies that drove the exercise of this power,
researchers and planning practitioners will be better informed in making decisions that will
impact the rebuilding and the future of New Orleans.
The specific cases studied as part of this dissertation are: the Municipal Auditorium
(Chapter 2); the development of Public Housing (Chapter 3); the Civic Center (Chapter 4),
Bridges and Highways (Chapter 5), the Cultural Center (Chapter 6); and the Medical Center of
Louisiana at New Orleans and Veterans Administration Medical Center (Chapter 7). The reason
for evaluating all types of projects resulting in the use of eminent domain use in New Orleans is
because all have profound impacts on the communities in which this governmental power is
exercised.
The primary finding of this dissertation is that the exercise of eminent domain has never
been used a principal tool in the implementation of redevelopment proposals in the city of New
Orleans. All projects throughout the established research period required the use of governmental
expropriation authority to complete land acquisition, but in all cases the government’s authority
was used conservatively and only when privately negotiated purchases failed.

Urban Planning; Urban History; New Orleans; Eminent Domain; Expropriation; Redevelopment
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Chapter 1
Introduction:
A Background of Literature and Methodology in Eminent Domain Research
In the summer of 2005, two separate and distinct events occurred which unpredictably
intersected in New Orleans in the subsequent years. On June 23, 2005, the Supreme Court of the
United States handed down a ruling in the case Kelo et al. v. City of New London (Connecticut),
et al. (hereinafter, Kelo) holding that the exercise of eminent domain for economic development
does fall within the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, if there is a properly and
legally adopted comprehensive plan in place for such actions.1 Two months later, on August 29,
2005, Hurricane Katrina made landfall as a high category 3 storm on the Saffir-Simpson
intensity scale, initially near Buras, Louisiana then finally near the mouth of the Pearl River.2 It
should be noted that it was not Hurricane Katrina, but the failure of New Orleans’s protective
levee system that caused the submersion of approximately eighty percent of the City of New
Orleans.
Of the many powers granted to federal, state, and local governments through the
Constitution of the United States, eminent domain is possibly the strongest and most imposing, at
least as it relates to citizens’ property rights. While the threat of losing one’s home to an
economic development project is fairly slim, the public outcry surrounding the Kelo decision
caused the elected leadership of the people to spring into action and place restrictions on how
and when takings may be exercised. In the wake of Kelo, forty-three of the fifty States, including
Louisiana, have passed laws limiting the application of eminent domain within their states.3
Ownership of property is sacred in America, and property rights are generally viewed as a
1

Supreme Court of the United States, Kelo et al. v. City of New London (Connecticut), et al, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
National Hurricane Center (NHC), Tropical Cyclone Report – Hurricane Katrina, 23-30 August 2005.
3
The Castle Coalition, as accessed via www.castlecoalition.org; on July 25, 2012, “Legislative Center.”
2

1

relationship between individuals and commodities, but property rights also dictate relationships
between individuals, as well as between individuals and their government. While ownership of
property is generally viewed as a private relationship, one must interact with others to gain
ownership, and the government controls how and at times if, property rights are protected and
enforced.4
This dissertation will explore several large-scale public undertakings in New Orleans
during the period from 1929 to 2011 in which the application of eminent domain was necessary
to accomplish the government’s goals. This research window will allow the analysis of eminent
domain applications from the construction of the Municipal Auditorium through the new medical
center projects spurred by the flooding associated with Hurricane Katrina. This timeframe also
allows for evaluation of the interaction between planning in New Orleans and the City’s
exercises of eminent domain. The New Orleans City Planning Commission, originally the City
Planning and Zoning Commission, was created in 1923 and the City’s first zoning ordinance was
adopted in 1929. Because the research period begins at roughly the same time as professional
planning in New Orleans, it will provide the opportunity to not only follow the evolution of
eminent domain but also to follow the evolution of planning in New Orleans, as it related to
public projects.
With the rise of modern, professional planning in New Orleans, it became possible for the
City to realize large redevelopment projects rather than focusing on construction of an individual
structure. At this stage in municipal governance, large public projects encompassing multiple
acres of land were not common. Not only would projects become larger in scope, they would
also transform from strictly projects of necessity to include projects of amenity, projects of

4

Campbell, J.L., & Lindberg, L.N. (1990). Property Rights and the Organization of Economic Activity by the State.
American Sociological Review, Vol. 55 (Oct. 1990), pp. 634-647

2

convenience, and projects of economic development. As planning grew to encompass more
aspects of the urban experience it became inevitable that the enhancement of that experience
would require property acquisition at some point. This is not to say that planning should be
viewed as a direct cause of projects resulting in the exercise of eminent domain, or its midcentury incarnation, Urban Renewal, but rather than the growth of planning as a profession made
projects of such scope possible.
This dissertation encompasses exercises of eminent domain by all levels of government:
federal, state and city. It is necessary to evaluate all levels of government for this type of
research because generally there is an overlapping goal or policy in the exercise of eminent
domain. This research is being conducted not only as a historical exercise in detailing the city’s
history with takings, but to study the policies and goals which were being pursued through the
exercise of eminent domain. This study includes relatively small projects such as the Municipal
Auditorium, larger projects like the Civic and Cultural Centers, and city-wide undertakings like
the creation of public housing and the development of the Interstate Highway System. The
reason for evaluating all types of projects resulting in the use of eminent domain use in New
Orleans is because all have substantial impacts on the communities in which this governmental
power is exercised. The following are the specific areas of focus within this dissertation:







Municipal Auditorium (Chapter 2)
Public Housing Developments (Chapter 3)
The New Orleans Civic Center (Chapter 4)
Greater New Orleans Bridge/Interstate Highway Construction (Chapter 5)
The New Orleans Cultural Center (present site of Armstrong Park) (Chapter 6)
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans / Veterans Affairs Medical Center
(Chapter 7)

These six cases have been selected due to their profound impacts on both the built and
social environment of their surrounding areas and New Orleans as a whole. This impact is not

3

necessarily limited to the physical impact of redevelopment on an adjacent community. For
example, the Municipal Auditorium was a small project, affecting only two municipal squares of
land, but this project represents a fundamental shift in governmental priorities for development
and the exercise of eminent domain. This project was the first in New Orleans which did not
meet the traditional standards of public use; the building would be municipally owned and would
house government and public events, but the motivating factor was to house private cultural
activities and promote tourism.
The establishment of public housing in New Orleans and the construction of the Greater
New Orleans Bridge and the Interstate Highways are projects which had substantial impacts both
on their immediate locations and for the entire community. Public housing not only cleared
slums and provided clean, modern housing to low-income individuals, but also placed local
government into the urban redevelopment business which would be extend further in subsequent
projects. Bridges and highways were, perhaps, the most significant project of the twentieth
century, from a planning and eminent domain perspective. These projects required the
acquisition of large quantities of land in nearly every neighborhood of New Orleans. Even those
areas escaping the physical impact of these projects would feel the social shift that they enabled.
No longer would the population of New Orleans be constrained by natural barriers or distance;
once high-speed expressways were made available, New Orleans’s surrounding parishes would
grow exponentially while the historic urban core declined.
The Civic Center, the Cultural Center, and the Medical Center of Louisiana at New
Orleans / Veterans Affairs Medical Center (MCLNO/VAMC) projects were selected due to their
scale and the wholesale changes to the urban landscape that is associated with them. The Civic
Center, the present location of New Orleans’s City Hall, removed the last residential

4

neighborhood in the Central Business District and allowed civic leadership to guide growth
towards the northern end of Poydras Street as they desired. The Cultural Center, or Louis
Armstrong Park, was envisioned as hub of intellectual pursuits. Museums, an opera house, and a
theatre would populate the site while simultaneously providing a growth boundary to the
burgeoning Central Business District. Lastly, the MCLNO/VAMC project, as with the other two,
effectuated substantial change both within the selected footprint and in its surrounding areas. The
projects required clear-cutting a portion of a National Register Historic District, altering traffic
patterns, and will result in the establishment of large, regional medical centers which will serve
as economic engines both within the city and without.
Significance and Purpose of Research
The reason for undertaking this research is that eminent domain has become a highprofile topic of American planning practice and research since the United States Supreme
Court’s Kelo decision. This decision affirmed that the exercise of eminent domain for economic
development does fall within the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, if there is a
properly and legally adopted comprehensive plan in place for such actions. Since that ruling in
the summer or 2005, many states – including Louisiana – have passed laws limiting the exercise
of eminent domain to uses that are truly “public.”
In the 2006 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, two resolutions were passed
and placed before the voters as constitutional amendments in September, 2006. Acts 851 and
859 served to limit the use of eminent domain within the state of Louisiana. Act 851, very
basically, provided a legislative definition to the term ‘public use,’ the definition was allowed to
remain very broad as to encompass potentially unrealized needs of governments, but specific
enough to provide that “[n]either economic development, enhancement of tax revenue, or any

5

incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in determining whether the taking or
damaging of property is for a public purpose”5 With the restriction of the Takings Clause
effectively accomplished in Act 851, Act 859 served to further protect private property rights
within the state of Louisiana. Act 859 provided, with certain exceptions, that any land
expropriated for a public purpose must be offered back to the former property owner before it is
sent to auction for purchase by a third-party. This restriction is limited to a resale within thirty
years of the initial taking, but effectively prevents the possibility of the government taking
property under false pretenses and offering it for resale to a developer.6
As of this writing, New Orleans is rebuilding from a disaster which inundated 80% of the
city. As the government undertakes the construction of a new billion-dollar Veterans
Administration and Louisiana State University hospital complex, eminent domain has resurfaced
as a method for obtaining the necessary land for the project to move forward. In addition to this
project, the New Orleans City Council has passed ordinances, collectively referred to as the
Good Neighbor Ordinance, allowing non-remediated properties to be cleaned and secured with a
lien placed on the property.7 Following the passage of the previous ordinances, the Council took
further action to remove properties deemed to be imminent health threats from the city;
Ordinance 22,499 MCS allowed the City to demolish abandoned structures without the consent
of the property owners following an administrative hearing.8
In addition to the timeliness of the research, another motivating factor in pursuing this
topic is that eminent domain exercises in New Orleans have never been chronicled. This
research will not only create a record of eminent domain in New Orleans but will also explore

5

Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 851 of the 2006 Regular Session, Page 2.
Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 859 of the 2006 Regular Session.
7
Ordinance 22,356 MCS, City of New Orleans
8
Ordinance 22,499 MCS, City of New Orleans
6

6

the policies and goals of the City in exercising this power. There has been previous research into
Urban Renewal in New Orleans but that research focused more on the policies and strategies of
the Urban Renewal program than on the exercise and implementation of eminent domain as a
tool within those programs. While the topic of eminent domain is nationally timely, the subject
is particularly important to the rebuilding of New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.
The purpose of performing a case study of eminent domain in New Orleans is, therefore,
two-fold. The first goal of this research is to create a chronicle of eminent domain utilization in
New Orleans from 1929 through 2011. This time period has been established in order to
incorporate the development of public housing, urban renewal, and the City’s recovery from
Hurricane Katrina. The second and primary purpose of this research is to better understand the
history of eminent domain in New Orleans. By better understanding the past uses of eminent
domain and the policies that drove the exercise of this power, researchers and planning
practitioners will be better informed in making decisions that will impact the rebuilding and
future of New Orleans.
Literature Review
Eminent domain as a governmental power has been written about from many various
fields, including economics, history, law, sociology, and urban studies. As a privilege held by
the government, the power to take private property for a public use is long established and the
legality of such action guaranteed by the document upon which that government is based. This
dissertation does not explore the government’s authority to exercise eminent domain, but rather
will be exploring how the three levels of government have utilized the power granted to it and
what the basis for those exercises were, in the context of New Orleans. This literature review
briefly discusses the origins of property rights and eminent domain, the development of eminent
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domain in the United States and, finally, how eminent domain as a governmental power has been
modified and somewhat limited over time. This review will serve as a basis for the case study of
eminent domain in New Orleans moving forward.
Understanding Property Rights
The foundation of modern property rights is found in the writings of John Locke,
particularly in his Two Treatises of Government originally published in 1690. Since that time
property rights have been in debate, but the basic principles have not substantially changed.
Krueckeberg illustrated Locke’s perspective on how one comes to own property in stating “the
product of your labor becomes your property by natural right as an extension of your liberty,
social status, and personality.”9 The product of one’s own work was viewed as the most basic
form of property. Over time, the basis of property shifted from functional possession to being
based in market-driven supply and demand. It was at this juncture that people began to possess
more than they could utilize, making it possible to accumulate wealth and control the availability
of goods.
In the American application of Locke’s ideas, the next major ideas in the realm of
property rights came from Thomas Jefferson. The Jeffersonian interpretation of property was
that property was a social, rather than a natural right. Jefferson differentiated natural rights from
social rights in that natural rights are those rights “necessary for moral and intellectual
achievement.”10 Of these natural rights, the most important were “individual liberty and social
freedom;”11 specifically, “freedom of thought, freedom from tyrannical political authority, and

9

Krueckeberg, D. A. (1995). The Difficult Character of Property, Journal of the American Planning Association;
Summer 1995, Vol. 61 Issue 3, pp. 301-307.
10
Cooke, J.W. (1973). Jefferson on Liberty, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Oct. – Dec., 1973), pp.
563-576, at 565.
11
Cooke

8

freedom in choosing and plying one’s own livelihood.”12 These liberties were “never to be
abridged or denied in any man-made institution.” 13 Post states that this is made clear through
Jefferson’s writing of the Declaration of Independence, in that he substituted the phrase “pursuit
of happiness” over “property” as an inalienable right;14 however, in eighteenth century thought,
the implication of ‘happiness’ was not necessarily distinct from ‘property.’ Use of the term
‘happiness’ in the context of the Declaration of Independence would have connoted that the
ability to acquire property was just as important as protecting the rights of individuals in the
property that they currently held, and “the right to obtain and possess property was at the heart of
the pursuit of happiness.”15
The policies enacted by Jefferson also demonstrated his thoughts on the issue of property
rights. Two specific actions are cited as demonstrable of his thinking: the enactment of laws
governing inheritance and the granting to all white males over the age of twenty-one the
necessary property to qualify as a voter. These laws were enacted because Jefferson believed that
property owners were the “most responsible guardians of social welfare” because “they had a
physical stake in the preservation of society and were ‘tied to their country by … the most lasting
bonds.”16 In Jeffersonian thinking, property rights as a social right differentiated from natural
rights because property “was incidental and adventitious, a right produced only after formation
of a social contract.”17 Post cites The Correspondence of Jefferson and Du Pont de Nemours to
explain how natural and social rights differ, in that social rights “are those of personal protection,
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of acquiring and possessing property, in which the individual power is less than the natural….
These are civil rights or rights of compact, and are distinguishable from natural rights.”18
From an economic standpoint, property rights are viewed by scholars as social rights
rather than natural ones, and the only true value of those rights are associated with those
elements of property which can be bought and sold. Demsetz states that “property rights specify
how persons may be benefited and harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify the
actions taken by persons.”19 In this analysis of property rights, there is no natural right
associated with either the creation or possession of property other than that which society
provides it.
Sociological perspectives on property rights date back to the formation of sociology as a
field. According to Carruthers and Ariovich (2004), property rights have been discussed in
sociological writings since the time of Marx. Marx theorized that property ownership is a
fundamental indicator of inequality. Since the legal system, and thus the state, has defended the
sanctity of property rights, those systems are also involved in the perpetuation of inequality.
Additionally, through the field of sociology, one is able to trace the development of property
rights and the shifts in fundamental principles as they correspond with larger social movements.
During times of revolution and other political change, there is commonly a change in the way
property ownership is viewed and controlled.20
Engels, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and The State, offered that the
concept of property ownership and especially the concept of land ownership was a creation of
18
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the bourgeoisie. Engels, in the tradition of Locke, believed an inherent right of ownership of that
which one produces. As stated above, the value associated with property and the need to possess
land stems from economics; goods derive their value when the market becomes involved, and the
same is true of land. The commoditization of goods, and therefore potential for profit from
goods, directly led to the private ownership of land which dictated who would benefit from the
production of that land.21
Carruthers and Ariovich also break property rights up into five elements of ownership.
The primary questions in this elemental discussion are: What can be owned? Who may own?
What rights exist in ownership? How are rights enforced? and How are rights transferred? To
the question of “What can be owned?” Carruthers and Ariovich state that the answer to this
question is fluid. Ideas of ownership change, as do societal norms that govern how rights are
protected and asserted. As an example in the United States, ownership once extended to holding
fellow human beings as property, and as American society came to find this practice
unacceptable the rules governing ownership changed, and virtually overnight fortunes were lost
without any form of compensation to the property owners. In modern times, property ownership
has been extended to ideas and thoughts. Never before in history has such a liberal view of what
constitutes property been given the protections of the legal and social systems that they exist
within.22
The answer to the question of “Who may own?” is not as simple as stating that anyone
may own property. The right to own property may be legally limited in some instances, and the
right to own extended in others. Under United States law, there exist two types of person:
natural and fictive. Natural persons, under the law, are actual persons, while fictive persons are
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the creation of government or industry, such as a corporation, non-profit, or governmental
agency. The legal rights of fictive persons were established in 1886 through the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in County of Santa Clara v. Southern Pacific Railroad Company.23 In
this case, the Southern Pacific Railroad was making the argument, among others, that the Santa
Clara County violated their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in that they were not being treated equally under the law. The Court did not rule
directly on this argument but rather its recognition of the validity of this reasoning led to the
acceptance of corporations as “persons” under the protection of the law. Carruthers and
Ariovich state: “[n]o society grants full ownership rights to all natural persons, and the rights of
fictive persons often differ across public/private or [for-]profit/non-profit lines.”24 These
distinctions often come through regulations related to use rather than pure ownership. For
example, non-profit agencies are not permitted to use their resources to participate in partisan
politics, but they may engage in politics associated with issues. This leads directly into the
discussion of “what rights exist in ownership?”
Ownership of real property does not necessarily constitute the right to do what one
pleases with a tract of land. There are numerous ways in which the use of property can be and is
actively limited, generally by government. Governments possess the ability to limit the use of
private property because it is that same government that is responsible for protecting private
interest in property. The restrictions of use can be seen as a trade-off of losing some rights in
land while gaining protection of the rights that are permitted. Restrictions on rights in real
property are most commonly seen in the form of municipal zoning laws. The uses of other types
of property can be seen in the example of licensure requirements for operating a motor vehicle.
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Restrictions on how property may be used can also be enacted in the private sector through the
use of restrictive covenants and contractual agreements.25 The main focus of this discussion,
however, is on the questions of how rights are enforced and how rights are transferred, which are
posed by Carruthers and Ariovich in their sociological investigation of property rights.
The process by which rights are enforced by government is a sign of not only the
importance placed on private property by a government but also the strength of the government
itself. Many measures enacted to protect the rights of private property owners are generally
based in policy rather than action. The ability of these policies to protect rights comes from the
perceived legitimacy of the source of those policies, which is the ruling government. When
these public policies weaken, or the perceived governing organization is no longer viewed as a
legitimate authority, property rights are generally one of the first societal creations to be both
questioned and strengthened. The public will commonly see the turmoil of government as an
opportunity to violate the private property rights of the owning classes and the government will
convert crimes that were formerly seen as property crimes into capital crimes, thus increasing the
power of the enforcement mechanism and the subsequent penalty for violating the laws.26
The process of buying or selling a particular piece of ground generally accomplishes the
transfer of rights. Even the transfer of property can be guided through the societal norms of the
area where the transfer is taking place. The example provided by Carruthers and Ariovich is that
of Mexico, and the prohibitions that exist against selling land to people from outside of the
community.27 Article 27 of the 1917 Mexican Constitution directly prohibited manufacturing,
mining, and petroleum companies from “acquiring, holding or administering rural properties” in
favor of traditional community-based land ownership. This prohibition was removed from the
25
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Mexican Constitution in 1992.28 So, while property gains its value from its very marketability,
there are nonetheless restrictions and social factors that can dictate how that marketing can occur
and to whom the property may be sold.29
From an economic perspective, the state takes on the role of allocating resources to
influence the activities of economic actors.30 Part of this allocation of resources is the legal
manipulation of property rights, illustrated less by the manipulation of legal safeguards than by
the exercise of governmental powers that allow property to be taken from its owner to benefit the
public good. Property rights are generally viewed as a relationship between individuals and
commodities, but property rights also dictate relationships between individuals. As is stated by
Campbell and Lindberg, the ownership of property by one person is usually equivalent to the
lack of ownership or control by another.31
According to Weimer and Hoyt, property rights are subject to three main restrictions by
government: taxation, eminent domain, and the police power.32 Of these three restrictions, this
research will focus on eminent domain and its ability to compel the sale of private property to
further the “public good.”
Development of Eminent Domain
The question of how property rights can be transferred is also primary to the question of
eminent domain and any discussion of property rights generally. The concept of eminent domain
as it is presently understood is first mentioned in the American Bill of Rights; however, the basis
for this concept derives from Clause 28 of the Magna Carta which ensure that no movable
28
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properties are to be taken without immediate payment.33 ‘Movable’ property under this meaning
included personal property (i.e. livestock, tools, hats), this did not include real estate. Real
property in England was possessed by the Crown. Those English elites able to attain the status of
‘land owner’ were never truly in possession of this property, but rather they were bound by
continual obligations and annual tributes to the Crown in order to retain their dominion over their
individual estate. Failure to comply with this requirement would have resulted in the loss of the
property that they theoretically ‘owned.’ While the English legal system did not require the
payment for real property under the Magna Carta, by the seventeenth century Parliament would
routinely provide for compensation when land was taken by the government for any purpose. 34
The conception of land ownership changed with the colonization and exploration of the
New World, due to the limitless amount of land found in North America, colonial governments
and settlement companies offered land grant titles in fee simple, which was the most absolute
form of ownership found under the English Common Law. However, while the government was
willing to be more generous insofar is allowing the possession of title to land, the concept of
eminent domain as understood by the English Common Law remained applicable and was
exercised. At this juncture, the power of the governing authority to expropriate privately held
land was not limited to truly ‘public’ purposes, but closely resembled what would today be
referred to as eminent domain for economic development. In addition to the use of this authority
for the development of roads and public buildings, eminent domain was extended in the Colonies
to include takings for the advancement of economic growth; this growth fostered the
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development of private industry but such industries were seen to benefit the community and were
considered a public service.35
While compensation for taken property was considered fundamental at this time, there
was no law to govern these transactions. For example, while the government would provide
compensation if productive land was taken, they would generally not compensate the owner if
the land taken was undeveloped. Ely states that this practice “was not a denial of the
compensation principle” but rather that “[b]ecause land was so plentiful, the colonists felt that
unimproved land was of slight monetary value. Moreover, they reasoned that the advantages of
a highway would more than offset the loss of a small amount of land.”36 As land became more
valuable, this practice ceased and compensation would become the practice regardless of the
actual value of the property taken.
Origins and Application of Eminent Domain in the United States
The validity of eminent domain in the United States is found in the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution, stating in part: “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”37 This was further modified by the fourteenth amendment, which states: “nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”38
These two statements serve as the foundation upon which all modern eminent domain takings are
based. In the United States, it is generally accepted that the government can take property from
an individual to serve a greater public good, but there has never been a definition provided for
what constitutes a ‘public use.’ ‘Public use’ has come to be viewed as protection of the health,
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safety, and welfare of the represented community.39 How those particular standards are assessed
is, for better or for worse, left to the same bodies that decide when and where to exercise the
power of eminent domain. This leaves the action and the justification of the action in the hands
of one or more governmental entities.
Traditionally, the “‘public use’ requirement” of eminent domain is “satisfied whenever
the power of eminent domain ‘is being exercised for a public purpose.’”40 However, there are
two opposing bodies of thought regarding the actual meaning of ‘public use.’ The competing
theories guiding the application of eminent domain are the actual use and public-benefit theories.
The actual use theory requires that all members of the public have access to the taken property in
its final form. For instance, land that is taken to construct a school or other government facility
will be open to the general public when it is completed, in comparison land that is taken for
redevelopment may be used to construct a new apartment complex or convention center, that
would restrict access to only tenants or conventioneers. There are two elements that are usually
weighed to determine if a taking can be described as actual use, the first element of this test is
universal access, and the second is equal access; both elements must be present, in some degree,
to constitute ‘actual use.’ This would mean that all members of the public would have access to
the result of the taking, and no member or group would have more access rights than any other
person or group. It has also been determined by the courts that all members of the public
realizing a non-tangible, but equal benefit from the taking can meet the actual use test.41
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The public-benefit theory of eminent domain requires only that the end result of the
taking benefit “some portion of the pubic.”42 This is a far less stringent standard than the actual
use requirements discussed above, and because “every action of a democratic government is
presumably designed to produce some public good”43 even exercising eminent domain to turn
the property over to another private party would meet the requirement if the goal of the program
would produce some quantifiable public-benefit. In deciding the Kelo case, the United States
Supreme Court reasoned that economic development is a traditional role of government and that
in many cases, “the government’s pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit individual private
parties.”44 It has been long accepted that the public-benefit theory was a legitimate test of the
validity of an eminent domain taking, but Kelo served to make this rule abundantly clear.
Meidinger states in his article The “Public Uses” of Eminent Domain: History and Policy
that the ‘public use’ requirement of eminent domain has been somewhat lost, since through the
years the courts have devised a system of standards that is loose enough to allow any
governmental taking to be justified, while at the same time strict enough for the courts to
occasionally invalidate takings.45 Through the judiciary’s liberal approach to what constitutes a
valid ‘public use’ it would virtually take the direct transfer of property from one private party to
another without any sort of government purpose to have a taking invalidated.46 The view
adopted by the judicial system comes down to the unwillingness of the courts to interfere with
the actions of local governments, since the courts assume that those governmental actors would
have the best knowledge of local affairs. Also, there is the belief that since legislative bodies
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speak for the people in a representative democracy, there is the presupposition that the actions
taken by these bodies will be in the best interest of the community.
Over time, takings have been extended to include not only the physical taking of
property, but also to the loss of economic gains caused by governmental regulation. Regulatory
takings are difficult to define, it is generally accepted that a regulatory taking occurs when the
government “severely restrict[s] the property’s use, they leave the owner in much the same
position”47 as if the government would have seized the actual property.
The government has been fully within its authority to exercise takings for economic
development for many years and it took the United States Supreme Court’s split-opinion in the
case of Kelo to truly bring to light the breadth of eminent domain powers, and the harsh reality
that the only thing standing between the homes of the populace and a shiny new convention
center was the restraint of local governments. For many, the thought of using the power of
eminent domain to spur economic development is reminiscent of the urban renewal schemes of
the 1960s. At that time, entire neighborhoods were declared “blighted” by local governments,
and federal funds were provided to provide just compensation to property owners and the
construction of new housing developments or civic complexes. Urban renewal should not be
seen to equate to the exercise of eminent domain, however, the utilization of eminent domain
was generally found to be an element of attaining the goals of the urban renewal program.
Though the most familiar and generally most documented use of eminent domain is in
urban redevelopment, this practice has a history long before the urban renewal projects of the
1960s. One of the earliest records of using eminent domain to combat urban ills is found in the
case Dingley v. City of Boston (100 Mass. 544), in which the court ruled that the exercise of
eminent domain to remove a public nuisance and preserve public health is within the rights of a
47
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municipality, as long as just compensation is paid for the land taken.48 Another ruling that
empowered the right of government to take land for urban redevelopment is found in New York
City Housing Authority v. Muller (270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153(1936)), in which the court found
that “decreasing the juvenile delinquency, crime, and disease it believed was caused by the slums
to be a broad public benefit satisfying the public use requirement”49 Over the years the public
use test has morphed into the public benefit test, which comes equipped with a more far-reaching
scope of what can be proposed as a public benefit. This practice is what has led up to the ruling
of Kelo and the fallout that is currently being experienced.50
The role of the government in redevelopment was explored more fully by Nancey Green
Leigh. While specifically focusing on the remediation of blight and decline in urban areas, there
are basically two elements that must be met for a government to expropriate ‘blighted’ properties
from its owner in order to initialize redevelopment: (1) state enabling legislation and (2) a
declaration of ‘blight’ status before land is targeted for seizure or redevelopment. 51 Taylor
Ruilova, explores the proposed urban redevelopment plan that has been enacted for the city of
Camden, New Jersey. In that plan, approximately 90% of the city of Camden will be declared to
be a redevelopment zone, and with $175 million in funding, the city is to be transformed, phaseby-phase, into a thriving urban center.52
Eminent Domain in New Orleans
This history of eminent domain exercise is visibly present in the New Orleans area.
During the urban renewal and highway building schemes of the 1950s and 1960s, a portion of
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interstate highway was placed through a previously thriving minority neighborhood and a grand
civic center constructed atop what was deemed to be a ‘slum.’ As was common of that era, the
government associated blight with the presence of low-income minorities, and the areas selected
for ‘renewal’ in New Orleans met just that description (See Appendix 1.1). For example, in
1951, the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) prepared A Preliminary Report Upon
Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment Project U.R. 1-A which detailed the slum conditions
of an urban neighborhood along with the reasons and strategies for clearing the area and
replacing the slum with new public amenities and property for commercial redevelopment.53
Today, the center of this urban renewal scheme contains the New Orleans City Hall, the Orleans
Parish Civil District Court building, a park, and vacant land where a state office building and the
Louisiana Supreme Court stood until demolished in 2009.
There is little academic work on the use of eminent domain in the city of New Orleans.
The majority of the research for this dissertation is from the City Archives and newspaper
accounts of redevelopment projects in New Orleans. It is evident from the existing research that
even those with the ability to exercise it viewed eminent domain as a four-letter word which was
avoided as much as possible during the planning process, as evidenced in the Report Upon Slum
Clearance. In that report, the exercise of eminent domain or any variation of takings was not
mentioned in the document; however, as an appendix to this report there is a table entitled
“Itemized Statement of Values”54 which was used to determine the fair-market value of
properties within the redevelopment zone to allow budgeting of property acquisition costs.
While the government actively tried to avoid the use of this unpopular tool, they have proven
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willing to exercise their eminent domain authority when negotiations failed or were becoming
too time consuming.
Limitations on Eminent Domain in Defense of Property Rights
Louisiana is not the only state to have taken the initiative to limit the effects of the Kelo
decision, but it is the one being focused on as this research explores how eminent domain and
property rights have evolved in New Orleans. Christopher Swope, in his 2006 article for
Governing Magazine, Domain Poisoning, argues the downside of such limitations to the use of
eminent domain. In a specific example that could parallel Post-Katrina New Orleans,
Sacramento, California seized hundreds of housing units in a crime plagued neighborhood,
turned them over to a non-profit agency and brought in a private management company. This
effectively revitalized the neighborhood, but such projects may be banned under Kelo-responsive
legislation adopted in Louisiana. Would this be a legitimate exercise of the ‘public use’ doctrine,
or would this be overstepping the boundaries into economic development?55
The first request for judicial interpretation of the effects of the 2006 Louisiana
constitutional amendments is found in a 2007 expropriation suit filed by the New Orleans
Redevelopment Authority (NORA) against Kittoria Johnson and Joseph Burgess, Jr. The
specifics of this particular case are similar to the many other cases that NORA has brought over
the years. There is no question as to NORA’s ability to seize blighted properties; however, the
ability for NORA to transfer these properties out of their agency for redevelopment is the crux of
the case. Particularly, NORA states that they are unable to find any title insurers willing to insure
the title of NORA-expropriated property because of the unresolved issue of the constitutionality
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of NORA’s transfer – specifically if the resale of the expropriated properties remains
constitutional under the amendments to the Louisiana Constitution.56
The desire to place limitations on the exercise of eminent domain in defense of property
rights is not new. For decades, state legislatures have been drafting laws and state constitutional
amendments that place limitations on how and when eminent domain can be exercised, and for
what purposes. As illustrated by Meidinger, Connecticut, Montana, and North Dakota enacted
limitations to specifically standardize what constitutes a ‘public use’ for the purpose of eminent
domain takings within their states. This was, however, not a prohibition on the exercise of
eminent domain for any specific purpose.57 These pre-existing limitations on the use of eminent
domain specifically address how situations that result in takings should be avoided if at all
possible. Connecticut’s language for the limitation of eminent domain was found in the
proposed Constitution of 1965, which stated in part: “No property shall be taken for public use
unless the taking be necessary for such use.”58 Meidinger states that this type of restrictive
language would require the governmental actors to prove that the proposed project “could not
reasonably be carried out without the condemnation.”59 While this is debatably a good standard
to which to hold governments, the more common, and non-specifically stated, approach to the
exercise of eminent domain is that of convenience, both to the taxpayers and the project. As
stewards of taxpayer dollars, governments commonly search for the most cost-effective means to
an end.
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Methodology and Purpose
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a record of eminent domain in the city of
New Orleans and the evolution of eminent domain as a tool as it relates to planning and
development in New Orleans. This is not only to provide a historical record of eminent domain
in the City, but to observe the exercise of this Constitutional power from urban planning and
public policy perspectives.
This dissertation utilizes mixed methods to develop a case study of eminent domain in
New Orleans between 1929 and 2011, from an urban planning and policy perspective while
analyzing the historical use of takings throughout the city. The qualitative methods of case study
research, historiography, and textual analysis are utilized to chronicle the story of eminent
domain, both from official historical records and through the accounts of these projects found in
the popular press. Quantitative methods will be utilized to evaluate population data for the areas
where eminent domain has occurred in the City, where available. These statistics are intended to
evaluate the locations of exercising eminent domain versus the population that occupied those
areas. Further, the acquisition of individual properties and the method of such acquisition will be
chronicled and evaluated to determine what, if any patterns emerge in the decision to exercise the
government’s expropriation authority.
Research Questions
There are three primary research questions which are explored through mixed research
methods. This methodological approach will allow the research to overlap and thus reinforce the
findings to answer the following research questions.
1) To the extent that the City of New Orleans over the last century has pursued
specific land use policies through the use of its eminent domain power, what
have those policies been?
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2) What particular factors have played a role in the City’s determination as to
which areas were suitable for municipal projects, and specifically, to what
extent was the impact of such projects on the surrounding community a factor
in policy-making?
3) What land use strategies, if any, might have been employed by the City that
would have been effective in accomplishing the same policy goals without the
need for exercising the eminent domain power, and do these strategies present
realistic and viable alternatives today?
Data Sources
The data sources explored in this research are primarily government documents which
were produced in the planning stage of large governmental undertakings. These documents
allow the research to follow the progression of conceptual municipal improvements through the
study and planning stage and to implementation, including land acquisition and the exercise of
eminent domain, when necessary, to fully realize civic priorities. The following sources of data
are sources of key information in this dissertation:


Archived information from the New Orleans City Planning Commission;



Municipal real estate records from the Division of Real Estate & Records;



City Archives from the New Orleans Public Library;



Condemnation Ordinances from the New Orleans City Council;



Legislative records of the State of Louisiana as it relates to eminent domain
powers of local governments;



Newspaper archives (The Times-Picayune, The Gambit Weekly, and older
newspaper records under former titles); and



City-recognized plans prepared by City agencies and outside planners for and in
conjunction with the rebuilding of New Orleans following Hurricane Katrina.
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Operational Definitions
Several terms are used throughout this dissertation which have perceived meanings
beyond what is to be addressed in this document. It is therefore necessary to operationalize key
terms which will be used throughout this chronicle of eminent domain exercises.
Eminent Domain: As used in this context, eminent domain should be understood as any
governmental taking of private property exercised under the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, which states in part: “nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.”60
Taking: ‘Taking’ shall be defined as a governmental exercise of eminent domain which results
in the transfer of privately held property to the government or another entity. A taking is
exercised when a governmental entity condemns private property through expropriation. This is
a more common term for eminent domain.
Public Use: No concise, concrete definition of the term ‘public use’ has ever been generated as
it relates to eminent domain. ‘Public use’ is generally viewed as protection of the health, safety,
and welfare of the represented community.61 There are competing interpretations of the term,
which are broken down into actual use and public benefit,62 both of which will be addressed in
this research. For the purposes of this research, ‘public use’ shall be defined as the purpose for
which any taking occurs.
Actual Use: ‘Actual Use’ requires that all members of the public have access to the taken
property in its final form. There are two elements that are usually weighed to determine if a
taking can be described as actual use, the first element of this test is universal access, and the
second is equal access. This would mean that all members of the public would have access to
60
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the result of the taking, and no member or group would have more access rights than any other
person or group. It has also been determined by the courts that all members of the public
realizing a non-tangible, but equal benefit from the taking can meet the actual use test.63
Public Benefit: ‘Public Benefit’ requires only that the end result of the taking benefit “some
portion of the pubic.”64 This is a far less stringent standard than the actual use requirement
because “every action of a democratic government is presumably designed to produce some
public good.”65 Even exercising eminent domain to turn the property over to another private
party would meet the requirement if the goal of the program would produce some quantifiable
public-benefit.
Research Methods
While this research utilizes mixed research methods, the research is best categorized
under the case study methodology. A case study is defined as a study where the “researcher
explores in depth a program, an event, an activity, a process, or one or more individuals. The
case(s) are bounded by time and activity and researchers collect detailed information using a
variety of data collection procedures over a sustained period of time.”66 While this dissertation
does recognize the application of eminent domain in the recovery of New Orleans from
Hurricane Katrina, the primary focus is on the way eminent domain has been used within the city
of New Orleans in the past. Yin’s description of a case study adds to the reasoning for this
methodology in the subject case. Yin describes a case study as “an empirical inquiry that
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the
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boundaries between the phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.”67 Eminent domain is
understood as the act of taking private property for a public purpose, but generally the context is
not made clear. One of the primary goals of this particular research is to bring together the
takings which have occurred in New Orleans with the policies and governmental goals which
were being furthered by exercise of eminent domain and how eminent domain, as a planning
tool, has evolved over the research period within the context of the city of New Orleans.
This proposed research asks ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions relating to the exercise of
eminent domain in New Orleans. According to Yin, these types of questions are explanatory and
“deal with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than mere frequencies of
incidence.”68 I have conducted this case study to research eminent domain as the land
acquisition tool of last resort, and as such how the decisions were made to exercise this power.
A substantial portion of this dissertation places an eye to the past in evaluating the ‘how’ and
‘why’ questions relating to eminent domain. While case study research is generally utilized in
real-time observations, the same methods may be utilized when looking to historical events. To
do so, the case study begins to co-mingle with historical research. When a case study is being
used to evaluate past events, the researcher generally has more options for information gathering
than using purely a historical methodology. Case studies also entail direct observation and
interviews of the persons involved in the events. A “case study’s unique strength is its ability to
deal with a full variety of evidence – documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations – beyond
what might be available in a conventional historical study.” 69 In particular, the case-study
methodology being proposed for this research falls with in the category of ‘embedded case-study
design,’ in that while eminent domain within the context of development in New Orleans is the
67
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primary purpose of the research, the results of the study will be attained through individualized
study of those cases comprising the evolution and execution of eminent domain within a
specified area. In this particular research, and in reference to Yin’s presentation of case-study
design, the ‘case’ in question is eminent domain in New Orleans, and the means of investigation
is through the analysis of individual cases detailing how, when, why, and for what ultimate
purpose eminent domain has been exercised within New Orleans over the course of the research
period. This embedded methodology contrasts with the alternative, holistic, design in that a
holistic research design would present a global analysis of eminent domain in the city, rather
than allowing a presentation of particular cases.70 By approaching the topic through analysis of
individual exercises of eminent domain, the goal is allowing an comparative analysis to track the
evolution of eminent domain as a tool in both planning and urban development as well as
observing its use and effectiveness as a tool in achieving the goals for which it was exercised.
A key question in case studies and one extraordinarily relevant in this proposed research
is the generalizability of the research findings. Yin proposes that challenges to generalizability
may be countered by studying multiple cases or through generalizing only to theoretical
positions rather than similar situations.71 Conversely, Stake discusses the need for what he terms
‘intrinsic case study’ which specifically addresses case studies which are not conducted with the
end goal of generalizing the results to a greater population. Stake states that intrinsic case
studies are undertaken “not because by studying it we learn about other cases or about some
general problem, but because we need to learn about that particular case.”72 Further, through an
intrinsic case study, the focus is placed on understanding the case being studied and the
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uniqueness of that particular case.73 In the intrinsic case study, there is not a strong argument for
generalizing to a greater population, nor is that position taken in the present research. Stake
allows for what is termed ‘naturalistic generalizations’ where “people can learn much that is
general from a single case.”74 According to Stake, this is “partly because [people] are familiar
with other cases and they add this one in, thus making a slightly new group from which to
generalize, a new opportunity to modify old generalizations.”75 This approach allows the reader
to interpret potential generalizations to their own experiential knowledge and does not require
that the researcher connect all possible points; the value of this approach is that “translation from
experiential language to formal language diminishes and distorts some of the meaning.”76
The professional analysis and interpretation of events or information by the researcher is
crucial to the validity of findings in one’s research. This holds true whether the research is being
done historically or as a case study. According to Stake, case studies rely not only on the analysis
of data but on the professional judgment of the researcher in interpreting the meaning of a
document, situation or singular event.77 Similarly, Howell and Prevenier state that while
historical research is primarily concerned with facts and evidence, there is a level of
interpretation that must be applied to create a historical argument about a document or
documented event.78 History is not a field in which a participant in the event is normally
available for clarification of sources or additional information which may not be included in the
written record.
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From a historical research perspective interpretive, interdisciplinary approaches are a
modern development, in that history is no longer constrained to the facts of an event, but rather
take into account the social and cultural background which led to that which is being
investigated. These approaches have a tendency to blur the lines between pure historical
research and the methods engaged in by the social sciences. The general perception is that the
two distinct fields of research have much to learn from one another, and that by taking elements
of each better research will be produced. From the historical perspective, the reliability of
sources is a key concern, where generalizability is the key concern in more general qualitative
research. The particular research being proposed will benefit by combining historical research
qualities with the more standard repertoire of methods found on the qualitative side of the social
sciences.79
In reference to Creswell’s definition of a case study, which states that a case study is
bounded by time and activity, with detailed information being collected through a variety of data
sources,80 historical research also studies change over time. Howell and Prevenier state that
while not all histories explicitly focus on change over time, even those which focus on a specific
event or moment in history must recognize a change through time because they are “exposing the
distinctiveness of the practices being described and the ways they came into being.”81
While my particular research will focus on the exercise of eminent domain within the
City of New Orleans, multiple embedded cases will be studied and analyzed. Particularly, this
research will focus on the exercise of eminent domain by the governmental actors, including the
City, State and Federal governments, and the policies and goals which were being pursued by
this exercise. Multiple cases within the city will be evaluated, not to reinforce findings of
79
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previous cases but to evaluate differences in governmental priorities, projects, and goals over the
past eighty years. The common element will be the utilization of eminent domain as the land use
tool utilized to acquire the needed property to achieve these goals, and the evolution of the tool
itself within the context of planning in New Orleans. This dissertation also evaluates through
what other mechanisms the government may gain control of property and how ultimately the
eminent domain had to be relied upon to ensure the successful implementation of policies and
achievement of goals.
Institutional Review Board Compliance
In compliance with the policies of the University of New Orleans, as it relates to
institutional review of research, the proposal for this dissertation was submitted to the University
of New Orleans Office of Human Subjects Research for review. This dissertation was been
determined to be exempt from review based on Category 4 of exempt research published by the
Institutional Review Board (IRB), the letter from the IRB granting exemption to this research is
included as Appendix 1.2.
Category 4 serves to exempt research involving the collection or study of existing data,
documents, and records, if these sources are publicly available. In examining uses of eminent
domain in New Orleans over the past century the primary sources of data are newspaper accounts
of the takings and city-generated documents and plans regarding the redevelopment of the
properties and strategies for obtaining the land needed for public improvements. Newspaper
records and historic city documents are generally available through the New Orleans Public
Library. For those documents not available through the library, all necessary planning and policy
documents are considered to be public record which must be made available upon request.82
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Rationale and Significance of Research
The significance of this dissertation is found not in the generalizability of this research to
other cities, but in better understanding the history and evolution of eminent domain within the
context of New Orleans. By better understanding the past uses of eminent domain and the
policies that drove the exercise of this power, researchers and planning practitioners will be
better informed in making decisions that will impact the rebuilding and future development of
New Orleans. This research will not only be able to guide recovery and capital planning in New
Orleans, but should also prove valuable in understanding public sentiment regarding the threat of
eminent domain. The current political climate in New Orleans, Louisiana and the United States
as a whole as it relates to eminent domain begs further investigation into the history and
evolution of the tool and the policies and objectives that have driven the exercise of eminent
domain.
Threats to Validity
The primary threat to validity within the proposed research is researcher bias. This
potential threat comes from two directions: my present employment with the City of New
Orleans and, more generally, my job as a planning practitioner. To compound this threat, I was
employed by the City Planning Commission of New Orleans for approximately one year; and a
portion of this dissertation studies the actions of this agency as it relates to past and potential
uses of eminent domain in New Orleans. While I am no longer employed with the City Planning
Commission, I remain employed by the City of New Orleans in the Department of Safety &
Permits. This position removes the potential of direct conflicts of interest which would arise in
researching the same city agency in which one is employed. However, through employment
with the City of New Orleans, there remains a potential threat to research validity that will be
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Chapter 2
The Municipal Auditorium:
Culture meets Tourism
The Municipal Auditorium undertaking was the result of a confluence of circumstances
in the early Twentieth Century. In 1919 the French Opera House, located in the Vieux Carré,
burned and with that fire the cultural heart of New Orleans was lost. Immediately following the
fire, the community rallied behind the reestablishment of the French Opera House, but there was
disagreement as to whether it should be rebuilt as it was or if the City should invest in a new,
modern auditorium.1 At this same time, chambers of commerce were beginning to develop both
in New Orleans and nationally with an eye towards promotion of cities as destinations which
would serve to increase business opportunities for local merchants and hoteliers. It was
presumably with the aim of civic improvement that the City opted to construct a new auditorium
rather than repairing the French Opera House or constructing a new building in that location. 2
The location selected for the new Municipal Auditorium was across North Rampart Street
from the Vieux Carré adjacent to what is presently known as Congo Square,3 within what has
become Armstrong Park.4 The exact site, chosen following analysis of alternate locations and
several public meetings, was a compromise between neighborhood activists and business
interests.
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Figure 2.1 – Times-Picayune Illustration of proposed Municipal Auditorium site.5

The business community and civic boosters encouraged this location as a boon to North Rampart
Street businesses and as a convenient location for downtown tourists.6 Neighbors and other
activists encouraged the City to find an alternate location to preserve the playground and
swimming pool within the square as public open space.
The Vision
Lyle Saxon, in his book Fabulous New Orleans, summarizes the spirit of New Orleans as
it related to the French Opera House in one simple sentence: “New Orleans went in to mourning
for the French Opera.”7 Saxon reproduces what amounts to the obituary for the French Opera
House which was printed in the Times-Picayune, and reflected the almost familial relationship
that the general public had with the structure, and as a result of this relationship, one can
understand the prolonged debate over if and how the building should be replaced:
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Gone, all gone. The curtain has fallen for the last time upon “Les Huguenots,”
long a favorite with the New Orleans public. The opera house has gone in a blaze
of horror and of glory. There is a pall over the city; eyes are filled with tears and
hearts are heavy. Old memories, tucked away in the dusty cobwebs of forgotten
years, have come out like ghosts to dance in the last ghastly Walpurgis ballet of
flame. The heart of the old French Quarter has stopped beating.8
The French Opera House had remained damaged and derelict following the fire of 1919
and “despite pleas by preservationists, business leaders, and opera lovers, dissention had plagued
all efforts to rebuild the opera house.”9 Ultimately the French Opera House was demolished in
1928 with the blessing of the Vieux Carré Commission and the City of New Orleans to make
way for a new apartment building.10
Discussion of replacing the French Opera House with a modern auditorium began shortly
after the fire and gained momentum through the 1920s, leading to the creation of the Municipal
Auditorium Commission in July, 1927.11 Contrary to the wishes of many in the French and
Creole communities, the City of New Orleans decided to abandon the French Opera House and
the Vieux Carré with the decision to construct a new auditorium. The vision outlined by the City
included opera as just one function of the new space, with the capacity to serve a growing
community. 12
In what appears to have been a letter to the full Commission-Council of New Orleans in
1928, Commissioner of Public Property John Klorer outlined the goals of a new auditorium in a
letter seeking approval to place a bond issue before the voters. The total bond issue was to
amount to $7,500,000, with $2,000,000 of that amount being designated for construction of a
new municipal auditorium. Commissioner Klorer outlined the goals for the new auditorium as
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benefitting business interests while also fulfilling the cultural needs of the community which had
been wanting since the French Opera House burned in 1919.13
As outlined in the bond proposal, the Municipal Auditorium would not only provide a
cultural home for opera and live theatre, but would also create a venue for indoor sporting
events, Mardi Gras balls, community functions, and “political, patriotic, and religious
gatherings.”14 In addition to these civic functions, the new auditorium would be designed and
constructed to accommodate large conventions and trade shows which could not be
accommodated in any existing halls in New Orleans. Commissioner Klorer notes that the
“Tourist and Conventions Bureau of the Association of Commerce will tell you how many
possible large conventions have to be passed up on account of the lack of a sufficiently large
convention hall.”15
In order to offset any community concerns relative to maintenance costs of the
auditorium, the City initially proposed designing the building in a manner that would generate
revenue for the upkeep of the building. The initial proposal would build pedestrian uses into the
first floor of the building, including restaurants, stores and offices, while the basement would be
constructed in a manner as to allow use as a parking garage, “thus ensuring both a convenience
to the public as well as a dependable everyday source of revenue.”16 As this bond proposal was
to move forward prior to the selection of a site for the building, Commissioner Klorer noted that
if land acquisition costs were not excessive, it may also be possible to construct a “combination
Auditorium and Municipal Office building.”17
13
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The Association of Commerce, the predecessor to the New Orleans Chamber of
Commerce, was an avid supporter of the new auditorium. Through the mid-1920s, the
Association’s Civic Bureau established an “Auditorium Committee” to garner support for the
auditorium proposal, the bond issue to fund the idea, and ultimately selection of the site for the
new structure. The Association of Commerce is generally credited with bolstering local pride
while commodifying New Orleans as a tourist destination; the auditorium proposal fit into both
of these categories. It was at this time that the Association of Commerce was initiating
promotional campaigns to develop the tourism sector of the local economy and actively began
working to bring conventions and trade shows to the City. The Association’s promotion of New
Orleans as a tourism center was reinforced by hoteliers and other businesses altering their focus
from being local commercial hubs to providing “sumptuous accommodations to visitors, thereby
providing an added justification for people to travel not out of need but for desire and status
attainment.”18 The plan to construct an auditorium capable of hosting large conventions was
seen as a benefit to the New Orleans business community, with one Association of Commerce
official stating to the Chair of the Municipal Auditorium Commission in February of 1928 that
“if the City could have an auditorium by October 1, 1928, that a convention which would bring
3,000 people over a week’s stay here might have been secured.”19
The debate over the location of the auditorium began even before a final decision was
reached on the question of whether an auditorium would be built. Mr. J. Henry Blache, in a
letter addressed to Mayor O’Keefe dated February 4, 1927, announced that he would be starting
a city-wide campaign to have Congo Square selected as the site for the new auditorium. Mr.
18
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Blache proposed this location for a number of reasons, among them being that the site was of
sufficient size and was owned by the City. More than an argument of economy, Mr. Blache also
proposed the site due to its relative location to the Vieux Carré and the Central Business District,
the location being along one of the main thoroughfares between the City and St. Bernard Parish,
and the location of the Square being “a link out of a chain of present and contemplated civic
improvements extending from the river front through Orleans Street and Orleans Boulevard to
the Lakeshore front.”20 The proposed civic improvements to which Mr. Blache was referring
were the proposed new municipal center which the City’s first adopted plan recommended be
constructed along Orleans Street in the Vieux Carré and extending to the blocks surrounding
Congo Square, in the area generally bounded by Dauphine Street, Dumaine Street, North Liberty
Street and Toulouse Street.21 The Bartholomew Plan recommended construction of this new seat
of government to locate along Orleans Street in recognition of the historic center of City
government being located at the Cabildo on Jackson Square.22
Further, as with many other civic undertakings, the impact on property values was a
driving force in Mr. Blache’s dedication to the use of Congo Square as the home to the
Municipal Auditorium. The selection of this location, it was proffered, would lead to an increase
in property assessments of fifty percent, which would lead to millions of dollars in tax revenues
for the City’s treasury and would also serve to equalize land values downtown of the Central
Business District with the value of uptown property.23
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The Planning
On July 11, 1927, Mayor O’Keefe formed the Municipal Auditorium Commission for the
purpose of crafting the most suitable proposal for the new auditorium, including its location.24
Less than one year after the formation of this Commission, the group presented their
recommendation as to the most suitable location for the new auditorium. The New Orleans Item
reported, on April 11, 1928, that the Commission would be recommending Congo Square as the
site for the new auditorium. While the announcement had not formally been made, the Item,
citing knowledgeable sources, published a story indicating that not only would the Congo
Square site be home to the City’s new auditorium, but it went on to state that “under tentative
plans, Beauregard Square will become the nucleus of a future civic center.”25
This civic center, proposed by Harland Bartholomew and adopted by the City Planning
and Zoning Commission, would consolidate government and city services into a single location
and create a monumental setting for the conduct of governmental business. Bartholomew
advocated the creation of this civic center for a number of reasons: the convenience to citizens,
adherence to the national trend of creating municipal centers, and as “fine municipal advertising
in that it gives to the city’s thousands of visitors and sight-seers an imposing view.”26 In addition
to these intangible benefits, Bartholomew spoke to the ability of the civic center proposal to
increase property values in the designated area:
The property in this neighborhood is not valuable nor in a good state of repair.
The neighborhood has shown little tendency to improve in recent years. It is
believed that the creation of a public building group facing Beauregard Square
and the squares bounded by Rampart, Dauphine, St. Peter and St. ann streets [sic]
would result in an appreciation of property values an in substantial improvements
in the immediate vicinity.27
24
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As evidence of this claim, Bartholomew cited previous Planning and Zoning Commission studies
which predicted the continued expansion of the Central Business District. This expansion of the
commercial core of the city could then be steered in the direction of North Rampart Street to
“stimulate and encourage a high character of building development in a district where it might
otherwise not be expected.”28
Though the Municipal Auditorium Commission took less than one year to select a site,
the length of time was seen as unacceptable to the Association of Commerce. The Chairman of
the Commission was invited to speak at a meeting of the Auditorium Committee of the
Association of Commerce in February of 1928, at which time the Committee members
questioned him as to why the process of selecting a site was taking so long. Mr. H. Generes
Dufor, Chairman of the Municipal Auditorium Commission, explained that the Commission
voted in September of 1927 to hold off on any announcements until Congress acted on the flood
relief bills pending due to the floods of 1927. The Commission did not want the announcement
that New Orleans would be spending $2,000,000 on a new auditorium to derail any possible
flood protection that Congress was contemplating. Mr. Dufor went on to tell the Auditorium
Committee that while no announcements had been made, the Committee had contacted an
architectural consultant to guide them on what type of building they could build with the funds
available and further explained that no site had been selected but assured the Committee that the
Association of Commerce would be consulted prior to a final decision.29
The position of the Municipal Auditorium Commission was unacceptable to the
Association of Commerce, with Committee members calling the “prompt erection of the
auditorium a matter of vital importance” and another stating that he believed that “the business
28
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interests of New Orleans do not take the viewpoint expressed by the Commission.”30 Further,
the Committee stated that any arguments raised by opponents of flood protection for the City
could be countered with other evidence and that even with these concerns, the Commission
should be moving forward with plans for the project without publicity so they could then present
their proposal once Congress acted on flood relief. Mr. Dufor agreed and stated that the
Commission was working surreptitiously, but that the position of the Commission was virtually
unanimous. In response, and perhaps in effort to push the Commission to act, the Association of
Commerce requested that they be allowed to propose a site to the full Commission-Council of
the City separately from the Municipal Auditorium Commission and then let the CommissionCouncil decide on the best location. Mr. Dufor rejected this proposal, but again assured the
Committee that the Association of Commerce would be consulted prior to selection of a final
location.31
The Commission analyzed five sites in depth, with cursory evaluations given to
additional locations. In addition to the site at Congo Square, the Commission also studied: 1) the
location of the Criminal Courts Building at Tulane Avenue and South Saratoga Street (the
present location of the Main Branch of the New Orleans Public Library), 2) the site of the old
turning basin on North Rampart Street, 3) the site of the City Hall Annex on Lafayette Square, 4)
a site on Coliseum Square, and 5) in the yet-to-be-acquired City Park extension. In reporting the
alternative sites, the Item stated that the protests regarding the removal of Congo Square were
heard and evaluated but did not change the Commission’s recommendation.32
The Municipal Auditorium Commission not only evaluated the proposed sites within
New Orleans but also, at personal expense, visited other cities with recently constructed auditoria
30
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to evaluate how these communities decided upon locations and how the selection of those
locations benefited the auditoria and their surrounding communities. Based on these evaluations,
the Commission did formally recommend the Congo Square location to the full Commission
Council, with the recommendation that the replacement playground should be completed prior to
beginning construction of the new auditorium.33 Mayor O’Keefe formally presented the
recommendation of the Municipal Auditorium Commission to the public and the Commission
Council on April 12, 1928 and introduced an ordinance to designate Congo Square as the
location of the new auditorium.34
A public hearing on the selection of Congo Square as the site of the Municipal
Auditorium was called by Mayor O’Keefe for April 24, 1928. The plan, as presented to the
Commission Council and the public was opposed by “the Playground Commission, the Fifth
Ward Civic League, and a number of individuals.”35 According to both municipal records and
newspaper accounts, opposition to the proposal was based on the location of the auditorium, not
on the merits of the auditorium itself; reporting in the New Orleans Item, the New Orleans States,
and the Times-Picayune suggest the City’s construction of a new auditorium was entirely
agreeable with the only points of contention coming in relation to the location of the structure.36
At the April 24, 1928 public hearing on the location of the Municipal Auditorium, the
Times-Picayune reported that during the course of the two-hour hearing, only one proponent of
the Commission-recommended site at Congo Square was present, Mr. Blache; it would later be
revealed, during the property acquisition phase of the project, that Mr. Blache had engaged in
33
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real estate speculation during the site selection process, purchasing a lounge at the corner of St.
Peter Street and St. Claude Street for an inflated price in hopes of profiting from the selection of
Congo Square as the site of the auditorium.37
All other speakers expressed opposition to the proposal, most commonly because the
proposed location of the auditorium would require the removal of a playground. At this hearing,
Mayor O’Keefe assured the opponents that the City would expeditiously work to replace the
playground and stated that the cost for acquiring a new playground would amount to
approximately $200,000. Though the representative of Rampart Street businesses offered to
work with the City to raise the money and assist in any way to create a new playground, the
opponents were not satisfied; their response: if the money can be found to buy land for a new
playground, why can money not be found to purchase a site for the auditorium?
In response to public concern regarding the loss of the Congo Square playground, Mayor
O’Keefe asked the Playground Commission to evaluate sites near Congo Square for the
establishment of a new playground. Specifically, the Mayor recommended the site of the old
turning basin as a new playground, but allowed flexibility to the Playground Commission to
evaluate other locations in the proximity of Congo Square as well. The Playground Commission
presented their report at the April 24 public hearing and concluded that the site of the old turning
basin would be unacceptable as a new playground. Congo Square was, at this time, a playground
for white children and the replacement playground would also be dedicated for use of white
children. The Playground Commission divided the area around Congo Square into four
divisions, with the results of their population analysis as follows, as presented in their report to
Mayor O’Keefe:
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Table 2.1 - Population Analysis for Replacement Playground Location38

Section A
Section B
Section C
Section D

White
Children
5-13 years
12
165
531
1332

White
Children
14-18 years
27
126*
336
795

Total
Whites
39
291
867
2127

Colored
Children
5-13 years
405
150
609
294

Colored
Children
14-18 years
84
87
285
117

Total
Colored
489
237
894
411

* There appears to be a typographical error in reporting this number, 126 is the mathematical difference between the
total white population and the 5-13 age bracket, as reported.

The Sections noted in Table 2.1 (above) are defined as follows:39


Section A: Canal St., St. Peter St., N. Rampart St., and N. Claiborne Ave.



Section B: Canal St., St. Peter St., N. Rampart St., and the Mississippi River.



Section C: St. Peter St., Esplanade Ave., N. Rampart St., and N. Claiborne Ave.



Section D: St. Peter St., Esplanade Ave., N. Rampart St., and the Mississippi River.

Based on the demographics of the four areas, the Playground Commission recommended
creation of the new playground in Section D, if the City decided to move forward with the plan
to construct the new auditorium in Congo Square. The Playground Commission also proposed
two locations which could be purchased and cleared to create the new playground. Site A was
the square bounded by Dauphine, Bourbon, St. Philip and Ursulines Streets; Site B was the
square bounded by Bourbon, Royal, St. Philip and Dumaine Streets. At the time of the
Playground Commission report, the assessed property valuation of Sites A and B was $96,700
and $117,600, respectively, which was presented to give an approximation of the acquisition cost
to the City.40
Notably, another dissenting voice in the public hearing was that of Mr. Charles Favrot,
the Chair of the City’s Planning and Zoning Commission. Again, there was not opposition to the
38
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auditorium itself, but rather to the site selected to house it. Mr. Favrot encouraged the
Commission-Council to place the project on hold until a comprehensive study on the placement
of government buildings could be conducted.41 Specifically, Mr. Favrot noted that the City was
proposing three new buildings at this same time, not just a new auditorium. In addition to the
auditorium, the City was working on selecting a site for a new union rail terminal and a new
Criminal Court building and Mr. Favrot believed that it would be in the City’s interest to have
these new improvements created around a civic center, with additional space to construct more
governmental buildings as the needs arose.42
Mr. Favrot’s position was likely guided, in part, by the Preliminary Report on The
General Problem of Selecting an Auditorium Site submitted to the City Planning and Zoning
Commission by Bartholomew and Associates. In the Preliminary Report, the City’s planning
consultant notes that “[i]n the minds of some, parks are merely open spaces which the
municipality fortunately has saved for building sites;”43 however, “[t]o cover a park area with
such a structure as an auditorium would be a gross violation of one of the basic principles of city
planning”44 and as such the City should not concern itself with discussion of the legality of
conversion of park space into an auditorium site.45
The Playground Commission’s report and the City’s assurances to replace the playground
were not the end of the debate on where this new auditorium should be built. Following the
April 24, 1928 public hearing, the Carrollton Business Men’s Association and the Jefferson
Davis Parkway Civic Improvement Association submitted proposals to the Municipal
41
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Auditorium Commission touting Mid-City as the best location for the new auditorium. The
association proposed two sites in Mid-City, the first being at the intersection of Tulane Avenue
and South Carrollton Avenue and the second being at the intersection of Tulane Avenue and
South Jefferson Davis Parkway. The Associations’ proposals for both locations stressed the
availability of parking and the presence of wide streets to encourage traffic flow. The groups
also noted that the property at Tulane Avenue and South Carrollton Avenue was owned by the
City and had failed to sell though the City had tried to sell it twice.46
At the same time that the City of New Orleans was discussing the placement of their new
auditorium, a legal challenge had been posed to an auditorium proposed by the City of
Shreveport. In a situation virtually identical to the debate raging in New Orleans, The
Shreveport City Council selected an existing public park as the location for a new public
auditorium. The Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in the case of Anderson v. Thomas
in April of 1928, and determined that land acquired and traditionally used as a public park could
not be repurposed as an auditorium site. While the Court concurred with the City of Shreveport
as to their outright ownership of the parcel, this ruling hinged not only on ownership but
traditional use of the space. 47 The Court concluded that
the city acquired this property in its governmental capacity for the declared public
use as a park; that it has been devoted to such use for more than 50 years; that
large sums of the public’s money has been expended upon its improvement as a
park; that under such circumstances it holds said property in trust for the use of
the public; that as long as said property is so used and needed the municipality is
without right to divert it to some other inconsistent public use.48
So, while the Court fully recognized the proposed auditorium itself as a valid public purpose, it
rejected the City’s selection of a parcel that was purchased and used as a public park as a suitable
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location. Particularly, the Court believed that if the erection of the auditorium were not to
completely change the character of the public park, it could be a suitable use; however, in the
instant case, the proposed auditorium would occupy the majority of the space, with the remaining
space being made unsuitable for “seekers after the peace and quiet of a park.”49
Following the Anderson decision, Mayor O’Keefe instructed the City Attorney to research
the acquisition of Congo Square to determine if there were any legal obstacles to the use of the
site for construction of an auditorium. The City stated that they believed the use of the site was
entirely legal, the research was being conducted out of an abundance of caution as legal action
had been threatened to preserve the playground50 in light of the Supreme Court’s decision.51
In what appears to be a draft of the City Attorney’s analysis of the City’s ownership of
Congo Square, the title is traced back to the French and Spanish Crowns in an effort to
distinguish New Orleans’s auditorium proposal from the Shreveport proposal which had been
invalidated by the Louisiana Supreme Court. In effect, the City would have acquired title to the
site of Congo Square through two separate avenues, neither of which would have led to
dedication of the site as a park. A portion of the site is traced back to a French land grant to
Chevelier de Morand in 1756 with subsequent sales leading to the purchase of the site by the
City of New Orleans in 1810 from Claude Treme. The other portion of the site was once
occupied by the Spanish Fort Burgundy. Title to the Spanish portion of the site traveled from the
Spanish Crown to the French Crown and finally to the United States Government in the form of
the Louisiana Purchase. In 1807, Congress authorized the transfer of formerly Royal lands to the
City of New Orleans, at which point the City gained title to the remainder of what became Congo
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Square.52 The City Attorney also concluded through a review of past ordinances relating to the
Square that there had never been a formal dedication of the space as a public park or playground.
While there had been ordinances passed to name the space and a 1916 ordinance to place the
management of the Square under the jurisdiction of the Board of Playground Commissioners “to
be used for playground purposes,” it was determined that none of these ordinances affected a
permanent dedication of the space as a public playground.53
As the City ultimately selected a site adjacent to Congo Square rather than the Square itself
as the location for the Municipal Auditorium, there was not a legal challenge filed to preserve the
park. Therefore, it is unknown if the City would have prevailed based on distinguishing the case
on the basis of the intent of acquisition or if the Court would have held that the Anderson ruling
applied due to the historic and continuous use of the space as a public park even though there
was never a formal declaration or intent to use it as such.
On May 23, 1928, the Times-Picayune ran an article stating that that Municipal Auditorium
Commission remained committed to their recommendation of constructing the new auditorium
on Congo Square and encouraged the Mayor to act on the recommendation so that if legally
challenged, the case could make it through the legal system and construction could begin.
Mayor O’Keefe, yet to receive a recommendation from the City Attorney, simply held the
position that no final decisions had been made. 54
On June 1, 1928, the Association of Commerce’s Auditorium Committee held a joint
meeting with the City’s Municipal Auditorium Commission, at which time the Committee and
the Commission both expressed the sentiment that Congo Square would not be the ideal location
52
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but that with the funds available, the building would have to be located on City-owned property.
The Auditorium Commission believed that if additional funds were made available the City
could purchase a more suitable location for the new auditorium.55
Also on June 1, 1928, at the meeting of the Commission-Council, Mayor O’Keefe
introduced an ordinance to authorize the acquisition, by purchase or expropriation, of the two
municipal squares to the rear of Congo Square. These Squares, designated as Squares 135 and
136, were generally bounded by St. Peter Street, St. Claude Street, St. Ann Street and N. Liberty
Street and were bisected by Orleans Street, which was to be closed as part of the auditorium
proposal.
Figure 2.2 – Mayor O’Keefe’s Proposed Auditorium Site56
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Ordinance 10,607 CCS was adopted on July 31, 1928 and the City immediately began
acquisition of the individual parcels comprising the site. As reported by the Times-Picayune, by
the time the ordinance was introduced by the Mayor, options to purchase had been signed on
most of the parcels but some hold-outs remained and while the announcement and introduction
of the ordinance was a surprise to the general public, the Commission-Council members had
been working on the proposal for weeks. The compromise location allowed Congo Square to
remain in use as a playground while accepting the general recommendation of the Municipal
Auditorium Commission as to the location of the new structure. 57 Following the introduction of
this ordinance, the Association of Commerce contacted the Auditorium Commission to ask why
this was not mentioned at the meeting. According to Mr. Charles Dunbar of the Executive
Committee of the Municipal Auditorium Commission, the Commission “knew absolutely
nothing of the proposed ordinance and was rather astonished that the City authorities should take
such action without consulting the Auditorium Commission.”58
In planning for the auditorium itself, the Auditorium Commission contracted the
architectural services of Favrot and Livaudais for the design of the Municipal Auditorium. The
Commission did not place this contract out to public bid as planned, but rather called a vote
among its members to award the contract to this local firm to expedite the work but also
“because of the great amount of time they have devoted in recent years to civic work without
compensation.”59 Specifically, Mr. Favrot served as chairman of the City’s Planning and Zoning
Commission.
Once contracted, the architects immediately began developing preliminary plans to
present to the Auditorium Commission detailing the space within the new Municipal
57
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Auditorium. The building would be built to seat 10,000 persons and would be dividable into two
separate halls to accommodate different types of uses. One section would seat 3,000 and could
be used as a “theater, ballroom, opera house, or concert auditorium” while the other section
could seat 6,000 and would be “suitable for use for opera, mass meetings, band concerts, public
school exercises and other activities.”60 Approximately 19,000 square feet of the total 25,000
square foot interior of the structure would be within the main exhibition hall, in order to
accommodate large events and conventions that the City was hoping to lure with the
development of this structure.
Figure 2.3 – Architect’s drawing by Favrot and Livaudais of the proposed municipal auditorium,
as published by the Times-Picayune.61

The Land Assembly
The City initially obtained purchase options on many properties within the proposed
footprint in the spring of 1928 prior to forwarding the site to the Commission-Council for
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selection.62 However, following the formal designation of the site, the Auditorium Commission
determined that the City’s purchase options reflected inflated property values which were
unacceptable. Rather than exercise the City’s purchase options, the Auditorium Commission
chose to allow the options to expire at which time they proceeded to attempt to renegotiate lower
prices with property owners, and failing that they were willing to resort to expropriation.63
In total, the City had obtained options on 22 of the 24 parcels comprising the site prior to
making the final site selection; the total value of these parcels was optioned at approximately
$275,000. The Auditorium Commission, the entity that would be responsible for the task of land
assembly, believed that this amount was substantially inflated. In comparing the purchase
options to the existing assessed valuation of the properties found on the City’s tax rolls, it was
found that the “assessed valuation … is only from one-third to one-fourth the amount named in
the options” and in several cases where properties were acquired by their present owners within
the last year or two, “the prices named in the options were three or four times the amount paid
for the parcels by the present owners.”64 According to Leigh Carroll, chairman of the
Auditorium Commission, the reason for this frugality in land acquisition was that “every dollar
paid for private property leaves that much less money for the [auditorium] itself.”65
It was later shown that the Auditorium Commission was wise to attempt to renegotiate
purchase options within the Municipal Auditorium site. As of October 1, 1928, the Commission
reported that new purchase options had been secured on 16 of the 24 properties within the site
and that there were negotiations underway for four more. Of the 16 properties were new options
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were obtained; the City realized a savings of $52,000 by renegotiating the purchase prices. The
initial options on these 16 parcels totaled $127,000 and the new price totaled $75,000.66
According to the records of the City’s Department of Property Management all but two
properties were acquired through negotiated purchase. The full record of property acquisitions,
including Square and Lot numbers, addresses and dates of acquisition, is included as Appendix
2.1. The remaining two properties, identified as Square 135, Lot 5 and Square 136, Lot 9, were
expropriated by the City of New Orleans to assemble the required land for construction of the
auditorium. As the Louisiana Supreme Court had already determined auditoria to be “public
uses” for purposes of exercising eminent domain, these expropriations were shepherded through
the legal system quite quickly.67
While the City’s records indicate the only two properties were acquired through
expropriation proceedings, the Times-Picayune’s reporting indicates that expropriation
proceedings were initiated against the owners of four parcels within the Municipal Auditorium
site. The first expropriation suit was filed with the Civil District Court on September 11, 1928;
suit was filed against William Gomez, the owner of “a vacant lot on St. Peter Street between St.
Claude avenue and Liberty street and of several old houses on Orleans street.”68 Mr. Gomez had
been approached a number of times by the City to negotiate a purchase of the properties but he
refused to engage the City’s advances so the City proceeded to take the necessary steps to
acquire the property through eminent domain.69 Further news reports appear to indicate that this
action was settled prior to trial, though this cannot be confirmed.70
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The second expropriation action filed by the City was against John Albion Saxton, who
owned one lot within the auditorium site. The newspaper reported the property address as 1222
St. Peter Street, but this would have been incorrect as the even-side of St. Peter Street was not
within the project footprint.71 In this case, the City alleged, Mr. Saxon not only refused the
City’s offers to purchase the property but invested in improvements in order to raise the value of
the structure. The city architect inspected the property and determined it to be in such a
dilapidated state that the property must be immediately repaired or demolished. Following this
inspection, the property owner had the property repaired to meet the City’s standards, but the
City’s attorneys maintained that these repairs were made in bad faith and that the City should not
be required to pay for the improvements or the increased property value.72 In this case, prior to
filing expropriation actions, the City made a final offer of $4,200 on this property but the owner
maintained that the true value was $10,000; the jury determined the fair value of this property to
be $5,500. While this was the second suit filed, this matter was the last to be disposed of at the
trial court level.73
The third expropriation suit filed by the City was for the property owned by J. Henry
Blache, who, as was noted previously, was the primary proponent of the Congo Square location
for the auditorium. Mr. Blache purchased the property located at 703 St. Claude Avenue on June
6, 1927 during the City’s evaluation of Congo Square as a potential site for the Municipal
Auditorium. The property was purchased for the inflated price of $18,500, which the City
maintained was more than $7,000 above the assessed valuation and even further above the actual
fair market value of the property. Mr. Blache refused to enter into a private sale with the City
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because they would not offer a price that would allow a profit over the speculative price paid for
the property. The City’s attorney, in the expropriation action filed with Civil District Court,
stated that the “property is needed for the auditorium and the owner must yield the same to the
city at its actual market value” and that Mr. Blache “cannot shift the burden or cost of his unwise
speculation in the property onto the shoulders of the taxpayers.”74
Prior to filing the expropriation suit, the City’s final offer was $16,500; Mr. Blache
maintained that the fair value of the property was approximately $30,000. The Court not only
allowed testimony in the matter, but brought the jurors to inspect the property as part of the trial.
Following testimony and a site inspection, and “after deliberating on the case for a few minutes
the jury recommended that the city expropriate the property for the amount that the owner had
paid for it,” $18,500.75
The fourth, and final, expropriation action filed by the City to fully acquire the Municipal
Auditorium site was filed against Domineque Salvatore, owner of the property addressed as 70913 St. Claude Street and 1214 Orleans Street. In this case, the City was petitioning the Court to
empanel a jury to determine the value of the structure as the parties had been unable to agree on
a fair price.76 The City made a final offer of $9,500 and the Salvatores believed their property to
be worth $25,000. The jury established a value of $14,500 for the property77 which the
Salvatores then appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court; on February 11, 1929, the Court
upheld the valuation set by the trial court.78
The site selected for construction of the Municipal Auditorium required the acquisition of
twenty-four individual parcels. Of these, the City only had to exercise its power of eminent
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domain in four instances. The City worked to avoid having to acquire private property, whether
through expropriation or purchase, but bowed to public pressure to preserve the open space of
Congo Square as a park.
Subsequent to the City’s assembly of land for construction of the auditorium, the
Commission-Council passed ordinance 11,115 CCS, revoking the rights-of-way along Orleans
Street and St. Claude Street where these streets crossed the site for the auditorium, essentially
creating a final, developable piece of land upon which the City’s new auditorium could be
constructed. Construction began in 1929 and the completed Municipal Auditorium was
dedicated on May 30, 1930.79
The Legacy
The Municipal Auditorium, completed in 1930, became a fixture of New Orleans cultural
and recreational life through the remainder of the Twentieth Century.
Figure 2.4 – Postcard depicting the newly constructed Municipal Auditorium80
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Over the course of the decades the structure, as anticipated by Commissioner Klorer in his bond
proposal to the Commission-Council accommodated a multitude of events and uses. Generations
of New Orleanians came to know the Auditorium as the venue of circuses and cultural events,
graduations, and Mardi Gras balls and in the 1990s as a casino and hockey arena.
Harland Bartholomew’s civic center plan, with the Municipal Auditorium as a
centerpiece was abandoned shortly after its adoption, presumably with the onset of the Great
Depression. When the City resurrected the plan for a new City Hall and Civic Center, the grand
plan was retained but the location shifted to the corner of Poydras Street and Loyola Avenue
(discussed in Chapter 4). In the 1960s, the City undertook the creation of a Cultural Center,
which became the site of present-day Armstrong Park (discussed in Chapter 6) with the
Municipal Auditorium as a central fixture in this plan. The Theatre of the Performing Arts was
added to the site and is the only element of the initial Cultural Center plan which came to
fruition.
Figure 2.5 – City Auditorium taken from Rampart St. side – September 9, 1957.81
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While the need, or at least the perceived need, for a new auditorium was readily accepted
in New Orleans in the 1920s, the location of the new building was cause for substantial debate.
Neighborhoods sought the economic boom that was sure to accompany the new auditorium and
the business community was generally open on the location of the auditorium as long as it was
built. What should be noted, and what was absent in the municipal and newspaper records of
this project, is the neighborhood in which the City chose to construct their new multi-million
dollar auditorium. If one refers back to the demographic data presented by the Playground
Commission on the suitability of different areas for a new white-children’s playground, there is a
figure that is somewhat masked. Section “C,” defined as the area generally bounded by St. Peter
St., Esplanade Ave., N. Rampart St., and N. Claiborne Ave. was the area with the highest
number of African-American children, and therefore likely the Section with the highest AfricanAmerican population.82 This Section is where land was taken to clear a development site for the
Municipal Auditorium in order to preserve the adjacent white-children’s playground. It would
be a stretch to place racial motivations on the desire to construct a new auditorium or in the
building of the local economy, but the same is not true of the claim that the leadership of New
Orleans – commercial and governmental – simply did not consider or care about the impact on
this neighborhood.
Ultimately, the location of the Auditorium was chosen based on pressure from North
Rampart Street merchants and others in the business community hoping to profit from the
presence of the new auditorium and the combination of local and convention traffic it would
generate. There are no records to indicate that there was any undue influence levied on the site
selection process by those with a vested interest in the site, numerous individuals proposed sites
and all, according to the official records of the City, were evaluated. However, the most vocal
82
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proponent of the Congo Square location, Mr. J. Henry Blache, was later revealed to have a
personal stake in the selection of Congo Square as the site of the Municipal Auditorium. When
Mayor O’Keefe relented to public pressure and shifted the site to the adjacent occupied
municipal squares, Mr. Blache came very close to losing in his speculative land deal but was able
to convince a jury to award him compensation that would allow him to break even.
The case of Mr. Blache is the only instance where such speculation can be documented,
but it is entirely possible that other properties within close proximity of Congo Square were
purchased during site deliberations in hopes of cashing in on the presence of this new,
municipally-funded tourist attraction.
The construction of the Municipal Auditorium was generally a success in terms of its
stated goals. As was outlined by Commissioner Klorer regarding the bond proposal, the
structure could, and did, house carnival balls and community functions, create a home for opera
and live theatre and accommodate conventions and trade shows; the structure also accomplished
the goals of the Association of Commerce. The Association aimed to make New Orleans a
venue for conventions and tourism and the Municipal Auditorium created that element of the
local economy.
At the beginning of the Twenty-First Century, the Municipal Auditorium was utilized
less for large events due to many other, larger venues being constructed in the intervening
decades, though many Mardi Gras balls and high school graduations continued to call the
structure home. In 2005, the flooding associated with Hurricane Katrina filled the basement of
the building and the structure suffered significant wind damage. The City is yet to repair the
structure or set a course for its future.
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Figure 2.6 – Current Condition of the Municipal Auditorium83
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Chapter 3
Public Housing in New Orleans:
The Transition from Homes to Housing
“The fundamental purpose of all government, whether state or municipal,
is to protect the morals and the health of the people and to provide for their safety.
All governmental activities, complicated as they are, have that simple end in view.”
- Supreme Court of Louisiana, 19381

Public housing in the United States, as it developed in the twentieth century, originated
with the Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937, which for the first time placed responsibility for
public housing within the federal bureaucracy. Prior to this Act, the Public Works
Administration (PWA), a New Deal agency, began to issue loans to limited-dividend
corporations for the construction of low-income housing under the auspices of the National
Industrial Recovery Act. The goal of these loans was to infuse money into the stagnant economy
and provide jobs to the unemployed masses. As a result of this experiment, a federal district
court issued a ruling in 1935 which stated that the federal government’s power of eminent
domain did not include takings to provide public housing or clear slums. 2 While the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that “taking one citizen’s property for the purpose of improving it
and selling or leasing it to another, or for the purpose of reducing unemployment” was not within
the scope of the federal government’s constitutional powers, they acknowledged that this same
action would not necessarily be prohibited to the individual states or their political subdivisions
under their separate constitutions.3 In 1936 a state court in New York held that local
governments were empowered to seize property for slum clearance and public housing. This

1
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ruling led the United States government to encourage local management of such projects and
ultimately paved the way to the model of public housing that was authorized under the WagnerSteagall Housing Act of 1937. 4
While the federal government did not get into the business of public housing until 1937,
consideration of such a program in New Orleans began in the late 1920s following a survey and
subsequent report by Woofter, commissioned by the Institute of Social Justice and Religious
Research, entitled Negro Problems in Cities. The report summarized the living conditions of
African-Americans in cities throughout the country, one of which was New Orleans.5 The
Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO) would later refer to this report in stating that
“crowded and unsanitary conditions and the type of non-weather proof houses in New Orleans
negro slums were large contributing factors in adult and infant mortality in this race of people.”6
No physical progress was made in the development of public housing in New Orleans as a result
of this report, but it did serve to raise awareness of the issue and bring a problem to the fore
which would otherwise have been easily overlooked by those able to make a difference.
This chapter will focus on New Orleans’s adoption of public housing and how the
policies that built HANO were formed, their impacts on the community and the acquisition of the
real estate needed to carry out the vision of the housing reformers that dominated policy debates
in the 1920s and 1930s which subsequently shaped the physical and cultural landscape of the
City for decades more. While the use of HANO’s expropriation powers was minimal in the
development of public housing, it was a matter of choice on the agency’s part, not legal
necessity. The research presented here shows that HANO was fully cognizant of their eminent
4
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6
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domain authority, but were also aware that resorting to use of that authority without exhausting
all possible alternative remedies would be highly unpopular, possibly leading to pushback
against the housing reforms that were seen as necessary for the protection of the health and
safety and New Orleanians.
The Vision
Although the reported findings of the Institute of Social and Religious Research did not
ultimately lead to improved housing conditions, steps were taken following the report that laid
the foundation for the creation of HANO and the development of public housing. In 1929,
Moise Goldstein, a New Orleans architect, submitted preliminary plans and cost estimates to the
Julius Rosenwald Fund for the development of new, improved housing for the African-American
community.7
The plans developed by Mr. Goldstein called for the redevelopment of what was
determined to be the worst African-American neighborhood in the city. This model development
was proposed for the site which would later be occupied by the Magnolia Project (later C. J.
Peete, currently Harmony Oaks). This proposal was submitted to the federal government, but
due to the lack of a clear housing policy at the time, no action was taken on the application;
housing conditions for the lowest-income sector of New Orleans’s population continued to
decline.8
Through a field survey of two blighted areas in New Orleans conducted by the Civil
Works Administration in 1933, the following conditions were revealed: of the 507 structures
surveyed, only 7% were found to be in ‘good’ condition. The remainder broke down as follows:
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45% ‘fair,’ 33% ‘poor,’ and 15% ‘dilapidated.’ Half of all units surveyed had only outdoor
toilets and no other sanitary facilities. The survey also analyzed mortality statistics for these
areas compared to New Orleans as a whole. The study indicated that in 1932, the death rate for
New Orleans as a whole was 16.11 per thousand of population while in these neighborhoods the
rate was 25 per thousand. The tuberculosis mortality rate was two times higher than the rate of
the city as a whole and the syphilis and cancer rates were 40% higher.9
Around this same time, public health officials in the United States began to recognize that
housing conditions are as much a concern to physical health as to social health. In a presentation
to the American Public Health Association, Dr. Charles-Edward Winslow, a Public Health
professor at the Yale School of Medicine, called on the public health community to “not be
satisfied to condemn insanitary tenements” but to make take responsibility “to see that insanitary
tenements are replaced by decent dwellings.”10 This call to action was reinforced by numerous
studies which correlated high disease and mortality rates with poor housing conditions. While it
was understood that those residing in these conditions had little, if any, ability to improve their
housing, this concern for general public health necessitated governmental action to provide safe,
sanitary housing for even the poorest of Americans.11
The next step in the improvement of housing conditions in New Orleans was undertaken
by the New Orleans Council of Social Agencies in 1933. This organization sponsored
applications to the Emergency Relief Administration for the development of two housing
projects in New Orleans, separate developments for African-Americans and for whites. The
Council of Social Agencies again contacted Mr. Moise Goldstein regarding the design of the
9
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proposed African-American housing project, as there was general acceptance of his previous
proposal.12 The firm of Owen and Underwood, local architects, was appointed to create a
proposal for the project for whites, which would be constructed in the Irish Channel area (later
constructed as the St. Thomas Project, currently the site River Gardens, a mixed-income housing
development).13 By April of 1935, the applications for housing had been accepted by the federal
government and the contracts were being prepared when the programs were suspended
indefinitely.14
This setback did not deter these committed members of the community from their pursuit
of adequate and sanitary housing for the underprivileged of New Orleans. During the 1936
Regular Session of the Louisiana Legislature, the state passed a housing act which authorized
any city in Louisiana with a population of greater than 20,000 to establish a municipal housing
authority15 in order to take part in slum clearance activities and construction of replacement
housing, under the sponsorship of the federal government.16 This legislation, Act 275 (House
Bill 480) of the 1936 Regular Session, was projected to allow New Orleans to receive
approximately $3,000,000 in federal funds for slum clearance and public housing.17
Under the provisions of Act 275, a petition signed by twenty-five citizens was presented
to the New Orleans Commission Council on September 18, 1936 requesting the authorization of
a housing authority for the City of New Orleans. At that time, the Commission Council adopted
a resolution to formally create HANO. Although HANO would operate as a separate entity from
municipal government, the language of Act 275 called for local leadership to establish and
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appoint the leadership of housing authorities. In March of 1937, the members of the HANO
Board were appointed by the Mayor and the Authority began operation. The first meeting of the
HANO Board was held on March 18, 1937 and resolutions were adopted to immediately
undertake slum clearance and housing development as authorized by Act 275.18
While the HANO Board and its Chair, Col. L. Kemper Williams, immediately began the
task of working with the federal government to secure funding, no such funds were actually
available.19 All funding for these activities was tied into the Housing Act, which was pending
before Congress for the fifth time in as many sessions.20 While the State of Louisiana and the
City of New Orleans undertook the necessary steps to qualify for federal funding as was
proposed, no more progress could be made in furtherance of the program until action was taken
in Washington, D.C. 21
On September 1, 1937, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed the Wagner-Steagall
Housing Act of 1937 into law22 and within days HANO submitted their applications to the
newly-created United States Housing Authority (USHA), which had yet to be formally organized
or staffed.23 The diligence and expeditious action of HANO paid off for the City of New
Orleans; on March 18, 1938 USHA awarded a loan of $8,411,000 to HANO for the construction
of low-income housing. This award to HANO was the first in the nation awarded under the
Wagner-Steagall Housing Act of 1937. Following this initial award, the USHA subsequently
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awarded HANO approximately $30,000,000 more by the end of 1938 for slum clearance and
housing projects within the city of New Orleans.24
Although the federal funding commitment to New Orleans and HANO was substantial,
there was an ever-present local understanding that public housing would only be utilized until the
private housing sector could fill the demand for housing. Additionally, there was a belief that
public housing would satisfy a temporary need for low-income housing created by the financial
realities of the Great Depression.25 While neither of these would ultimately prove to be the case,
these were popular positions which allowed New Orleans to accept federally-backed slumclearance and public housing dollars at a time when a large percentage of New Orleanians were
living in substandard conditions, and municipal leadership believed that the road to the future
could be paved over the past.
The creation of HANO marked the beginning of the municipal government taking part in
providing housing, but it was not the first step that was taken in trying to improve the conditions
of housing. The City of New Orleans adopted its first building code in 1929, with the goal of
improving housing conditions and ensuring the safety of structures. Prior to this, the City only
concerned itself with larger public concerns of fire hazards and structural stability. Even with
the adoption of a building code, there was no provision built into that ordinance to require
compliance from existing structures and specifically excluded any structure built prior to 1919.
Enforcement of the code was tasked to the City Architect’s office which did not have the staff to
successfully implement the regulations. Adding to the City’s inability to effectively require
improvements to existing properties, the New Orleans Fire Department was not authorized to
enforce local fire ordinances, but rather this authority was retained by the State Fire Marshal,
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which led to lax enforcement and was subject to political interference by state officials.
Additionally, health and sanitation guidelines were generally enforced broadly, such as relating
to preventing outbreaks of disease, rather than as specifically applying to housing conditions.
Not only did this allow substandard housing to remain occupied, but it did not provide any
motivation to improve the conditions.26
The Planning
As previously noted, planning for the implementation of public housing in New Orleans
began almost a decade before there was a mechanism in place to fund such an endeavor.
Through the late 1920s and through the 1930s, plans were crafted and refined in anticipation of
federal dollars being made available to improve the housing conditions in low-income sections
of the city.
The first housing survey of New Orleans was presented by Woofter in 1928 through the
report commissioned by the Institute for Social and Religious Research (ISRR) as a part of a
national study. For this survey, the Institute’s researchers partnered with local housing advocates
to survey the conditions of African-American neighborhoods and to gain information about the
occupants thereof. Figure 3.1 (below) illustrates the areas of New Orleans classified as AfricanAmerican neighborhoods for survey purposes.
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Figure 3.1 – Distribution of African-Americans within New Orleans as of 1925.27

The results of this survey revealed that living conditions for poor African-Americans in
New Orleans in this era fell far short of the standards set forth by public health professionals as
requirements for healthy communities. Excess density of population and overcrowding within
dwellings were two key elements targeted by early housing advocates as emblematic of the
problems facing African-American communities. Table 3.1 (below) indicates the population
density of New Orleans in 1925.
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Table 3.1 – Density of Population in New Orleans, 1925 (with densities of African-American
neighborhoods broken down by Ward) 28
Ward
White
African-American
Population Net Residence Density Population
Net
Density per
Area (Acres)
per Acre
Residence
Acre
Area (Acres)
304,700
22,038
14
109,380
3,671
30
1, 2, 10,
38,700
845
46
11, 12
Lower
6,800
180
38
1 & 10
7
11,500
298
39
4, 5, 6
18,500
576
32
Upper
3,230
115
28
14 & 16
Lower 16
1,750
72
24
3
9,800
427
23
Lower
5,400
255
21
12 & 13
Algiers
4,700
355
13
17
3,800
317
12
Industrial
3,300
327
10
Canal
As seen here, and reported by ISRR, the density of the average, primarily African-American
neighborhood in New Orleans was more than twice that of white neighborhoods.29 The findings
presented for New Orleans appeared to have been within the density standard of approximately
thirty-five persons per acre set forth by the U.S. Housing Corporation at the time. Though the
numbers were within these limitations they were presented as being out of character for the
community as a whole and therefore substandard.30
The standard by which ‘overcrowding’ was measured was an occupancy of two or more
persons per room within a dwelling. In their 1925 survey of New Orleans, ISRR found that
16.5% of all African-American dwelling units exceeded this standard. In some instances, this
28
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overcrowding was found to be attributable to the presence of lodgers who were taken in as
tenants to off-set some of the costs of living; in New Orleans it was found that 6% of AfricanAmerican families had lodgers present at the time of the ISRR survey.31
By the early part of the 1930s, little was officially known of the physical housing
conditions in New Orleans, except “that the amount of bad housing there is considerable.”32 In
the 1933 survey of blighted areas conducted by the Civil Works Administration, almost half of
all dwelling units were classified as being in poor or dilapidated condition. Further, the property
survey indicated a “prevalence of small dark rooms, inadequately lighted and ventilated
[structures], and of tenement and alley buildings ‘without sanitary facilities which lead to right
living’” as factors which led to higher incidences of illness and death within these communities
than in the city as a whole. Additional factors used to determine the conditions of housing, and
the resultant percentages of the study are indicated below:
Table 3.2 Condition of Living Units33
Nature of Fault
Leaking roof
Leaking plumbing
Unsafe walls
Unsafe floors

Percent
of Total
13.85
4.39
16.22
18.92

Nature of Fault
Unsafe stairs
Broken windows
Poor drainage in yard

Percent
of Total
10.47
22.64
22.97

This general understanding of the prevalence of ‘bad housing’ in New Orleans was reinforced by
HANO’s own later findings. Data presented in 1938 by HANO indicated that there were a total
of 55,170 substandard dwelling units prior to any slum clearance activities, the total number of
dwelling units in the city at that time was 135,780; this means that in 1937, approximately 41%
of all dwelling units were considered substandard. To put this statistic in terms of individuals,
these 55,170 dwelling units were occupied by approximately 72,000 families (or approximately
31
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225,000 individuals).34 In the 1930 Census, the population of New Orleans was tabulated as
458,762.35 These numbers indicate that approximately half of the city’s population resided in
housing that was considered to be substandard.
In the first annual report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans, HANO released
summary of the findings which led to their selection of sites to be cleared and redeveloped with
public housing. The proposed sites were generally located as follows:36


Project LA-1-1 (St. Thomas): Generally bounded by St. Thomas
Street, Josephine Street, Laurel Street and Felicity Street. (For white
occupancy.)



Project LA-1-2 (Magnolia): Generally bounded by Magnolia Street,
Washington Avenue, La Salle Street, and Louisiana Avenue. (For
African-American occupancy.)



Project LA-1-3 (Iberville): Generally bounded by North Robertson
Street, St. Louis Street, North Saratoga Street, and Iberville Street.
(For white occupancy.)



Project LA-1-4 (not constructed): Generally bounded by North
Claiborne Avenue, St. Philip Street, St. Claude Street, and Orleans
Street. (For white occupancy.)



Project LA-1-5 (Lafitte): Generally bounded by North Rocheblave
Street, Orleans Street, North Claiborne Avenue, and Lafitte Street.
(For African-American occupancy.)



Project LA-1-6 (not constructed): Generally bounded by North
Rocheblave Street, Dumaine Street, North Roman Street, and
Orleans Street. (For African-American occupancy.)



Project LA-1-7 (Calliope): Generally bounded by South Claiborne
Avenue, Calliope Street, South Broad Street, and Erato Street. (For
African-American occupancy.)

34
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Project LA-1-8 (not constructed at proposed location): Generally
bounded by North Galvez Street, Press Street, Louisa Street, and
Florida Walk.37 (For white occupancy.)



Project LA-1-9 (not constructed): Generally bounded by South
Saratoga Street, Poydras Street, and Tulane Avenue.38 (For white
occupancy.)

Projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 were those first proposed by HANO and ultimately the first
redevelopment projects in the nation authorized under the Housing Act of 1937. These proposals
were crafted prior to the creation of HANO or the passage of enabling legislation and had been
designed since 1934 through funding by the New Orleans Council of Social Agencies, as
previously discussed. The remaining sites were selected by HANO through subsequent real
estate and housing surveys of New Orleans.
In 1938, a survey was conducted which focused on the areas later refined into Projects
LA-1-3 and LA-1-5; this survey was sponsored by the Works Progress Administration and
partially funded by HANO and the City’s Department of Public Welfare. Sites for LA-1-7 and
LA-1-8 were determined due to their primarily vacant character rather than the presence of
blight. This was done to try to create the federally-mandated balance of housing units
demolished to housing units constructed.
To document the conditions at the proposed sites, HANO released a summary of their
housing condition surveys, indicating the interior conditions found within each project area. This
data is reproduced in Table 3.3 (below). This data does not reflect the physical condition of the
structures, but referring back to Table 3.2, partial information is available for Project Areas LA1-1 and LA-1-2.
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No. of units
surveyed

Cold Water Only

No lighting
facilities

No heating
arrangements

Major repairs
needed

Unfit for use

Indoor shared
toilets

Outdoor shared
toilets

Stove only in
kitchen

Sink only in
kitchen

No stove or sink

No bathing
facilities

Table 3.3 – Structural Condition Tabulation of Tenant Relocation Department Survey39

LA-1-1
LA-1-2
LA-1-3
LA-1-5
LA-1-7

513

451

183

116

129

41

37

78

92

1

42

207

869

854

471

168

309

70

127

311

226

31

116

454

723

714

485

168

364

101

196

341

329

5

229

476

567

532

172

171

141

40

27

81

138

2

27

220

25

25

8

2

3

2

0

2

0

0

0

10

LA-1-8

67

64

35

33

32

9

0

1

40

1

1

62

2764

2640

1354

658

978

263

387

814

925

40

415

1429

Project
Number

While this data provides only a snapshot of dwellings located within the project
boundaries, HANO officials believed that these findings were applicable to the conditions which
would be found throughout the city in structures deemed ‘substandard.’ These findings were
summarized in the statement that “there is on every hand desolation, despair, squalor, poverty,
frustration – the whole sordid and dangerous group of sinister elements that form the component
parts of a slum.”40 Figures 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, below, are composite photographs presented by
HANO in their Annual Reports to illustrate the conditions of structures within the boundaries of
the proposed project sites.
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Figure 3.2 – Composite photograph of existing conditions within the LA-1-2 site.41

Figure 3.3 – Composite photograph of existing conditions within the LA-1-3 site. 42

41
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Figure 3.4 – Composite photograph of existing conditions within the LA-1-5 site. 43

HANO outlined their site selection guidelines both in terms of the benefit that would
ultimately occur through the construction of housing and the benefits to be realized through the
removal of substandard and slum housing. Specifically, since HANO understood its mission to
be two-fold: HANO officials intentionally selected sites that would allow for the removal of a
large number of slum properties while simultaneously providing the services and amenities that
were viewed as beneficial to future tenants.
In selecting project locations, HANO also considered the accessibility of transportation,
proximity to schools, recreational and community resources, and availability of medical services.
According to HANO, attention was also paid to the City’s plan for future development.
Particularly, they looked at where investments were proposed for playgrounds and street
improvements so that they could adequately plan their housing developments to “harmonize with

43
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these other developments.”44 While cost of property acquisition was not officially reported by
HANO as a factor in the site selection process, it is logical to conclude that since their focus was
on removing the worst slum conditions in the City these areas would have likely been the some
of the lowest priced tracts of land that met the criteria of being integrated into the larger
community insofar as schools, transportation, and other resources.
In retrospect, another element likely factored into the site selection process was the
possibility of public opposition. Certainly the sites proposed by HANO for redevelopment
would have met their stated criteria, but there was likely an eye to public relations in the site
selection. Only Projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 were located in densely populated neighborhoods.
The subsequent projects moved to less densely developed areas; Thayer (1979) notes that
“Iberville (LA-1-3) and Lafitte (LA-1-5) replaced the dead “Storyville” area which had before
their construction been a wasteland of sorts” and that “Calliope (LA-1-7) was on vacant land
near an industrial area;”45 while St. Bernard (LA-1-8) was a considerable distance from the
center of the city and was disconnected from the adjoining neighborhoods by rail lines.
Additionally, the St. Bernard site was owned by an investment company that was holding vacant,
fringe property for future development; Thayer (1979) states that the construction of the St.
Bernard development on this tract was to bail out investors that had been unable to otherwise sell
off the site. Whether accurate or not, the selection of this location for development of a housing
project brought at least the appearance of impropriety into the HANO site selection process.46
In addition to the unclear site selection policies employed by HANO, it also appears that
their operational policies evolved over time. Projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 were constructed on
land cleared specifically for that purpose. This caused the city’s housing crisis to be magnified
44
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since those least able to find decent housing were made homeless while new housing was
constructed. This problem seems to have also factored into HANO’s site selection process. As
discussed above, as these redevelopment projects progressed, HANO moved to less populated
areas for the construction of public housing. This would have likely had as much to do with the
availability of underdeveloped or undeveloped land as it had to do with minimizing displacement
of those who needed assistance the most. This policy led to the construction of new housing on
available tracts and subsequent demolitions of slum housing in other areas to meet the Housing
Act’s requirement of an equal number of dwellings demolished as created.47
Within the developments, the proposed changes could not have been more dramatic;
replacing the dense, substandard housing detailed above would be large, modern apartment
buildings. While the sizes of the structures and individual units would vary, the elements of the
living units would be uniform. Each unit would be equipped with the conveniences of modern
life: gas ranges and heaters, electric refrigerators, bath tubs, and laundry sinks. The sites would
be designed with structures covering approximately 25% of the total site area to allow an
“abundance of fresh air and sunshine.”48 While each site was individually designed, the general
concept for all of the proposed project sites was similar. Figures 3.5 and 3.6, below, illustrate
HANO’s vision for public housing for two of the redevelopment sites.
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Figure 3.5 – Proposed layout, in perspective, for Project LA-1-2.49

Figure 3.6 – Proposed layout, in perspective, for Project LA-1-7.50

Though, as the Times-Picayune indicated, there was general agreement as to the necessity
of these projects, both in terms of the jobs to be created by construction and the housing itself,
actually beginning the projects proved to be a difficult task. According to a Times-Picayune
editorial on September 6, 1938, HANO was facing issues with acquiring the land necessary to
begin clearance and subsequent construction. Despite the fact that HANO was the first local
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housing authority in the nation to receive a commitment of federal funds, there were 78 projects
in other communities which were either complete or under construction before HANO had even
completed site acquisition to begin the proposed redevelopment.51
The impact of these undertakings, according to HANO, was substantial. According to the
HANO 1939 Annual Report, expenditures for the several projects through the end of 1939
totaled $2,654,119.95 in land acquisition, $674,970.52 in wages, and $1,106,064.20 in materials.
These dollars would then flow back into the local, regional, and national economies in the form
of new jobs and increased salaries in associated industries. HANO also believed that the benefits
accrued by these projects were not only economic, but that “the benefits to future tenants of these
homes cannot be measured in dollars and cents as human misery and discomfort cannot be so
measured.”52 However, in an attempt to quantify human misery, HANO noted that the decreases
in juvenile delinquency and infant mortality in addition to generally improved health in these
areas would “result in savings to the city far in excess of the amounts that would have been
received in taxes on the property occupied by the projects when privately owned.”53
The Land Assembly
In their 1938 Annual Report, HANO noted that “[b]y the end of January, 1938 the firm of
Ernest A. Carrere’s Sons reported that 45% of the necessary property in the white area (Project
LA-1-1) and 47% of the necessary property in the Negro area (Project LA-1-2) had been covered
by options.” Early in the planning process, HANO began contemplating the best course of action
for the acquisition of the property required for their proposed slum clearance and redevelopment
projects. This led to the appointment of a real estate firm (Ernest A. Carrere’s Sons) to begin
gathering signed purchase options on properties within the two targeted areas in late 1937.
51
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According to HANO, the policy pursued in the acquisition of property was one of “equity
and fairness.”54 To that end, HANO hired a team of real estate professionals to individually
appraise every property within the sites selected for redevelopment. These appraisals were then
forwarded to USHA for review and independent analysis. Once the property values were
established under this mechanism, HANO’s real estate team would then work with the individual
property owners to obtain purchase options on the properties.55
The specific demographics of the property owners and residents within these areas is
unknown; however, based on the data presented by Woofter (1928), both areas to be occupied by
these new housing developments were predominantly occupied by African-Americans. Figures
3.6 and 3.7, below, present Woofter’s population distribution and density maps with the
locations of the St. Thomas and Magnolia housing developments indicated.
Figure 3.7 – Distribution of African-Americans within New Orleans as of 1925, with general
locations of St. Thomas (red) and Magnolia (green) Housing Developments indicated.56
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Figure 3.8 – Population Density of African-Americans within New Orleans as of 1925, with
general locations of St. Thomas (red) and Magnolia (green) Housing Developments indicated.57

It should be noted that based on these population density maps the locations selected for
establishment of the first two housing projects served to reinforce racial separations within New
Orleans. The location of the Magnolia development in the Central City neighborhood (indicated
in green, above) placed the African-American housing development within a concentrated
African-American neighborhood while the St. Thomas site would have the effect of removing a
growing African-American population from an otherwise predominantly white area of the
community (indicated in red, above). The official records of HANO do not reflect that racial
homogeneity outside of their immediate developments was intended or anticipated, but it is
reasonable to assert that it would have been more popular to propose housing for whites in an
otherwise white neighborhood than to propose publicly-funded integration of a community.
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This appraisal process worked well at the onset of the project, according to HANO, but
by the autumn of 1938 some property owners began demanding higher prices for their properties
than HANO would be able to pay. The belief at the time was that due to properties being taken
for use as housing projects, the government should be willing to pay a premium for the required
land. HANO immediately went on the offensive against this position and stated that if the
properties could not be acquired at a price that HANO deemed reasonable, they would have to
look to other sites for redevelopment. While HANO would have been within their statutory
authority to seek title to the required properties through expropriation, they appeared to be
unwilling to take that route so early on in the redevelopment process. Instead, they coordinated a
public relations attack with the Times-Picayune; according to HANO, “[t]he newspapers assisted
the Authority in moulding (sic) public opinion upon the issue, pointing out the grave civic risk
being incurred by some scattered instances of unreasonable selfishness on the part of a few
owners.”58
One must assume that the prices HANO and USHA arrived at would have been fair based
on the local appraisals and subsequent independent review, but it appears that the demands made
by property owners was, at least in some instances, about more than greed. The Times-Picayune
ran an article entitled “Owners Protest Prices Proposed in Housing Area: Business Proprietors
Say Appraisal Left Out Good Will Item,” which outlined the objections of business owners
within the housing project sites. According to this article, these individuals believed that not
only were the prices offered for the actual real estate unacceptable, but that their businesses
would suffer from having to leave a neighborhood where they were known, and reestablish in a
new neighborhood. As one business owner stated: “[w]e are perfectly willing to sell our
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properties and look for new business locations, if necessary even going into new territories in the
city, if the housing authority pays us what we think our present locations are worth.”59
While HANO initially planned to acquire all property through negotiated purchases, they
were aware that doing so might not have ultimately proved successful. To prepare for an
eventual exercise of eminent domain, HANO requested that the State Attorney General initiate
legal proceedings that would allow the courts to determine if the exercise of eminent domain for
the purpose of slum clearance and redevelopment as public housing would be constitutionally
permissible. The case progressed through the courts during 1938, and the Louisiana Supreme
Court ultimately ruled that both slum clearance and public housing were public purposes for
which eminent domain may be exercised.60
The final resolution of the Attorney General’s suit was rendered on September 28, 1938,
and by this point HANO had come to believe that most, if not all, properties within project sites
LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 whose purchase could be negotiated had been. The October 23, 1938
edition of the Times-Picayune announced that HANO would begin filing expropriation suits
within days in order to complete land acquisition on those sites so that redevelopment could
begin. By announcing the pending legal action via letter to property owners and subsequently in
the press, HANO’s legal department was of the “opinion that some of the remaining holdouts,
particularly those cases where the margin of difference between their price and the offer of the
authority is slight, will come to agreement before the institution of court action.”61
Apparently the legal department’s belief was correct. HANO announced in their 1938
Annual Report that through initiation of condemnation proceedings, property owners who had
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been holding out for higher prices were ‘induced’ to sign purchase options without legal
proceedings.62
While later academic research indicates that approximately half of the required property
for Project LA-1-1 and all of the property for Project LA-1-2 were acquired through eminent
domain, it is unclear where these findings originate.63 Unfortunately for this investigation, the
property transfer records for these sites have not been retained by the Real Estate and Records
Division of the Department of Property Management for the City of New Orleans. HANO’s
early Annual Reports indicate that the agency had to resort to expropriation “[i]n a few cases –
but none of an extreme character – [when] the Authority and the property owners failed to agree
upon valuation.”64
This pattern of primarily negotiated purchases with occasional expropriations appears to
be supported by the reporting of the Times-Picayune. On October 23, 1938 the Times-Picayune
published an article entitled “Expropriation of Sites in Low-Rent Project Area to Begin.” In this
article, the newspaper reported that HANO was preparing to file its first round of expropriation
suits for property acquisition within the Project LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 areas;65 five days later, on
October 28, 1938, the newspaper published a second story, announcing that HANO had filed a
second round of expropriation suits for an additional three properties within the Project LA-1-2
site.66
While the reporting of the Times-Picayune cannot be expected to chronicle every
expropriation proceeding initiated in the furtherance of these projects, its reporting does provide
that the following properties were taken via judicial ruling rather than by negotiated purchase:
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Project LA-1-167
o 801 St. Andrew Street



Project LA-1-268
o 3317 South Robertson Street
o 3323 South Robertson Street
o 2606 Belmont Place

Through an analysis of print journalism of the era and HANO’s self-reporting, it is clear that
expropriation was not a desired route in property acquisition for the furtherance of public
housing in New Orleans, and was viewed as a necessary step in completing land assembly for
slum clearance so that the larger project of housing poor families could move forward. For the
purpose of this dissertation, the review of newspaper reports was limited to expropriations for
Projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 due to two considerations: the first being that these were the first
two sites developed and acquired by HANO for slum clearance and public housing; the second
being that these were the most densely populated areas of the sites to be redeveloped.
By January 19, 1939, the Times-Picayune announced that HANO would begin title
transfers for properties within the Project LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 areas. At this time HANO had
obtained purchase options on all negotiated purchases and final judgments had been rendered in
the few cases where expropriation suits had to be prosecuted. The total cost for property
acquisitions within the two sites was reported to be $1,750,000 paid to approximately 400
individual property owners for 1,300 dwellings.69 Table 3.4 (below) reflects HANO’s property
acquisition costs through the end of 1939 for projects LA-1-1 and LA-1-2 as well as the other
three active projects which were under development at the time.
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Table 3.4: Total Site Area and Land Acquisition Costs for Projects as of December 31, 1939.70
Average cost
Total
Total
Average
Total square
Total cost
per square
parcels
squares
cost per
footage of area
for area
foot in 2012
in area
in area
square foot
dollars71
LA-1-1

237

13

1,226,979

$1,046,239

$0.853

$14.05

LA-1-2

152

11

774,728

$878,574

$1.134

$18.69

LA-1-3

192

11

760,484

$906,460*

$1.247*

$19.65

LA-1-5

260

16

939,987

$760,783*

$0.882*

$13.34

LA-1-7

27

14

1,220,472

$170,000

$0.139

$2.30

* Site acquisition was not complete for these Projects as of December 31, 1939. Data presented is the amount of
total signed purchase options and resultant average cost per square foot as of this date.

The Legacy
Though this chapter only discusses the planning and implementation of the first several
housing projects constructed by HANO, it is important to note that New Orleans’s experiment in
public housing did not end with the close of the Great Depression or Second World War.
Through the late 1940s into the 1960s HANO, with the backing of federal dollars provided under
the Housing Act of 1949, continued to grow. This growth was in the number of projects, the
number of buildings within individual projects, and percentage of the New Orleans population
residing in public housing.
The Housing Act of 1949 altered the financing scheme for public housing throughout the
country and the aim was to “remedy the observed defects of earlier housing laws and to provide
new opportunities to address the housing issue.”72 What this meant to New Orleans specifically
was that approximately $18,000,000 would be flowing to the city through HANO for slum
clearance and redevelopment. The initial plan announced by HANO for use of this funding was
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to acquire and clear slum properties which would then be sold to the private sector for
redevelopment, with initial focus on the “fringes of the civic center site.”73 This plan would later
be abandoned after the Louisiana Legislature modified urban renewal enabling statutes in 1954.
Following this modification, HANO would be prohibited from expropriating private property
and transferring or leasing it to a third party for redevelopment (see further discussion of
Louisiana’s limitations on urban renewal in Chapter 6).
In addition to this funding, the Housing Act of 1949 allocated additional dollars for use in
the expansion of traditional public housing. As under the Housing Act of 1937, HANO was the
first local housing authority in the nation to be awarded funds under this section of the Housing
Act of 1949. Upon receipt of these funds, HANO announced that 5,000 units would be added to
their inventory across the five existing housing developments, and that “[i]n each instance …,
new construction will commence opposite an existing project or on an open space within it, so in
effect, five projects will be increased in size.”74 Thayer (1979) notes that this announcement
appears to have been met with no public debate as to how this would impact either conditions
within the existing housing projects or the surrounding areas; the housing projects were initially
designed to provide ample open space, as the density of development was seen as one of the
urban ills that would be remedied through slum clearance. However, due to changes in
conditions, it had become necessary to increase the density of developments without expanding
public housing into new locations.75
As time progressed, HANO developed additional public housing projects; Fisher, Florida,
Desire, and Guste were built in the late 1950s into the early 1960s to address the ever-increasing
demand for publicly assisted housing in New Orleans. The demand was so great that, upon
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completion in 1956, the 1,860-unit Desire development was inundated with approximately 4,000
applications for housing. What is important to note is that the Desire development was built in a
difficult to access industrial area with little to offer in the way of community amenities.76
By the 1970s, New Orleans had the most public housing units per capita of all American
cities, and HANO, as an agency, was financially struggling.77 In 1979 the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) began to evaluate the performance of housing
authorities nationwide based on specified performance indicators and contractual obligations
under the Housing Acts under which financing was provided for public housing construction.
Beginning with the first survey in 1979, HANO was designated as “troubled” by HUD. By
1994, HANO was ranked “as the worst performing large housing authority” in the nation.78
Finally, in February of 1996, the Secretary of HUD declared that HANO was in breach of its
contract with the federal government. As a result of this breach, the HANO Board was dissolved
and HUD appointed a federal administrator to oversee the operations of HANO.79 The HANO
Board has not been reestablished and the agency remains under federal oversight as of the
writing of this dissertation.
The legacy of HANO on the physical landscape of New Orleans remains present to this
day. Nearly all sites acquired for the establishment of public housing remain in use for that
purpose; however the original physical improvements have been replaced at nearly every site.
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Figure 3.9 – “Legacy Buildings” at River Garden (St. Thomas).80

All of the original sites, with the exception of Project LA-1-3 (the Iberville Development), have
been redeveloped in recent years to alleviate what had become superblocks of poverty. In the
place of the original housing projects, HANO has sold the property to private developers for
construction of mixed-use, mixed-income communities. The only location of the first six sites
where HANO’s original, lauded improvements remain is at the Iberville Development, though
this site will soon be cleared to make way for redevelopment, which will comprise fewer
dwelling units and would employ a mixed-income occupancy policy which would result in a
substantial loss of dwelling units for poor residents.
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Figure 3.10 – Mixed-Occupancy, Mixed-Income Structure at River Garden81

These projects, by and large, restored the traditional urban street-grid of the city while attempting
to recreate the historic architectural fabric of New Orleans. HANO has now functionally
evolved into a clearinghouse for public housing assistance rather than a large-scale provider of
housing, though several of the projects developed in the 1950s and 1960s remain under direct
control by HANO.
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Chapter 4
The New Orleans Civic Center:
Making a Modern City
“Ladies and gentlemen: We are dedicating more than a structure. I believe that in
meeting here we are rededicating ourselves to the upholding of an honored task – the
building of a greater community for ourselves and for our children.”
- Mayor de Lesseps S. Morrison, 19571

The Civic Center project symbolizes New Orleans’s introduction to what would become
known as Urban Renewal, and began before the concept was brought into fashion with the
Housing Act of 1949. The City’s Planning Director, Brooke Duncan, had been pitching the idea
of a Civic Center to the Maestri administration, but the Mayor had not warmed to the idea.
Following the election of deLesseps S. Morrison, his Administration seized the Civic Center
proposal as an opportunity to both modernize city government and construct a legacy, and
immediate action was taken to begin assembling the necessary real estate.2 Bauman notes that
during World War II, American civic leaders were enamored with the image of a “deslummed,
beautiful… city,”3 with this vision culminating in the Housing Act of 1949. Blight was
commonly viewed as a cancer on urban environments with the only treatment found in the form
of planning and urban revitalization.
This diagnosis did not escape Mayor Morrison. Upon assuming office in 1946, Morrison
urged increased city planning and announced that the clearance of slums would begin in order to
address the City’s housing shortage. Morrison’s newly named director of housing, Robert
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Morrow, stated that by his estimation, the City was facing a housing shortage amounting to
15,000 units. In response, the Mayor presented a plan to create 18,000 units of low-rent housing.
This specific endeavor did not come to fruition, and Morrison began exploring other physical
changes that would show progress towards the creation of a modern New Orleans.4
The Vision
The Civic Center, a centralized home for City government, was adopted as the physical
embodiment of the changes proposed by Mayor Morrison in his defeat of the political machine
of Mayor Maestri. Morrison proposed to revise the City’s charter, modernize and streamline
municipal government, and reorganize personnel within the bureaucracy; the construction of a
new government complex was the perfect visual image to reflect those reforms and an ideal
opportunity to trumpet his goal of planning a modern city.5
Planning, as a professional municipal undertaking, began in New Orleans with the
creation of the New Orleans City Planning and Zoning Commission in 1923. Among the first
substantial actions of this Commission was retaining the services of Harland Bartholomew and
Associates, of St. Louis, Missouri; the Bartholomew Report was the first document created by
this new commission and served as the foundation of planning in New Orleans. As part of this
report, Bartholomew recommended the creation of a municipal center, complete with new
buildings to modernize city services.6 Bartholomew proposed this center to focus on Orleans
Street in the Vieux Carré, as homage to the original seat of colonial and municipal government at
the Cabildo. The report and its recommendations were adopted by the Planning and Zoning
Commission but were not acted upon. This inaction was partly due to increasing property values
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in the Vieux Carré, it was also partially attributable to the interest in preserving the historic core
of the city that gained substantial popularity in the 1920s. Almost two decades later, the plan
was dusted off and brought back to the fore by Brooke Duncan, then the Director of the Real
Estate Utility Department, with one critical change – the location of the ‘Civic Center’ – which
was now proposed to occupy a neighborhood adjacent to the Central Business District which had
been deemed blighted.7
Figure 4.1 – Times-Picayune Illustration of the Civic Center and other public improvements
(Civic Center site outlined in red).8

The Civic Center promised several things at the outset: 1) to “eliminate … a squalid
slum;” 2) boost property values in the booming Central Business District; and 3) centralize
municipal government.9 In addition to these proposed goals of the project, the City would gain
the ability to guide the growth of the Central Business District in the direction of its choosing.
7
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As an added benefit to the City’s endeavor, this location – between what was the existing Central
Business District and Charity Hospital (and a proposed Veteran’s Administration Hospital) – was
among the “lowest priced property available to the central business section.”10 The appraised
value of the property made possible the acquisition of a site large enough to not only construct a
new building for the New Orleans municipal government, but would allow for the development
of a true Civic Center complex.
The proposal, as laid out in 1945 by Brooke Duncan, called for the acquisition of eight
municipal squares in the area generally bounded by Gravier, South Saratoga (now Loyola
Avenue), Poydras and LaSalle Streets. This would allow six entire municipal squares for
construction of governmental buildings, with two squares being dedicated to open space to serve
both the Civic Center and the state’s Charity Hospital. In addition to the assembly of property
for the construction of the Civic Center, the plan also called for a portion of this land to be
dedicated as a right-of-way to allow the widening of South Saratoga Street (now Loyola
Avenue). This would be required under the plan to provide improved automobile access to the
new center of local government while also creating a grand boulevard to connect the City’s
Municipal Auditorium and the newly-constructed Union Passenger Terminal.
To further the City’s goal of slum clearance, the 1945 preliminary plan also contemplated
private investment in the areas surrounding the Civic Center. Specifically, Mr. Duncan
envisioned parking garages, parking lots, and hotels to serve not only the new Civic Center but to
serve all of this new northern extension of the Central Business District. By removing “one of
the worst slum conditions that now exists in New Orleans,”11 the City would be opening the
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doors to development that had been retarded by the presence of “tenement buildings of no
economic value.”12
There is little detailed information available on the condition of this neighborhood in the
official records, but to counter this description of the community to be cleared from the New
Orleans landscape, one can look to the depiction of this community provided by one of its
renowned native sons, Louis Armstrong. In his autobiography, Satchmo: My Life in New
Orleans, Armstrong describes the neighborhood as poor but functioning, and provides depth to
an area otherwise portrayed as simply a slum to be eradicated. There were honkey-tonks (which
would later become the first jazz clubs), shops, a school, and churches; all elements which make
for what would now be described as a walkable community. Armstrong recounts his youth as
being a part of this neighborhood. He attended the Fisk School, gained an interest in music from
the churches and neighborhood bands, sold papers on the streets, and lived near the intersection
of Liberty and Perdido Streets (approximately where the main entrance of City Hall is now
located). It is also in this neighborhood that a young Louis Armstrong was given the opportunity
to play in quasi-professional bands and was, from time-to-time, employed as a coronet player in
the honkey-tonks or brothels found in this part of the City. 13
By the time the Civic Center was being proposed to occupy this area, the neighborhood
had been in decline for some time. Fields (2004) tracks the changes in this neighborhood
through the perspective of urban morphology, and while the specific morphological study did not
entirely overlap with the Civic Center site (only one square of the Civic Center is found in
Fields’s study), the change is worth noting as representative of the area’s condition at the time
the Civic Center was proposed.
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In the period between 1908 and 1937, Fields found substantial reductions in the number
of structures occupying municipal squares in the neighborhood of what would become the Civic
Center. Of these noted changes, calculated on a municipal square by municipal square basis, the
lowest was a reduction in total buildings of less than one percent, while the remaining eight
squares studied showed losses ranging between 66% and 100%.14 This reduction in structures
was partly due to more lucrative use of property as parking lots as automobiles came to dominate
urban transportation. The more profitable use of this space combined with the deteriorating
conditions of the existing structures resulted in the vast swaths of parking which have since
become the primary land use in the area directly abutting the Civic Center.
These losses account for only the number of buildings located within the study area and
do not accurately portray the quality of neighborhood life. This is perhaps better explained
through the numerous neighborhood commercial services present in the area. Fields found,
through a survey of the 1938 Polk Directory of Businesses, that many groceries, clothiers,
specialty shops, and offices existed in this area even after the large-scale loss of structures noted
between 1908 and 1937. While the area may not have been affluent, it was a functional, living
New Orleans neighborhood.15
Though this was a functioning neighborhood, the City took the position that the area was
in need of investment and substantial change that only governmental intervention could
accomplish. According to Mr. Duncan’s “Proposed Plan for a Central Municipal Center,” the
area for his proposed Civic Center had already been proposed as a potential site for a federal
housing project due to its blighted condition. Rather than allowing the redevelopment potential
of this location to be squandered in the form of government-assisted housing, the City took the
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position that due to the site’s ideal location “for the convenience of the public -- for pedestrians,
automobile, and public transportation” it would be ideal for the Civic Center.16 The City
concluded that if this area was to be the subject of large-scale redevelopment, the end result
should be a project that would add to the growing Central Business District rather than a use
which would obstruct the commercial growth of the area. This conclusion was probably on
target, as the superblock-style development of the federally-funded housing projects would likely
have created a boundary to commercial growth and prevented the Central Business District from
expanding north of Loyola Avenue. As for the housing needs of the city, Mr. Duncan’s proposal
goes on to state that “[i]t is also a well known fact that there are numerous other similar slum
areas, as bad or worse, that would be more suitable for residential use by the Housing Authority,
and which could be acquired as cheaply, or at lower cost.”17
The Planning
In the early to mid twentieth century, planning shared two themes: planning for
preservation of the existing urban fabric and planning to create homogeneity by modernizing
urban cores. New Orleans experienced both during this period; the creation of the Vieux Carré
Commission in 1925 symbolized the preservation element and the modernization element was
represented by the City Planning and Zoning Commission, created in 1923. As part of the City
Planning and Zoning Commission’s goals of modernizing the city, plans were created for the
removal of existing urban fabric and the reshaping of the Central Business District.18
The idea of a modernized metropolis was not uniquely New Orleanian, but fell into a
larger, national goal of moving the country from the Great Depression and World War II into a
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modern age, to be defined by automobiles, concrete, glass, and steel. Plans to rescue declining
downtowns and combat the draw of suburbia were commonplace across American cities, and
many relied on the use of eminent domain to acquire and repurpose property to suit their often
newly-adopted plans. This national movement led to the Housing Act of 1949, through which the
federal government would provide up to three-quarters of funding for projects which would
remove slums and clear land for redevelopment.19 To place the Civic Center into a national
context, it is worth noting that while the project began in 1947, the City of New Orleans filed an
application with the federal government in 1950. The application was approved and funding was
provided to the City to offset the architectural design costs of the new Civic Center complex.20
Under the Housing Act of 1949, many cities across the United States undertook similar
redevelopment schemes as that proposed as New Orleans’s Civic Center. The Housing Act
contained two separate elements: one element dealing directly with the provision of public
housing and one dealing with slum clearance and urban redevelopment. The public housing
element of the Housing Act authorized a total of 810,000 public housing units nationally through
1955 but, as Mohl (1993) notes, by 1960 only 320,000 units were actually constructed. The true
impact of the Housing Act of 1949 came from the second element of the Act which provided
funding for the removal of blighted and sub-standard housing units. This portion of the law was
seized upon and used in cities throughout the United States: “Big-city central business districts
were rebuilt and modernized under the aegis of urban renewal legislation; look-alike glass and
steel office towers transformed the urban skyline everywhere.”21
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Following the election of Mayor Morrison and his adoption of Brooke Duncan’s plan for
the construction of a modern Civic Center complex, initial steps were taken to acquire the
requisite property to implement the vision. A bond election was called in the spring of 1947 to
sell $23.5 millions dollars of municipal bonds. This bond issue was to provide $12 million for
an ongoing rail-grade separation project for rail lines serving the newly constructed Union
Passenger Terminal, $10.5 million for street improvements throughout the city, and $1 million
for Civic Center site acquisition.22
Prior to this bond issuance, an assessment was performed to approximate the cost of
acquiring the land needed to construct the Civic Center. The Civic Center was to occupy
approximately eight municipal squares; Table 4.1 (below) indicates the existing development of
the municipal squares as of October 8, 1946; and the total estimated cost for site acquisition
came to $456,360.
Table 4.1 – Development and Value of Civic Center site23,24
Square 303
Square 304
Square 305
Square 332
Square 333
Square 334
Square 340
Square 341

Partial Square, owned by City of New Orleans
33 lots, 2 common alleys
Land: $60,400, Improvements: $16,720
36 lots, 2 common alleys
Land: $50,400, Improvements: $19,600
37 Lots, 3 Common Alleys
Land: $43,100, Improvements: $9,680
33 Lots, 2 Common Alleys
Land: $49,100, Improvements: $8,900
28 Lots, 2 Common Alleys
Land: $88,600, Improvements: $31,100
39 Lots
Land: $41,000, Improvements: $10,100
26 Lots
Land: $33,800, Improvements: $3,860
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The Bureau of Governmental Research (“BGR”) released their “Special Report on
Proposed $23,500,000 Bond Issue” just before the bond election which was held on April 15,
1947. In this report, BGR noted that they were generally in favor of the bond issue and
recommended approval, but expressed some concerns with the initial proposal, the possible site
selection, and the cost of the overall development. In the bond ordinance, the City did not state
the specific location for the new Civic Center complex, though it had been stated that the
municipal government was looking at land at Poydras and South Saratoga. As there was no firm
proposal for the development of the site or specific details on how the proposed consolidation of
government would proceed, BGR was left to make a number of assumptions in their analysis.25
In their recommendation for approval of ‘Proposition 3’ of the 1947 bond election BGR
makes two key assumptions in their analysis of the proposal: (1) the eventual widening of South
Saratoga Street (Loyola Avenue) due to the presence of the Union Passenger Terminal, and (2)
the slum conditions present within the neighborhood found at the intersection of South Saratoga
and Poydras Streets.26 Again, it is worth noting that the language of the bond proposal did not
lock the government into this location, nor did it specify this particular location for
redevelopment under this urban renewal scheme. Once the bond was passed, the City would be
free to acquire land wherever it so desired for the purpose of developing a Civic Center.
A third assumption that BGR was forced to make due to a lack of specificity in the Civic
Center proposal was in which elements of government would be consolidated into the new
complex. In their discussion of the Civic Center element of the 1947 bond proposal, BGR
discusses the numerous buildings currently occupied by city government with an eye towards
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moving all of these functions to the new Civic Center complex. Specifically, government was
spread across City Hall (now Gallier Hall), the City Hall Annex, the Soule Building, the Howard
Annex, the Old Criminal Courts Building, and the Board of Health Building; in addition, there
was also the “New Courthouse Building” in the Vieux Carré (now the Louisiana Supreme
Court).27
Among the arguments in opposition to the proposed Civic Center complex were the cost
to eventually construct the proposed complex (estimated at $15-$20 million) and that the existing
governmental offices were not inadequate but merely poorly maintained. BGR suggested that as
an alternative to land acquisition and the subsequent construction of a new municipal complex,
the City could dedicate the proposed funding to renovation and retention of the existing
government buildings rather than abandoning the current buildings in favor of a consolidated
location and a brand new complex. Certainly this argument must have had proponents in the
general populace, but city leaders were dedicated to their new complex and the ‘renovate and
retain’ argument did not appear to gain any traction with decision-makers.28
The bond election held on April 15, 1947 was a success for Mayor Morrison and the
modernization of the City. All three bond proposals were approved and the city immediately
began to purchase the properties in the area which was to become the Civic Center. As
properties were acquired by the City, the improvements were razed and replaced with surface
parking lots. These lots were then leased to private operators in order to accommodate the need
for parking in the bustling, increasingly automobile-oriented Central Business District. Planning
for the eventual development of the site began soon after the successful bond election, but the
physical development of the site was placed on hold while the City completed other projects.

27
28
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The progress of the Civic Center project in the intervening years was slow and not
clearly traceable, with the exception of the Mayor’s annual published reports, which trumpeted
the annual progress made by the Morrison Administration in achieving the goal of a modern
New Orleans. The Mayor’s 1949 “Report to the People” detailed progress on the Civic Center
stated that “half of seven squares of slum land near the business district above Tulane Avenue
were acquired [in 1948], the rest to be acquired in 1949. This million dollar undertaking will
temporarily serve as the site of 2½ squares of offstreet (sic) parking at low rates.”29 An
illustration included in the 1949 Annual Report (reproduced below) indicates that one thousand
parking spaces were to be provided on the noted 2½ squares of land.
Figure 4.2 – Parking Lot Illustration from Mayor Morrison’s 1949 Annual Report30

By 1954, the land acquisition was complete, as was the transition of the area from
neighborhood to parking lots. The 1953-54 Annual Report of the Mayor boasts of the success of

29
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the Civic Center project as opening the business district to unimpeded growth and encouraging
private investment where it had previously been absent. The report stated “six years ago the
Civic Center area was a cancerous slum blocking the natural growth of the central business
district. Then the city purchased the area, cleaned out the dilapidated buildings and cut through a
new 152-foot wide boulevard. The interest of private business was stimulated in the area. New
multi-storied buildings were constructed and existing buildings expanded.”31 It is worth noting
that these achievements were produced without the City breaking ground on the structures that
were to occupy the Civic Center.
In 1951, the Housing Authority of New Orleans (HANO), in cooperation with the City of
New Orleans prepared “A Preliminary Report Upon Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment:
Project U.R. 1-A.” This report was compiled in response to the Housing Act of 1949, which
provided local governments with federal dollars for slum clearance. The total site studied for
this report was approximately forty-six municipal squares in area, generally bounded by South
Saratoga, Poydras, South Broad Streets and Tulane Avenue, and included the site designated to
become the new Civic Center. Much of the Civic Center site had been acquired by this time, but
the report spoke generally to the conditions of the area in terms relative to the condition of the
remainder of the U.R. 1-A site. Only one of the squares previously listed as part of the Civic
Center complex, Square 334, was detailed in this report with the remaining squares being
indicated as “Entire Area Site of Civic Center.”32
The selected boundaries of Project U.R.1-A were arbitrary, as admitted by HANO in their
report, the stated reason for this being that “the total extent of urban redevelopment needs for the
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City as a whole [having] not been determined.”33 While admittedly arbitrary, the justification for
the boundaries of the project is clearly defined in the Report, and conditions stated are inclusive
of the Civic Center site. HANO found that the area was “characterized by obsolescence and
blight” and “lack[ed] adequate community facilities for the existing population” and that
wholesale redevelopment would be the only way to improve the area and address the needs of a
growing, modernizing city.34
The “obsolescence and blight” of the project area was determined by a number of factors
outlined in Exhibit 7 of the report, breaking the individual municipal squares down into white
versus ‘negro’ population, and the number and percentage of dwelling units lacking hot water,
with outdoor or shared water closets, with shared or no baths, and general dilapidation. As has
been stated, the project area for U.R.1-A was far larger than the site of the proposed Civic Center
and only Square 334 of the Civic Center site was evaluated for this report. Therefore, by the
general statements made by the U.R.1-A Report and the overall presentations of the Civic Center
site by its proponents, one is left to approximate the conditions of the eight municipal squares
prior to the City’s acquisition and clearance of the site. The following table illustrates the noted
conditions of Square 334 within the Civic Center site relative to the entire U.R.1-A project area.
Table 4.2 – Conditions of Civic Center site in comparison to U.R.1-A project area.35
White
Dwelling
Units
No.
%
Square
334
U.R.1-A
Site

Negro
Dwelling
Units
No.
%

No.

%

No.

No Hot
Water

Outside
W.C.

Share W.C.

Share Bath

No Bath

%

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

0

0

21

100

21

100

20

95

20

95

6

29

14

66

456

33

908

62

733

51

397

27

411

28

155

11

415

29

33
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While the statistics provided by the U.R.1-A study indicate a disproportionate impact on
the African-American community within both the Civic Center site and the U.R.1-A study area,
the impact cannot be fully understood without placing this data against the backdrop of Citywide numbers. According to the United States Census Bureau, the population of New Orleans
was 29.3% “non-white” in 1950.36 These numbers clearly illustrate that the African-American
community of New Orleans was disproportionately impacted by both the U.R.1-A and Civic
Center projects at rates of two to three times the statistical expectation.
Whether this racial disparity was an intentional or unintentional consequence of the
projects is undocumented; it seems that the result may have been a combination of the two.
While the projects likely did not intentionally target African-American communities in New
Orleans, the reality of the situation is that through Jim Crow and associated oppression, this
community was relegated to the least desirable neighborhoods, both by custom and, in some
cases, legal mandate.
Hirsch profiles the Morrison Administration’s approach to race relations as fairly
disingenuous. While Morrison sought to appeal to African-American and did make efforts to
improve the share of municipal services open to African-American neighborhoods, no real effort
was made to address the societal inequalities which permeated New Orleans. Specifically,
Morrison constructed new facilities within the New Orleans Recreation Department for the
African-American community and opened up hiring within the New Orleans Police Department
and public libraries to African-Americans; these accomplishments were set within the framework
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of “preserve[ing the] traditions and habits of [the] city.”37 For all of his posturing to the
contrary, perhaps Morrison’s own words best convey his Administration’s approach to the issue
of race in New Orleans: “racial segregation is embodied in the basic law of the State of
Louisiana, and we are obligated to abide by it.”38
In addition to the racial characteristics of the Civic Center site and the U.R.1-A project
area, HANO also measured the conditions of the area based on ‘Dilapidation,’ with the standards
for this determination clearly outlined in Appendix A of the Report. The extent of dilapidation
was to be determined based on an evaluation of four elements: 1) weather tightness of the
structure; 2) makeshift construction; 3) extent of disrepair; and 4) hazards to the safety of
occupants. Specifically, the quantifiable conditions of individual properties were assessed as
follows:39
1) Exterior Dilapidation:
a. Walls; cracks missing materials, loose materials, sagging or leaning.
b. Chimneys; missing material or leaning.
c. Windows; missing materials or operation defects.
d. Porches; weak or broken supports, railings, or steps.
e. Roof; missing materials or obvious leakage.
2) Interior Dilapidation:
a. Basements; cracks, leakage, or bad floor.
b. Floors; sagging, missing materials, or excessive wear.
c. Partitions; same as walls.
d. Ceilings; same as walls.
e. Stairways; same as porches
3) Dilapidation of Utilities:
a. Electric Service; wiring deficiencies.
b. Plumbing; lacking or inoperative water supply, inoperative flush toilet,
lacking, obsolete, or unsafe bathing facilities.
c. Heating; detrimental to health, conducive to fire.
37
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The following table presents another comparison of Square 334 within the Civic Center footprint
to the larger U.R.1-A project site as a whole:
Table 4.3 – Dilapidation of Civic Center site in comparison to U.R.1-A project area.40

Square
334
U.R.1-A
Site

Exterior
No.
%

Dilapidation
Interior
No.
%

No.

%

18

86

18

86

18

86

796

55

784

54

773

53

Utility

Based on these standards, the City was able to utilize funding through the Housing Act of 1949
to seek federal dollars for the proposed Civic Center complex. Specifically, funding was
obtained to aid in the site and architectural design of the proposed Civic Center complex
following the submission of the U.R.1-A report in 1951.
Figure 4.3 – Visual Representation of Property Conditions within the Civic Center site.41

The Land Assembly
Immediately following approval of the $23,500,000 bond issue in 1947, the City of New
Orleans began the process of land assembly for development of the Civic Center. Over the
40
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course of the subsequent eight years, the City acquired 197 individual lots comprising the Civic
Center site. Through a review of the real estate transfer records maintained by the City’s
Department of Property Management, it is clear that negotiated purchase was the acquisition
method of choice for the Civic Center. Of the 197 individual parcels acquired for this project,
only 12 were taken through expropriation rather than through negotiated purchase.
Table 4.4 – Summary of Property Acquisition for the Civic Center site.42
Municipal
Square
304
305
332
333
340
341

Number of
Lots
32
34
37
35
33
26

Number of
Expropriations
2
3
5
0
0
2

At the outset of the project the determination was made to acquire as much needed
property through purchase rather than expropriation. On September 28, 1946 the City
announced the location of the proposed Civic Center. Within days, the Morison Administration
announced what actions would be taken to being acquiring the property and bringing the project
to fruition, the Times-Picayune reported that Mayor Morrison’s position was to “attempt to
negotiate for purchase of the properties … but in the event of failure to negotiate a purchase at a
fair appraisal price [the City] will institute condemnation proceedings.”43
Once the site selection was official, the process of inventorying the required land and
obtaining appraisals to budget property acquisition costs began. The Morrison Administration
estimated that the land within the Civic Center could be obtained for a reasonable price and
Brooke Duncan noted that the entire Civic Center site had a total property assessment of only
$525,000, which was seen as beneficial to the City for the purpose of site acquisition. On a
42
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property map dated October 8, 1946, the City outlined the ownership of the required properties
which included notations for land already publicly owned and properties which were targeted to
be acquired through exchange.44 An interesting discrepancy is found in this document when
compared with the property transfer records: the map, dated 1946, indicates that Lots 1, 2, 3, 4,
A, U, V, W, X, Y, and Z of Square 333 were, at that time, owned by the City of New Orleans; 45
however, property transfer records indicate that the City of New Orleans acquired these parcels
through purchase on August 20, 1948.46 The individual from whom these parcels were acquired
was Gervais Favrot, Chairman of the City Planning and Zoning Commission. It is impossible to
determine how or why this discrepancy occurred but it is interesting to note.
This conflict in the record does give the appearance of impropriety on the part of the site
selected for the Civic Center project; however, it is somewhat unlikely that as the owner of less
than one-third of a single municipal square Mr. Favrot would have actively steered the project to
this site. While there is no specific information available to explain this glaring error in the
record, it does lead one to question whether anyone else involved in the decision-making process
owned property within or adjacent to the Civic Center footprint. It should be noted that no other
conflicts between the initial ownership map and property transfer records were identified in the
full review of these documents.
While the appraisals for properties within the Civic Center site were undertaken
immediately upon selection of the site in 1946, the Commission Council did not authorize the
Morrison Administration to begin property acquisitions until May 21, 1948. This action by the
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Commission Council authorized the negotiated purchase of half of the requisite property for the
overall project and all sales were subject to ratification by the Council prior to purchase. 47
There was little coverage of the few expropriation proceedings by the press, the sole
exception appears to have been over the properties owned by Mr. Herman Doescher, Jr. Mr.
Doescher owned lots 5 and 6, of Square 304 with improvements bearing the municipal addresses
436-38 and 442 Loyola Street. The contention in this case, which appears to have been what
attracted the attention of the press, was that the expropriation was being fought not only on the
basis of the project but rather on the merits of the state law under which the expropriation took
place. In 1948, the Louisiana Legislature passed an act which removed the requirement of a jurytrial in expropriation cases. Mr. Doescher filed suit arguing a jury must be empanelled to
determine a fair value for his properties. The challenge levied against the Civic Center proposal
was that the project was likely years away from construction so forcibly expropriating the
property at this point was premature. Mayor Morrison was called to testify on behalf of his Civic
Center project and stated that the plans were sufficiently far along that his administration
expected to let the contracts for construction within 18-months. On December 30, 1949, the court
ruled in the City’s favor regarding both arguments and awarded Mr. Doescher $16,120 for his
two properties on Loyola Street.48, 49, 50
Property acquisition, both via negotiated purchase and expropriation, continued through
April of 1955 with 7 of the 12 total expropriations within the Civic Center site taking place
between February and April of that year. The total expropriations within the Civic Center site
amounted to only 6% of the total lots acquired. The reason for this low number of expropriations
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is likely attributable to the political determination to negotiate purchases combined with the
length of the overall acquisition process.
From the time the Commission Council authorized the Morrison Administration to begin
assembling the land to the point where all land formally entered the City’s possession eight years
elapsed. During this time there was little motivation on the part of municipal leaders to forcibly
acquire property; there were no construction deadlines or contractual obligations that required all
property to be obtained by a specific date. While this was likely beneficial to the City in terms of
reducing the number of required expropriations it also acted against the City in at least the one
legal challenge to expropriation that was followed by the press.
The Legacy
The Civic Center was developed in accordance with the early plans, with a new City Hall
to consolidate municipal government, the main branch of the New Orleans Public Library, a new
state office building, the Louisiana Supreme Court and a new complex for Orleans Parish Civil
District Court. City Hall was dedicated on May 6, 1957 and the other buildings comprising the
complex were completed in the following years. In addition to the structures occupying the
Civic Center, Loyola Avenue was created by widening South Saratoga Street to a width of 144
feet. This stretch of roadway from the Municipal Auditorium to the newly-constructed Union
Passenger Terminal was dubbed the “miracle mile” to reflect its prominent place in the renewal
of New Orleans.51
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Figure 4.4 – City Hall – August 23, 1958 52

Figure 4.5 – Postcard depicting the newly constructed Civic Center 53

52
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In 2005, following Hurricane Katrina, the state office building and the Louisiana
Supreme Court building were abandoned and subsequently demolished. The site remains
improved with City Hall, Orleans Parish Civil District Court, the main branch of the New
Orleans Public Library, and Duncan Plaza.
The Civic Center project, as proposed and eventually realized, provided the citizens of
New Orleans with a modern government complex that reflected both the new governmental
structure of the City and the push to modernity that the 1950s came to represent; but at what
cost? The neighborhood had been in decline for many years preceding the decision to take and
clear the land for redevelopment. While the area once was occupied by a thriving neighborhood
of shops, community resources, and residents, many had gone by the late 1940s. Perhaps this
decline was as much due to the poor physical conditions which were found in the community,
but perhaps these conditions were partly a self-fulfilling prophecy in that the land had been
designated as a potential redevelopment site for public housing prior to the Civic Center
proposal. This designation, which was made in the mid-1930s, may have led to further
disinvestment within this neighborhood which was already in decline causing the area to spiral
into outright blight; the truth in this instance will never be known.
The stated goals of the Civic Center project were generally accomplished; those goals
being: elimination of slum conditions, boosting area property values, and centralizing
government. While the goals themselves are debatable as appropriate exercises of municipal
government, it must be recognized that the City achieved what it set out to do, at least in the
short term. Over the intervening five decades since the Civic Center was constructed, the area
has seen both the desired rise, and the unexpected decline in adjacent private investment.
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While the residential slums were removed from the landscape, a commercial slum has
taken hold. The surface parking lots once seen as necessary to the survival of downtown have
proven a barrier to development and the 1950s-era office structures have largely been abandoned
in favor of high-rise development along the Poydras Street corridor. A cursory examination of
the conditions surrounding City Hall, in the neighborhood described by Louis Armstrong in his
autobiography, will find that the birthplaces of jazz have largely been demolished to make room
for surface parking lots. The “interests of private business” which were trumpeted by Mayor
Morrison in 1954 as being symbolized by multi-storied buildings have been put asunder and
those buildings left to decay in the shadow of City Hall.
Figure 4.6 – Upper Poydras Street, 2012 54

The long-term success of the project comes not necessarily from the stated goals, but
from the subsequent projects, both public and private, which expanded the Central Business
District in accordance with what was viewed as the area’s logical growth pattern. By removing
54
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the blighted neighborhood from the lake-side boundary of the Central Business District, the City
opened development for numerous office buildings and hotels along Poydras Street and that
portion of Loyola Avenue between City Hall and the Union Passenger Terminal, as well as the
development of the Louisiana Superdome in what was a rail yard a stone’s throw from the Civic
Center site.
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Chapter 5
Bridges and Highways:
Accommodating the Automobile at the Expense of the City
“Now let me say at the very outset that transportation, and
certainly road transportation is a lifeline of any community”
- Mayor de Lesseps S. Morrison, 19581

Building the automotive infrastructure was neither a quick nor easy task in a city as
historic as New Orleans. Certainly it was one thing to pave the existing surface streets to
accommodate the automobile, but it was another thing entirely to create the infrastructure of
regional expressways that the burgeoning automobile age demanded in the mid-twentieth
century. The City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana recognized the infrastructural needs
of the New Orleans area and crafted plans for the building of bridges and highways connecting
Orleans and Jefferson Parishes before the federal government created the Interstate Highway
System, which would permanently scar many historic cities throughout the United States.
Of the governmental undertakings studied as part of this research, the construction of
bridges and highways were the projects that had the most far-reaching and lasting impacts on the
physical and social conditions of New Orleans. The very nature of these projects caused shifts in
the daily life of citizens in nearly all parts of the City, whether that change was a result of altered
traffic patterns or commutes, the physical division of once united neighborhoods, or, on a larger
scale, the clearing of large swaths of a community to provide space for construction of these
projects. The focus of this chapter will be on the visions for and planning of these large-scale
public improvements and the property acquisitions that were required to make these plans come
to fruition. Although the historical records show that the State and City governments tried to
1
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avoid expropriation proceedings, they did not shy away from the exercise of eminent domain to
acquire the needed property to move forward with what was perceived as best for the public atlarge.
The Vision
Shortly following the end of World War II, New Orleans – and many other American
cities – began looking at ways to invest in the infrastructural needs that had been laid fallow
during the conflict. Among the projects New Orleans sought to implement for the improvement
of the community and the enhancement of its growth was the Pontchartrain Expressway, a
freeway connecting the Central Business District with Airline Highway and the proposed
Veterans Memorial Boulevard being constructed in Metairie, in adjacent Jefferson Parish.

The

goal of this highway was to increase accessibility to the Central Business District from both the
residential portions of New Orleans and the developing bedroom communities in Jefferson
Parish.
To reduce project costs, the Pontchartrain Expressway was proposed to be built within
the New Basin Canal right-of-way. Construction of the New Basin Canal was authorized by the
Louisiana Legislature in 1831 and opened for service in 1835; the Canal provided a connection
from the Central Business District to Lake Pontchartrain.2 The Canal was dug by hand at a cost
of $1,225,0003 and approximately 8,000 lives, the death toll in this project being caused
primarily by cholera and yellow fever epidemics.4 With the passing of a century and rail, truck,
and barged freight rendering the Canal obsolete, the City of New Orleans, in conjunction with
the State’s Highway Department, began exploring other possible uses for this space. The
2
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conclusion these entities arrived at was that the Canal should be filled and the space reused to
create a singular rail line into the heart of the City with the remaining space being devoted to the
construction of a super-highway to serve the automotive needs of New Orleans.
Originally this new super-highway, which would replace the New Basin Canal, was
proposed to connect “Julia Street at the River to Lake Pontchartrain (a distance of some five
miles) where it would connect with the proposed causeway to Mandeville.”5 The proposed
starting point at Julia Street was in anticipation of the contemplated Mississippi River crossing to
be located in that general vicinity, and the route of the New Basin Canal was seen as the only
place to construct such a highway in New Orleans.6 The closure of the Canal was approved by
Constitutional Amendment on November 5, 1946. The Times-Picayune, which editorialized for
the passage of the amendment as being “of vital importance to the future of New Orleans,”7
reported that the Amendment passed by large margins both within New Orleans and state wide.
With all New Orleans precincts reporting, the final vote tally on Amendment 31, authorizing the
closure and filling of the New Basin Canal, was 47,587 in favor and 7,343 opposed; state wide,
only 422 precincts out of a total 1,871 had reported by press time two days following the election
with a recorded vote of 52,101 in favor and 9,116 opposed, but the amendment was projected to
pass.8
With the future of the Pontchartrain Expressway virtually secure, the municipal
leadership turned their attention to creating a vehicular river crossing within the city of New
Orleans. Until this time, the only bridge spanning the lower Mississippi River was the Huey P.
Long Bridge in Jefferson Parish, ten miles upriver from the Central Business District of New
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Orleans.9 In 1948, a Constitutional Amendment was placed before Louisiana Voters “authorizing
a bridge across the Mississippi River at New Orleans.”10 The exact location of the bridge had not
been determined at this time, but what was known was that the East Bank side of the bridge
would have to connect to the proposed Pontchartrain Expressway. This proposed configuration
was in accordance with the City’s Major Streets Plan and had been approved by the United
States Bureau of Public Roads, as federal funds were being sought for partial funding of the
project. Though the specific details of the bridge had not been clearly defined, Amendment 21
was approved by Louisiana voters in 1948. The vote in New Orleans totaled 49,021 in favor of
the authorizing amendment and 9,669 opposed.11
While voters approved the concept of the Mississippi River Bridge in 1948, the plans and
financing scheme were not settled until the 1952 Legislative Session and subsequent election.
Amendment 10 authorized the bonding capacity of the Mississippi River Bridge Authority to
finance the bridge project and to back those bonds with not only toll revenue from bridge userfees but to dedicate the State’s Highway Fund No. 2 (a vehicle license tax) to the maintenance of
the proposed bridge and guaranteeing of the bonds.12 Additionally, Amendment 19 was placed
before the voters at the same election to reallocate “a portion of the Dock Board’s 9/20ths of one
cent gasoline tax” to finance the construction of bridge approaches13 and to authorize up to $30
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million in highway bonds to be sold by the Department of Transportation to finance their share
of construction costs for the Mississippi River Bridge.14
Not surprisingly, Mayor Morrison endorsed the proposed constitutional amendments
designed to fund the Mississippi River Bridge, and its approaches and associated improvements.
These amendments were endorsed by Mayor Morrison as not only crucial to the bridge project,
but as “vital to the growth of the New Orleans metropolitan area and to our neighboring parishes,
which need these key projects.”15 The Mayor went on to clarify that these amendments were not
solely for the benefit of New Orleans but were intended to improve infrastructure both in the
surrounding region and across the State. Amendment 10 would, in addition to furthering the
construction of the Mississippi River Bridge, authorize funding for the Lake Pontchartrain
Causeway and the Little Woods–Lakeshore Highway, connecting Downman Road, in New
Orleans East to the Highway 11 Bridge between Orleans and St. Tammany Parishes.16 This
amendment would also provide funding for various other road and drainage projects in Orleans,
Jefferson, St. Charles, St. John the Baptist, Tangipahoa, and St. Tammany Parishes.
A second proposed Constitutional Amendment, Amendment 19, would have even farther
reaching impact according to the Mayor; this amendment would reallocate funds that were solely
dedicated to the New Orleans Dock Board and redistribute them across the state. This
amendment was touted as not only aiding in the financing of the Mississippi River Bridge but
also to allow construction of an Industrial Canal crossing in New Orleans, the West Bank
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Expressway in Jefferson Parish, a Red River Bridge in Shreveport and various highway projects
in Baton Rouge and Lake Charles.17
In 1956, Congress passed the Federal Aid Highway Act, providing for 40,000 miles of
roads across the country over a period of 16 years. The 40,000 mile authorization was then
divided among the states based on requests from state highway departments. The Louisiana
Highway Department’s initial request was for the allocation of 1,150 highway miles, but the final
allocation by the federal government granted just less than 600 total highway miles.18 Under the
Act, the Highway Department made clear, highways could be located anywhere the state dictated
without the involvement of local officials and without regard to local conditions or plans, this
included the ability to determine highway routes regardless of the impact on property owners and
the losses that could potentially be suffered as a result of expropriation. However, in the
benevolence of the State Highway Department, the Department decided to work with local
officials on the placement of these federal highways.19 The proposal for the federal highway
system presented to the community in 1958 is exactly that which was subsequently constructed
and is present in New Orleans today (see Figures 5.8, 5.11, 5.12). The highways were designed
to complement the Pontchartrain Expressway and Mississippi River Bridge and also, generally,
followed the adopted Major Streets Plan of the City. The one major deviation from the City’s
plan was that a portion of highway, which would come to be designated as Interstate-610, would
not be located along Florida Avenue. Instead it cut through residential portions of the Lakeview
and Gentilly neighborhoods because the angle at which Florida Avenue intersected the proposed
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route of what is now Interstate-10 was too sharp to create a safe connection and too congested
with rail rights-of-way.20
As required by the Bureau of Public Roads, a hearing was held on the proposed route of
the highways. This hearing was held in the New Orleans City Council Chambers on February 11,
1958 and included the entire proposed federal-aid highway system for Jefferson and Orleans
Parishes. There was support and opposition present for the routes through both parishes, with the
primary opposition having to do with the land assembly for the project rather than the principles
of the highway project itself. At the outset of the hearing, Mayor Morrison tried to assuage the
opposition to the land assembly element of the proposal by reminding the public that both the
Pontchartrain Expressway and Mississippi River Bridge projects required “acquisition of
property, removal of peoples’ homes and other incidental consequences.”21 Morrison stated that
people should recognize that the engineering of these projects should be left to the engineers and
that the route that “the best place to put the highways is where the engineering determines it
should be put.”22 The implication of this statement being that the City would stand in agreement
with the State’s engineering studies for locating the highways without particular regard for those
whose property stood in its path. Morrison’s position was clear in that the acquisition and, if
necessary, expropriation of property was but an “incidental consequence” to progress that, while
not pleasant, must be tolerated and expected.
Certainly Mayor Morrison’s position was supported by the fact that the State Highway
Department aligned their recommendations so closely with the City’s adopted Major Streets
Plan. This was a plan that was initially created in 1926 by Harland Bartholomew and Associates
under contract to the New Orleans Planning and Zoning Commission. The initial plan focused
20
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primarily on the Central Business District, but through subsequent revisions and updates in the
1950s, a focused vision for the creation of a major street network serving all of New Orleans was
adopted.
The vision outlined by the City through this plan specifically included the then-underconstruction Pontchartrain Expressway, Mississippi River Bridge and Little Woods–Lakeshore
Highway, as well as major thoroughfares to be located along Claiborne Avenue, Elysian Fields
Avenue, and Florida Avenue; these routes being selected due to the existing widths of right-ofway, which would allow the City to create multi-lane radial streets without the added expense of
right-of-way acquisition.23
The Planning
The bridge and highway projects in New Orleans from the 1950s into the 1970s trace
their origins to Harland Bartholomew’s Preliminary Report on a System of Major Streets
adopted by the City in 1927. This first major streets plan for the city, while not as ambitious as
its successors, called for the designation and creation of major arterial roads to effectively and
efficiently move people to and from the Central Business District.24
At this point in the development of transportation planning in New Orleans,
Bartholomew and the City Planning and Zoning Commission were primarily concerned with
creating a system of streets in the city that would allow for the free flow of traffic. In the
Preliminary Report, Bartholomew lamented the piecemeal and haphazard development of the
city, and resultant varying street widths, jogs, and dead ends. These odd configurations in the
street grid were caused by the historic development pattern of the city, reflecting New Orleans’s
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growth across antiquated plantation and municipal boundaries. Bartholomew states in the
Preliminary Report that:
[t]he increasing use of motor vehicles has brought about a
revolutionary change in street traffic and a resultant demand for
highways adapted to modern vehicular use. The theory that all
streets are of equal value and importance in the city passed with
the leisurely horse-drawn carriage and the lumbering wagon.
Wherever this point of view is retained there is almost certain to be
a waste of public funds and enormous economic losses due to
poorly designed pavements and unsatisfactory street
improvements.25
The Preliminary Report outlined fifteen improvements to either create or modify major
streets in the city of New Orleans. The full list of proposed improvements can be found in
Appendix 5.1; however, there are two proposals which merit brief discussion, as they later
became the basis for highway proposals: Proposal 4 called for the immediate widening of North
Peters and Decatur Streets below Canal Street, and Proposal 9 called for the widening of
Calliope Street from South Rampart Street to South Peters Street. Proposal 4, the widening of
North Peters and Decatur, was suggested to accommodate port traffic that was projected to travel
from the wharves in the vicinity of Canal Street to the Industrial Canal. This proposal, while
perhaps not specifically responsible, can be seen as the first suggestion of a riverfront
expressway.26
Proposal 9 called for the widening of Calliope Street to serve the up-river traffic entering
and exiting the Central Business District. Howard Avenue was the main traffic artery in this area
of the city, but due to existing development could not be widened to accommodate the everincreasing traffic volume projected in this report.27 The proposal under the Preliminary Report
was for the widening of Calliope at ground level even though the street was considered “remote
25
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from the business center.” The reasoning behind this proposal was to create a boulevard that
could become the up-river “counterpart of Canal Street,” and the report encouraged the City to
undertake this street widening “as soon as possible in order to anticipate the inevitable expansion
of the business district.”28 While this street widening never actually occurred, this was the
general path taken by the Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressway in the 1950s.
The initial Bartholomew major streets plan was revised in 1947 in accordance with state
law and again updated in 1951, as “many changes [had] occurred in the character and
development of the New Orleans urban area since the preparation of the early plan.”29 These
revised plans now took into account the need for express highways, not just widened surface
streets for the movement of traffic.
The first major projects undertaken during the mid-century era to make New Orleans
more accessible to the automobile were the Mississippi River Bridge and the Pontchartrain
Expressway. These projects were designed to allow the growth and expansion of the New
Orleans metropolitan area through increasing the potential for development on the West Bank of
the Mississippi River in both Orleans and Jefferson Parishes as well as the further development
of the East Bank of Jefferson Parish.
The Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressway were conceived as separate
projects with essentially the same purpose. The Pontchartrain Expressway had been discussed as
part of the Grade Separation Project that consolidated all incoming rail lines into one central
Union Passenger Terminal and virtually eliminated at-grade rail crossings within New Orleans.
Upon the inception of this project, the City viewed the New Basin Canal as the most logical
place for these consolidated rail lines due to the availability of land and the obsolescence of the
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canal. At this same time, Robert Moses, famed highwayman of New York City’s Triborough
Bridge Authority, was working on a highway plan for New Orleans that would help modernize
the area with limited-access highways. The Moses plan for New Orleans called for the
construction of a concrete and steel expressway to be built from roughly S. Rampart Street at
Calliope Street to Airline Highway along the route of the New Basin Canal.
Figure 5.1 – Photograph of the Filled New Basin Canal Illustrating the Available Right-of-Way
to be used for the Pontchartrain Expressway.30

The orientation of this highway was also intended to connect to any future Mississippi River
crossings that may be constructed; at this time plans for a bridge were preliminary at best but
there was certainty that a bridge would eventually be constructed though there was no
established timeline for doing so.31 Aside from the proposed connection to a future bridge, the
New Orleans City Planning and Zoning Commission considered the location of the Pontchartrain
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Expressway to be a “very logical location because of available right-of-way relationship to
existing development and to the urban development which the project will so conveniently
serve,”32 and encouraged the connection of the expressway with Poydras Street to provide a
direct connection into the Central Business District.33
Figure 5.2 – Downtown Portion of the Pontchartrain Expressway (yellow) With Connection to
the Mississippi River Bridge (red).34

As plans for the Pontchartrain Expressway were finalized, the City and State began
working on plans for a Mississippi River crossing at New Orleans. This bridge would connect to
the Pontchartrain Expressway in New Orleans and be tied to a proposed West Bank Expressway
in Jefferson Parish, creating the area’s first regional road network. This system was designed to
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accommodate both existing traffic conditions and the projected growth of the City and the West
Bank of Jefferson Parish through 1975.35
While there was general agreement with the concept of a vehicular crossing of the
Mississippi River at New Orleans, there were numerous details that had to be negotiated. The
ultimate location of the Mississippi River Bridge shifted slightly during these negotiations,
though the overall orientation of the structure and its connection to the Pontchartrain Expressway
were constants in the construction plans. These shifts were relatively slight, with the structure
moving by mere blocks on either side of the river. The Algiers side of the structure would
remove residential areas regardless of the ultimate position of the structure, but by shifting the
orientation of the bridge in the Lower Garden District, highway planners were able to avoid the
large commercial structures of the Warehouse District and align the bridge and approaches along
Calliope Street and through less-densely developed industrial areas and the mostly residential
areas on the lake-side of Magazine Street.
In order for the state to construct a river crossing, the location and structure of the bridge
had to be approved by the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). The initial
application presented to USACE in 1946 called for construction of a bridge to be located at Julia
Street; this application was approved and a permit issued for construction. At the same time, the
State Highway Department hired Robert Moses to review traffic studies of New Orleans and
make recommendations for construction of arterial highways to serve the metropolitan area.
Among the recommendations made was the relocation of the proposed Mississippi River Bridge
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to an area where the right-of-way acquisition would be less expensive and where the route would
be less likely to interfere with the proposed Union Passenger Terminal project.36
The relocation of the structure was proposed at Thalia and Bringier Streets. This location
would have required the placement of both piers of the bridge within the navigable portion of the
river and the New Orleans Dock Board objected to these as obstructions to river traffic. The
Dock Board, officially the Board of Commissioners of the Port of New Orleans, was created in
1896 by the Louisiana Legislature for the express purpose of “improv[ing] the wharves and other
facilities of the Port and greatly develop[ing] and expand[ing] commerce by removing many of
the obstacles now placed in the way of advancement.”37 While their initial task was to bring all
wharves under the same operating procedures, by the 1950s, the Dock Board had expanded their
role to recruiting business for the port and ensuring that the port could safely and adequately
handle the ever-increasing size of shipping vessels calling on New Orleans.38
Not only would this proposed location require placement of support piers in the navigable
portion of the Mississippi River, this proposal for the span also presented a vertical clearance of
135 feet with a 1,400 foot center span, far lower than the 175 foot elevation that the Dock Board
felt was required. Based on the operational objections of the Dock Board, the initial permit
application by the State was rejected and the bridge designers had to go back to the drawing
board to revise the proposal to ensure that the bridge would not impede the business of the port.39
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Figure 5.3 – New Orleans Item Illustration of the proposed Mississippi River Bridge.40

After months of negotiations with the Dock Board, the Mississippi River Bridge
Authority finalized a revised bridge proposal to be presented to USACE. The revised proposal
called for placement of the bridge at Lamarque Street on the West Bank and just below Calliope
Street on the East Bank. The revised location of the bridge proposed one pier to be located
within the river (towards the West Bank side of the stream) and the second pier to be located
adjacent to the wharves on the East Bank side. The Bridge Authority also raised the height of the
center span to an average elevation of 155 feet above the river from the 135 feet that was initially
proposed.41
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Figure 5.4 – Times-Picayune Illustration of proposed Mississippi River Bridge42

While the Dock Board maintained their objection to placing any support structures within
the stream of the Mississippi River, they were willing to negotiate with the Bridge Authority on
the vertical clearance of the structure. In a meeting of the Dock Board that was held just prior to
the Bridge Authority’s meeting to finalize the permit application, the Dock Board unanimously
voted to support the permit application with respect to the vertical clearance but to oppose the
placement of the support pier 230 feet from the western bank of the river. In giving its approval
relative to the vertical clearance of the proposed bridge, the Dock Board made clear that they
were not completely pleased with the negotiated plans but likely felt political pressure to move
the project forward:
The board of commissioners has heretofore suggested that the center
height of the bridge at mean high water should not be less than 175 feet.
However, after further study and in a spirit of conciliation and as
evidence of its sincere interest in having a bridge built across the river at
New Orleans, the committee recommends that the board agree to issue
its permit for a bridge of 155 feet center clearance at stage 20 feet on the
Carrollton gauge.43
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The record does not speak to the change which apparently occurred following this
approval. As constructed, the pier within the river was placed towards the eastern bank of the
river rather than the western bank as was agreed upon by the Mississippi River Bridge Authority
and the Dock Board. Figure 5.5 (below) indicates the final design of the Mississippi River
Bridge which reflects the bridge as it was constructed.
Figure 5.5 – Final Design Rendering of the Mississippi River Bridge.44

The placement and vertical elevation of the span were not the only points of contention in
the planning of the Mississippi River Bridge. The state Highway Department and the
Mississippi River Bridge Authority proposed a four-lane bridge to span the river, which was
projected to accommodate traffic for approximately 40 years following construction. This traffic
estimate and the proposal of the four-lane bridge were based on the projections of Robert Moses
in the 1940s. In 1951, as the City, State and Mississippi River Bridge Authority were developing
the actual plans for a bridge, the firm of Harland Bartholomew and Associates sent a
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memorandum to the City Planning and Zoning Commission questioning the long-term functional
capacity of the four-lane bridge.45
The Bartholomew memorandum suggested a six-lane bridge would more successfully
create the capacity needed to serve the growing population of the New Orleans area. An
unknown in the planning of this structure was the population growth estimate for the West Bank
of Jefferson Parish, which would likely grow exponentially in the years following the opening of
a vehicular river crossing. The State, based on the Moses report anticipated an average of 12,500
vehicles per day to be served by this bridge in the 1990s, the Bartholomew memorandum
suggested that this number was unrealistically low, citing that the traffic counts of river crossings
in 1945 totaled 8,950 river crossings per day on the four river ferries serving the Central
Business District. The reasoning employed by Bartholomew and Associates to question the
estimates of Robert Moses was quite logical:
The development of land on the west bank has taken place under
conditions which discourage travel to and from the central business
district. … The west bank has presumably attracted a population
which attaches comparatively little importance to quick and easy
access to the central business district and other east bank centers of
employment. A bridge or tunnel which provides quick and easy
access to the central business district will open up large areas on
the west bank to accommodate a type of population that depends
on such access. This would be a factor tending to make the rate of
increase in trans-river traffic greater than the rate of population
growth on the west bank.46
The City took the observations of Bartholomew and Associates seriously and hired the
firm of Masters and Henderlite to compile new traffic projections for the Mississippi River
Bridge. The Masters and Henderlite report determined that the Bartholomew observations were
generally well-founded but determined that the increased traffic coming from the West Bank
45
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communities would be shared between the Huey P. Long Bridge, the proposed Mississippi River
Bridge and a third proposed Mississippi River crossing at Luling (in St. Charles Parish, further
upstream than the Huey P. Long Bridge). Even with these crossings taken into consideration, the
consultants determined that a six-lane bridge would be required in New Orleans prior to 1975.47
The Mississippi River Bridge Authority decided to disregard these concerns and move forward
with plans for a four-lane structure. The final width of the bridge was set at 52 feet, comprising
four traffic lanes and a four foot wide median.48
The permit for construction of the Mississippi River Bridge was issued by USACE on
March 10, 1954 and the Mississippi River Bridge Authority began the process of raising money
though the sale of revenue bonds.49 The bridge opened to traffic on April 15, 1958 to much
fanfare, with the Times-Picayune pronouncing the event as the dream of a century fulfilled, with
“the travel habits of as yet untold thousands of New Orleanians [set to] undergo a change.”50
Figure 5.6, 5.7 – Mississippi River Bridge Authority illustrations of West Bank and East Bank
approaches to the Mississippi River Bridge.51
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Following finalization of plans and during the construction of the Pontchartrain
Expressway and the Mississippi River Bridge, Congress passed the “Federal Aid Highway Act of
1956,” which, as has been previously noted, authorized 40,000 miles of limited-access highways
throughout the country, with just less than 600 total miles being initially allocated to the State of
Louisiana. The Act dictated that these highway miles were at the discretion of state highway
departments and Louisiana’s Highway Department began planning for these highways even
before the law won final approval in Congress.52
Prior to the passage of the Act in 1956, Louisiana’s highway engineers began studying
the existing infrastructure within the state in anticipation of the eventual passage of the Act. This
initial planning allowed the state Highway Department to immediately act to begin construction
on the federally-backed miles of Interstate Highway. The initial projects undertaken by the
Highway Department were more rural in character than urban primarily due to the difficulty in
placing urban rights-of-way in a manner that would not alter existing development too
dramatically. As the Highway Department moved forward with plans for the urban portions of
the Interstate Highway System in Louisiana, the state began to coordinate with city officials in
order to keep the highways as consistent with local plans as possible.53
A requirement of the Act, and of the federal Bureau of Public Roads, was a public
hearing during which the public would be allowed to present their support or opposition to the
State’s proposals with all comments being forwarded to the Bureau of Public Roads in
Washington, D.C. for evaluation prior to a final decision.54 The plans for the federally-funded
highway projects were presented to the community on February 11, 1958 and the hearing
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combined all highway miles in Orleans and Jefferson Parishes. The highways as proposed, and
ultimately approved and constructed, are indicated in Figure 5.8, below.
Figure 5.8 – Times-Picayune reproduction of City Planning Commission’s Map of the
‘Approved Route of City’s Interstate Hwy. Link.’55

The state Highway Department outlined their proposal for Orleans Parish as follows: upon
entering Orleans Parish from Jefferson Parish, the highway:
intersects Pontchartrain Boulevard midway between Kenilworth
Street and Florida Boulevard; then the highway turns south, utilizing
the right of way between West End Boulevard and Pontchartrain
Boulevard. It connects with the Carrollton Interchange at Airline
Highway.56
The highway then continues
through the Airline-Tulane-Carrollton Interchange, then continues
south and east along the Pontchartrain Expressway to a junction at
Claiborne Avenue.
At Claiborne Avenue, the route, as
55
56

Times-Picayune, May 24,1958, accessed via www.newsbank.com, at 14
Ibid, at 13.

139

recommended, swings northeast to approximately St. Bernard
Avenue. From that point it continues in a northeast direction
crossing the Interharbor Navigation Canal to a point approximately
midway between
U. S. 90 and the Lake front. From this point it
swings almost due east, crossing Paris Road, crossing U. S. 90, U. S.
11, near the lake front and then across the lake on new twin
structures. It also includes a section through the Kenilworth area,
starting generally at Pontchartrain Boulevard, Florida Avenue and
extending easterly to a connection with, what we refer to as the outer
loop, to a junction with the inner loop near Franklin Avenue.57
The Interstate Highway proposal outlined by the state Highway Department was, as
previously noted, generally consistent with the Major Streets Plan of the City of New Orleans.
The primary deviation from the plan was that the City called for the development of Florida
Boulevard through Lakeview and Gentilly as a major through connection, the state’s highway
engineers found the use of this right-of-way to be “almost an impossible situation.”58 The route
was complicated by the presence of two rail lines and an awkward angle at which the bypass
highway would have to be connected to the primary highway. This connection would have
resulted in a four level interchange and would have impeded the anticipated industrial
development along the corridor. The state also recognized that New Orleans needed a major
street to serve cross-town traffic and believed that this corridor would best serve that purpose.
Due to these factors, the decision was made to propose the highway, which would eventually be
designated Interstate-610, through residential neighborhoods.59
Of all the highway miles proposed within the City of New Orleans as part of the
Interstate Highway System, the Lakeview-Gentilly proposal for Interstate-610 proposal is the
only portion that generated any substantial opposition at the required public hearing. The mayor,
while trying to placate the residents of these neighborhoods who would lose their homes to
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progress, outlined that the state Highway Department, at the request of the City, evaluated no
less than nine separate proposals for alternate routes that would not bring a highway through
neighborhoods. At the end of the engineering and traffic studies the state determined that the
initial proposed route was the most feasible from traffic movement, cost, and engineering
perspective.60
While not overly enthused about that prospect of large-scale land acquisitions, the City
nevertheless conceded to the Highway Department’s position and Mayor Morrison became a
champion for the project within City government. At the public hearing held on February 11,
1958, numerous individuals and organizations spoke in support of the Highway Department’s
proposal, including Mayor Morrison, the City’s Chief Administrative Officer, the Chamber of
Commerce, the Central Labor Council (local AFL-CIO organization), and the general manager
of City Park, Mr. Ellis LaBorde. Mr. LaBorde’s comments in the context of the hearing were
interesting, in that while neither speaking as a proponent or opponent of the highways generally,
he wanted to put on record that in finalizing the proposal to run the proposed Interstate-610
through City Park, provisions should be made “for the preservation as much as possible of our
golf courses, and some other major attractions that are in the park such as your fountain, and also
for providing for safety of the people patronizing the park by having adequate pedestrian
underpasses and vehicular underpasses.”61
Louis Bisso, the Director of the City Planning Commission, also spoke in overall support
of the project. Mr. Bisso stated that the City Planning Commission had specifically approved of
the proposed highway route as the best for the City and the most keeping with general “planning
principles.” Essentially, the City Planning Commission had analyzed the alternative routes for
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the Lakeview-Gentilly highway and determined that in terms of economy and efficiency, this
route was preferable to some of the proposed routes that would have managed to avoid taking
people’s homes. In looking at the Florida Avenue route, the City Planning Commission
determined that the path would result in the loss of 147 houses where the proposed LakeviewGentilly route would result in the loss of 163 houses. While having less impact on individual
structures, the Commission determined that the complexity involved in creating the junction of
the highways at Florida Avenue would cost far more than the benefit realized in saving sixteen
houses.62
New Orleans’s District “C” Councilman, James Fitzmorris, Jr., was perhaps the most
vocal opponent present at the public hearing. Councilman Fitzmorris specifically rose in
opposition to the Lakeview-Gentilly route proposed as a cross-town connection. In outlining the
history of the project, Councilman Fitzmorris stated that “[o]n July 5, 1957, the city council
expressed its firm opposition to [the Lakeview-Gentilly] segment of the proposed highway route.
… This was done in the form of a definite resolution adopted by the council and passed by a vote
of six to one.”63
Through the Motion of July 5, 1957, the City Council vowed to “put forth its best effort,
and do everything necessary and proper to”64 eliminate the proposed Lakeview-Gentilly bypass
route through New Orleans. The motion firmly stated the position of the Council and directed
Mayor Morrison and all other administrative officials to take action on three specific issues: 1)
remove the Lakeview-Gentilly bypass route from the Interstate Highway System proposal, 2)
make the improvement of the Florida Avenue a priority, as called for in the adopted Major
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New Orleans City Council Motion of July 5, 1957. Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New
Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 296.
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Streets Plan, and 3) include the newly-completed Mississippi River Bridge and approaches in the
Interstate Highway System so that federal dollars could be used to pay for construction of the
bridge and tolls could be eliminated.65
Following this action by the City Council, Councilman Fitzmorris continued, the state
took the position that if New Orleans did not want the highways that the state was proposing then
the City would simply be bypassed; to quote Councilman Fitzmorris:
Again and again, thinly disguised threats were made that the city of
New Orleans would be bypassed in effect an ultimatum was actually
delivered which called for unqualified acceptance by the city
officials of the entire plan embodied in the recommendation made by
the Department’s consulting engineers. The Department called for
unconditional surrender by its firm declaration that no part of the
Interstate Highway System would be constructed in New Orleans
unless the city council objections as expressed in its July 5, 1957
resolution were withdrawn. This resulted in councilmanic action on
November 7, 1957, whereby the July 5, 1957 resolution was recalled
and rescinded and it is significant did not approve the Department’s
plan. It was simply a convenient motion which satisfied the
Department’s conditions, precedent for this public hearing.66
Interestingly, while the New Orleans City Council’s motion of November 7, 1957 did
rescind the motion of July 5, 1957, the Council maintained their overall opposition to the crosstown route proposed to cross through Lakeview and Gentilly. The motion, as adopted, recalled
and rescinded the previous motion and invited the state’s Highway Department to hold their
required hearings in New Orleans; additionally, the motion stated:
At the same time, we again suggest that the proposed cross-town
route continue to be studied by officials of the department with a
view of causing a minimum of property damage, and that assurances
be provided to property owners whose property may have to be
acquired for necessary right-of-way within the next 5-year period
that a fair and reasonable price will be paid for such properties.67
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In acknowledging that New Orleans needed to be connected to the highway system,
Councilman Fitzmorris wanted to be on record as opposing the route that had been determined
by the state and which would interrupt life in several neighborhoods when there were alternate
feasible routes which could be chosen. The Councilman essentially conceded that nothing would
be done about the route selection, and further noted that his constituents realized the same;
however, Councilman Fitzmorris pressed the Department of Highways as to when the property
acquisitions would begin and how long people would be given to find new homes. The initial
timeframe given at this stage of the planning process simply stated that the Lakeview-Gentilly
segment of the highway system would come to fruition in the next ten to fifteen years.
In addition to Councilman James Fitzmorris, Jr., numerous citizens of Lakeview rose in
opposition to the proposed Lakeview-Gentilly route. The residents of this area implored the state
to seriously evaluate the alternate routes even if that meant adding a few minutes of travel to
someone’s cross-town travel. The residents that would feel the immediate impact of the highway
were convinced that the state was ignoring the lives to be interrupted out of mere convenience.68
The absence of discussion about the primary highway to be built along Claiborne Avenue
is notable in the transcript of this hearing. There were two mentions in the entirety of the
meeting, with the exception of where the state verbally outlined the proposed route. While this
section of highway was not particularly objectionable at the time, likely due to the proposed use
of existing right-of-way rather than requiring property acquisition, the Claiborne Avenue
segment of Interstate-10 had the strongest and most detrimental long-term impact to its
surrounding community.
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The first mention was a concern of Tulane University, which was proposing to develop
property at Claiborne Avenue and Canal Street. The particular concern was if their development
would be taken and demolished due to the placement of entrance and exit ramps from the
highway. Representatives of the state highway department obfuscated in ‘clarifying’ that the
topic of the hearing was only on the general routes and that the exact locations of entrances and
exits would be determined at a later time.69
The second mention was in the context of a proposal made by Fred Donaldson to
eliminate the Lakeview-Gentilly route altogether and create a combined local and bypass route
within the Claiborne Avenue right-of-way. This proposal called for the construction of a layered
highway, with local traffic utilizing surface streets, local highway traffic on the first level of
grade-separated highway and then a second highway level to accommodate cross-town traffic
separate from the entering and exiting local highway use (see Figure 5.9).70 The record does not
indicate if this proposal was seriously considered by the Highway Department, but regardless it
was not selected and the Highway Department proceeded with, and the federal Bureau of Public
Roads approved of, the initial highway proposal for New Orleans, with the Lakeview-Gentilly
bypass route included.
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Figure 5.9 – Illustration of ‘The Fred Donaldson Plan to Eliminate the Lakeview Bypass”71

By the mid-1960s, the Mississippi River Bridge was approaching its daily traffic capacity
and the Mississippi River Bridge Authority, in conjunction with the City Planning Commission
began to evaluate proposals on increasing the daily traffic capacity of vehicular river crossings.
The City Planning Commission staff broke the possibilities for satisfying traffic demands into
four possible solutions:72
1) Increase the capacity of the existing bridge or build a new one at the same
location.
2) Construct an additional bridge over the Mississippi River between the present
bridge and the Huey P. Long Bridge.
3) Impose tolls on the use of the existing Mississippi River Bridge to discourage
use by private automobile.73
4) A combination of items two and three.
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Ibid, at 6.
Consideration of a Proposal to Increase the Capacity of the Mississippi River Bridge (City Planning Commission
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Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 197, at 9-2.
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The recommendation proposed by the staff and ultimately adopted by the City Planning
Commission and forwarded to the Mississippi River Bridge Authority was the last, with several
additional items to be considered in order to address congestion and vehicle movement:74
1) Steps should be taken to increase the capacity of the Huey P. Long Bridge.
2) Construction of a new Mississippi River crossing should be started
immediately at a location between the Mississippi River Bridge and the Huey
P. Long Bridge.
3) Transit terminals with available parking should be constructed on the
Westbank to encourage the use of transit to access the Central Business
District.
4) A large parking structure should be built at the Algiers ferry terminal and
high-speed pedestrian ferries instituted.
5) Begin planning for the construction of the Paris Road Bridge with the goal of
completion by 1980 or earlier if the Dixie Freeway is constructed.75, 76
The recommendation of the City Planning Commission was forwarded to the Mississippi River
Bridge Authority for consideration and initial planning began to further the construction of a
second Mississippi River crossing within the City of New Orleans. In November of 1966, the
Mississippi River Bridge Authority obtained approval through a constitutional amendment to
refinance the existing Mississippi River Bridge to fund construction of two additional bridges. 77
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Consideration of a Proposal to Increase the Capacity of the Mississippi River Bridge, at 9-7.
The Paris Road Bridge was proposed to connect Lower Coast Algiers with Paris Road in St. Bernard Parish,
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The preliminary planning of this new bridge called for it to be located approximately at
Napoleon Avenue in New Orleans connecting to the vicinity of Barataria Boulevard in Jefferson
Parish. The bridge proposal itself did not seem to incite much opposition; however, the
opposition from both the community and elected officials surrounded the placement of the bridge
approaches. Mayor Victor Schiro’s administration generally supported the bridge proposal but
only if the approaches would tie into the proposed Riverfront Expressway without creating a
highway through existing neighborhoods. This position was echoed by a study commissioned by
Governor John McKeithen, which stated that the bridge’s approaches “must be an extension of
the Riverfront Expressway” and that no elevated approaches should be permitted along Napoleon
Avenue or any other street nor should any approaches be allowed to bisect residential
neighborhoods. The report concluded that the proposed bridge at Napoleon Avenue could only
be considered if the Riverfront Expressway was realized.78
In 1969, the U. S. Secretary of Transportation acted to eliminate all consideration of the
Riverfront Expressway by federal officials, the end of this project then made the
recommendations of the Mayor and Governor impossible. The Mississippi River Bridge
Authority proceeded with plans to construct a bridge at the Napoleon Avenue location but now
with revised approaches running down Napoleon Avenue and connecting with South Claiborne
Avenue via a tunnel. This was later revised to remove the tunnel from Napoleon Avenue and
place it in the vicinity of General Taylor Street, six blocks downstream from Napoleon Avenue.
This approach was also to be placed underground via a tunnel but would require large-scale
property acquisitions and the demolition of 820 housing units, displacing approximately 3,300
people.79
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Opposition within the community quickly coalesced, and with that community pushback
came opposition from elected officials. The New Orleans City Council passed a resolution
rejecting the General Taylor Street proposal due to the displacement of homes and individuals as
well as the need to bisect a community in order to construct the approaches to the bridge. The
Mississippi River Bridge Authority responded to the Council’s opposition in a letter on April 23,
1970.
In this letter, the Authority generally states that the General Taylor Street location of the
bridge is the most practical and that the City would suffer dire economic consequences if they do
not concede to the Authority’s plan to improve traffic flow into the City of New Orleans from
neighboring Jefferson Parish. The Authority presented a case to the New Orleans Council that
tax revenues would suffer due to blight caused by disinvestment in the City and that Jefferson
Parish’s West Bank would develop into a satellite Central Business District which would lead to
less metropolitan concern for the historic commercial core of the community.80
The community and political opposition to the proposed Napoleon Avenue/General
Taylor Street crossing did not diminish, and the Mississippi River Bridge Authority relented in
August, 1970 in the form of a Resolution which, to briefly summarize, stated that the Authority
has determined that the General Taylor Street crossing is best and if either the City of New
Orleans or Jefferson Parish want the bridge located elsewhere they need to pay for the studies
and engineering. The Authority expressed willingness to build their bridge wherever the local
governments selected but that they would not expend their resources on determining any location
other than the one they had already selected.81
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This decision resulted in the cancellation of the second Mississippi River crossing
between the Mississippi River Bridge and the Huey P. Long Bridge, but the traffic capacity
problems on the two bridges remained. To settle the question of location, in 1971 Governor
McKeithen appointed a committee to study possible bridge location and to present the state with
a location so planning could proceed. Several options were evaluated by the Molony committee
(named for the Chair of the committee, Michael Molony, President of the New Orleans Chamber
of Commerce), including locations entirely in Jefferson Parish, a location between Algiers and
Press Street in New Orleans, and a location to parallel the existing Greater New Orleans Bridge.
After years of study, the committee voted to recommend the parallel location to the state and this
location was subsequently endorsed by Governor Edwards on August 30, 1974.82
Ultimately the City of New Orleans, Jefferson Parish and the Mississippi River Bridge
Authority agreed that the best location for a supplemental crossing would be adjacent to the
existing Mississippi River Bridge. Much of the required right-of-way was already in the
possession of the State and through reconfiguring the existing approaches very little new land
would be required, particularly in downtown New Orleans where property values were highest.
The second Greater New Orleans Bridge, dubbed “GNO II,” opened to traffic on October 1,
1988.
The Land Assembly
It is impossible to argue that a bridge or highway is not a “public use” as understood by
the American legal system, but regardless of the State’s ability to expropriate land to complete
these projects, it is clear from the property records that substantial efforts were made to acquire
property through negotiated sales rather than through judicial expropriation.
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For the purpose of analyzing land acquisition for the Mississippi River Bridges and the
Pontchartrain Expressway, property records were surveyed for the span of the bridge and
expressway between the foot of the Mississippi River Bridge at the West Bank toll plaza to the
point where the Pontchartrain Expressway began traveling through the New Basin Canal rightof-way. Once the highway entered the existing government-owned right-of-way, land
acquisition was minimal and would have only been required to accommodate entrances and exits
from the highway.
For the construction of the Mississippi River Bridge and the Pontchartrain Expressway a
survey of property transfers, summarized in Tables 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, indicates a total of 184
parcels acquired to assemble the right-of-way of both projects (full property transfer information
for this project can be found in Appendix 5.2). Out of the 184 parcels acquired for the projects,
only 45 of those were acquired by the state through acts of judicial expropriation, which is
approximately 24% of the property acquisition for these projects.
Table 5.1 –Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Mississippi River Bridge
Right-of-Way (West Bank/Algiers)83
Number of Parcels
Number of Parcels
Square
Acquired
Expropriated
280
9
4
281
12
4
282
15
4
285-A
3
2
285-B
3
1
A
2
0
(284A)
7A
1
0
7B
3
0
8A
4
0
59
13
5

83

See Appendix 5.2 for Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain
Expressway Right-of-Way.
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Table 5.2 –Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Mississippi River Bridge
Right-of-Way (Lower Garden District / Central Business District)84
Number of Parcels
Number of Parcels
Square
Acquired
Expropriated
46
4
1
71
6
2
72
6
1
138
3
0
139
4
1
156
6
2
157
15
2
158
9
1
159
6
2
Table 5.3 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Pontchartrain Expressway
Right-of-Way.85
Number of Parcels
Number of Parcels
Square
Acquired
Expropriated
214
6
4
238
16
1
254
9
2
277
4
2
290 &
16
2
312
325
9
2
The next project undertaken by the Louisiana Department of Highways in New Orleans
was the Interstate Highway System. As previously discussed, the State’s proposed highway route
followed the City’s approved Major Streets Plan fairly accurately, with the deviation of the
Lakeview-Gentilly Bypass not following Florida Avenue. In the acquisition of these rights-ofway, the Highway Department used their power of expropriation sparingly, which is surprising
particularly due to the opposition that had been voiced at the public hearing regarding the route
in 1958. Through analysis of the property acquisitions, it appears that the minimal number of
takings for this project is attributable to two factors: time and power.
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Time is proposed as the first factor in helping to minimize the necessity of expropriation
in these projects. In reviewing the timeline of these projects, it is clear that the State was in no
particular rush to acquire parcels. The required public hearing was held in early 1958 and the
property acquisitions began in 1959 and were completed in 1972, with the bulk of properties
being acquired in the early to mid 1960s. It appears that through this extended period many
people were able to negotiate sales with the Highway Department that would allow the State to
acquire the needed property while not having to forcibly evict people from their homes.
The second factor, power, is proposed because in the case of the Interstate Highways
through New Orleans, most of the property taken was that of individuals whereas the case of the
Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressway much of the property was owned by
commercial interests. This would have meant that in many cases individual property owners
would have likely yielded to the needs of the State without much objection where commercial
property owners would have been in a better financial position to try to fight the expropriations
with the goal of either realizing a higher price for the property or retaining their property.
In evaluating the property transfers for the Interstate Highways through New Orleans, a
decision was made to limit the scope of this research to property acquisitions for Interstate-10 to
the section between Tulane and Franklin Avenues and then the entire route of Interstate-610
from Franklin Avenue to West End Boulevard. These boundaries were determined due to the
sparse population found beyond Franklin Avenue and the route of the highways past that point.
Much of Interstate-10 through New Orleans East, as it is now known, was acquired by the City
as part of the Little Woods–Lakeshore Highway with much of the remaining right-of-way
paralleling existing rail lines.
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The full property transfer table for this project can be found in Appendix 5.3, but the
findings are summarized in Tables 5.4 and 5.5. (below). As indicated previously, the number of
expropriations found in the land acquisition for the Interstate rights-of-way were statistically far
lower than the 24% expropriation rate found for the initial construction of the Mississippi River
Bridge and the Pontchartrain Expressway although the total property acquisition, by number of
parcels, was much higher.
Table 5.4 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Interstate-10 Right-of-Way
(Tulane Avenue to Franklin Avenue).86

86

Square

Number of Parcels Acquired

403
434
207
208
209
225
164
182
193
197
198
199
753
754
755
757
758
767
768
769
888
909
910
1026
1027
1028
1056
1057
1058
1073
1209
1172

9
16
3
17
3
7
4
5
6
6
10
11
6
16
10
9
7
11
26
3
20
6
20
6
15
7
6
17
12
19
14
10

Number of Parcels
Expropriated
3
2
1
5
1
1
0
0
3
2
4
8
2
2
0
3
0
3
3
0
2
1
0
0
3
0
1
2
0
1
2
3

See Appendix 5.3 for Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Intersate-10 and Interstate-610 rights-of-way.
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Square

Number of Parcels Acquired

1210
1211
1380
1381
1493
1494
1708
1917
1918
1978

5
15
11
14
4
10
3
12
7
9

Number of Parcels
Expropriated
0
0
2
2
0
1
0
2
1
0

Table 5.5 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Interstate-610 Right-of-Way
(Franklin Avenue to West End Boulevard).87
Square
2095 /
2096
2097
2098
2099
2100
2101
2102
3
4
6
7
12
13
2104
2105
2106
2107
2109
2110
2111
2137 /
2289
1966
2112
2113
2114
2115
2116

87

Number of
Parcels
Acquired

Number of
Parcels
Expropriated

Square

Number of
Parcels
Acquired

Number of
Parcels
Expropriated

1

0

2133

9

0

14
17
14
14
18
18
21
6
22
15
19
8
17
21
18
17
16
18
20

0
3
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
0
0
0
1
1
0
2
0

2132
2131
2295
2296
2297
2298
2313
2314
2315
2316
402-B
400
399
398
397
396
395
5 or 394
4 or 393

22
5
7
1
1
1
1
1
1
7
1
10
11
10
13
13
12
11
14

1
1
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1

9

0

3

5

0

10
16
6
1
9
1

0
2
1
0
0
0

2 or 392
1
391
390
427
428

16
9
8
19
2
21

0
2
0
0
0
0

See Appendix 5.3 for Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Intersate-10 and Interstate-610 rights-of-way.
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In the assembly of right-of-way for Intersate-10, the state acquired a total of 427 parcels.
Of these 427 individual parcels, a total of 66 properties were taken through expropriation,
making a 15% expropriation rate for this section of the highway system. Surprisingly, the
expropriations for the Interstate-610 section of the highway system resulted in even fewer
expropriations in both real numbers and as a percentage of total properties acquired. For the
Interstate-610 route through Lakeview and Gentilly, a total of 597 parcels were acquired by the
state with only 25 of these resulting from judicial expropriation, bringing the expropriation
percentage for this section of highway to a mere 4%.
Notably, the Claiborne Avenue section of Interstate-10, which was to be constructed
entirely within City-owned right-of-way actually resulted in the largest percentage of
expropriations of any individual segment of the interstate highway route through New Orleans.
While this land was actually taken for entrance and exit ramps rather than the actual highway,
the State acquired 155 individual parcels on squares abutting Claiborne Avenue (from Tulane
Avenue to St. Bernard Circle) and exercised eminent domain in the acquisition of 42 of these
properties. This resulted in an expropriation rate of 27% for the acquisition of rights-of-way
through New Orleans’s historic Tremé neighborhood. If the property acquisitions in this area are
removed from the above total presented for acquisition of the Interstate-10 right-of-way, this
brings the actual expropriation rate for assembly of the remaining 272 parcels down to 9%, with
a total of 24 expropriations outside of Tremé.
In construction of the GNOII Bridge, the Mississippi River crossing paralleling the
original Mississippi River Bridge from Algiers to the Central Business District and Lower
Garden District, the State Highway Department required additional properties to accommodate
the now-widening bridge right-of-way. While the site analysis used to select the location
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determined that very little new property would be required by saving space through
reconfiguration of the existing access ramps, the total property acquisition for the construction of
the second span and the attendant changes to the Pontchartrain Expressway resulted in the State’s
acquisition of 143 parcels (184 parcels were acquired for the construction of the original span).
Detailed property acquisition information can be found in Appendix 5.2, but is briefly
summarized in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 below:
Table 5.6 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Greater New Orleans Bridge
II Construction (West Bank/Algiers)88
Number of Parcels
Number of Parcels
Square
Acquired
Expropriated
275
20
3
276
8
1
274
21
4
270
10
1
271-A
1
0
282
2
1
285-A
2
0
285-B
1
0
270-A
7
0
C
15
0
7B
1
1
8B
1
0
59
10
2
Table 5.7 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Greater New Orleans Bridge
II Construction (Lower Garden District / Central Business District)89
Number of Parcels
Number of Parcels
Square
Acquired
Expropriated
46
1
1
70A
1
1
71
7
2
72
7
2
119
4
2
138
2
1
139
2
2
88

See Appendix 5.2 for Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Greater New Orleans Bridge II and
Pontchartrain Expressway Right-of-Way.
89
See Appendix 5.2 for Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Greater New Orleans Bridge II and
Pontchartrain Expressway Right-of-Way.
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Square
156
157
158

Number of Parcels
Acquired
3
2
5

Number of Parcels
Expropriated
2
0
1

Table 5.8 – Parcels Acquired by Purchase versus Expropriations for Pontchartrain Expressway
Right-of-Way.90
Number of Parcels
Number of Parcels
Square
Acquired
Expropriated
183
5
1
214
1
0
238
2
0
254
2
2
Out of the 143 parcels acquired for this project, the state expropriated 30, which results in
a 21% expropriation rate for this project. This percentage is similar to the 24% expropriation
rate that was found for the original Mississippi River Bridge and Pontchartrain Expressway
project. This finding serves to underscore the reality that power, or perception thereof, played a
role in deciding whether to fight the State or acquiesce to their purchase request. Many of the
parcels acquired for this project, particularly in the Lower Garden District and the Central
Business District, were commercially owned, whereas those in Algiers were predominantly
residential. If property acquisition for each side of the river is separated and analyzed
independently, this theory becomes even clearer: on the Westbank the effective expropriation
rate for the GNOII project was 13% whereas in the Lower Garden District and Central Business
District the expropriation rate was 41%.
The Legacy
The long-term implications of the highway projects in the New Orleans area are similar
to those found throughout the country. Rather than making the historic commercial core of the
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community more accessible, the bridges and highways intensified the abandonment of these
urban areas in favor of the tranquility of suburbia. As an example of this, one can look at the
traffic volume counts provided by the City Planning Commission of New Orleans in their
analysis of the proposal to increase the capacity of the Mississippi River Bridge. To look at the
totals for just two years paints a picture of the exponential growth of the once-rural West Bank
into a bustling suburb. The Mississippi River Bridge was planned with a capacity of 50,000
vehicles per day; this capacity was projected to adequately serve demand into the 1990s.91
According to the City Planning Commission’s Staff Report, in January of 1964 the Mississippi
River Bridge had an average daily traffic count of 30,831. By January of 1965 the daily traffic
count increased to 48,932.92
Figure 5.10 – The Crescent City Connection, as viewed from Algiers (2012).93

The bridges and highways have become ingrained into the travel patterns of New
Orleanians and have ever-increasing traffic volumes. Much of the highway route has become an
accepted part of everyday life in both commuting and as elements of the urban landscape.
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Memorandum to Mr. Bisso.
Consideration of a Proposal to Increase the Capacity of the Mississippi River Bridge
93
Photograph by author.
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Figure 5.11 – Present Aerial View of New Orleans Interstate Highways (in yellow), Jefferson
Parish Line to Franklin Avenue.94

Figure 5.12 – Present Aerial View of New Orleans Interstate Highways (in yellow), Franklin
Avenue to St. Tammany Parish Line.95

94
95

Google Maps Aerial Imagery, retrieved from maps.google.com on September 10, 2012.
Google Maps Aerial Imagery, retrieved from maps.google.com on September 10, 2012.
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The only part of the system that is controversial today is a portion that was almost ignored when
it was proposed and constructed: the Claiborne Avenue section of Interstate-10.
Figure 5.13 – Map of Interstate-10 from the Pontchartrain Expressway to Elysian Fields
Avenue.96

When this section of highway was constructed, a neighborhood was bifurcated and a
thriving African-American commercial corridor was destroyed. North Claiborne Avenue
through Tremé was a wide boulevard lined with local businesses and majestic oak trees under
which the community could gather (Figure 5.14). This was replaced with concrete and the
perpetual shadow cast by an elevated highway (Figure 5.15). It is worth noting that Tremé was
not the only community split by the Interstate Highway System; Interstate-610 ran directly
through the Lakeview and Gentilly neighborhoods, clearing hundreds of structures as it crossed
the city. It is impossible to state conclusively why these communities did not suffer the same
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Tulane University School of Architecture (1965). Study of the Proposed Riverfront and Elysian Fields
Expressway and an Alternate Proposal. Plate 9. Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New Orleans
Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 292.
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Figure 5.14 – North Claiborne Avenue at Dumaine Street (looking east), undated (1950s).97

Figure 5.15 – North Claiborne Avenue at Dumaine Street (looking east), 2012.98

negative impacts found in the Tremé area, but it is this researcher’s belief that the reason is likely
to do with two separate factors: the first being that these were relatively new areas of residential
97
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www.nutrias.org.
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development, therefore the place attachment was not as strong as would have been found in the
historic Tremé community; and the second being that Interstate-610 did not remove a historic
community gathering space, as was lost on North Claiborne Avenue.
The selection of North Claiborne Avenue for the placement of the elevated Interstate
Highway was based on the designation of North Claiborne Avenue as a ‘major street’ within the
Major Streets Plan and the availability of right-of-way, the records do not indicate that there
were any ill intentions regarding placement of this highway through this thriving AfricanAmerican community. White elites in New Orleans have been charged with indifference to the
construction of this section of highway at best and racism at worst. The official archive records
reveal evidence of neither.
Since the time of highway construction, subsequent research has stated that
preservationists, in fighting against the proposed Riverfront Expressway, offered North
Claiborne Avenue as an alternative, encouraging double-layered highway development through
this area to satisfy the traffic capacity which required the addition of the Riverfront Expressway.
Mohl (2002) cites the Vieux Carré Courier as a vocal supporter of this alternative, editorializing
in 1965 that the right-of-way on North Claiborne Avenue could “be developed to the limit, with
at least two upper levels.”99 It is important to note that although little attention was paid to the
decision at the time, the use of North Claiborne Avenue as Interstate Highway right-of-way was
designated following the public hearing in February of 1958 and was not the result of eliminating
the Riverfront Expressway.
Additionally, based on copies of national publications found within the City Planning
Commission’s archived material, the prevailing thinking of the era was that highway adjacency
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would actually boost property values and commercial desirability rather than depress it.
According to the American Right of Way Association “all properties coming within the
influence of a freeway [would] enjoy tremendous benefits.”100 These benefits would be realized
not only in increased commercial traffic for adjacent businesses but also in the form of higher
property values for properties adjacent to these highways.101 These publications cited specific
figures from studies in multiple states attesting to the benefits of urban expressways, this was
likely an accurate assessment of the impact of these highways in areas where there was room for
development as a result of expressway construction. These reports only addressed truly urban
expressways in terms of the slum clearance possibilities of such projects. The Automotive
Safety Foundation profiled the success of highways in New Orleans, referencing the
Pontchartrain Expressway and grade separation projects that were occupying the New Basin
Canal right-of-way, stating that “a blighted area partially surrounded the business district” and
that “high-grade planning and financing resulted in slum clearance, … right of way for a
proposed freeway, appropriate site for a new city hall and civic center as well as a new medical
center.”102
Regardless of how the Pontchartrain Expressway and related improvements may have
been portrayed nationally, planning officials in New Orleans saw the highways, and particularly
the interstate system, as a mechanism to provide for transportation needs of the community
rather than as an instrument of change. In a 1960 questionnaire from Engineering News-Record,
Louis Bisso, Director of the City Planning Commission, was asked: “Is your city taking the
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fullest advantage of the opportunities offered by urban expressway construction for slum
clearance, urban renewal, rezoning, relief of traffic congestion and other community objectives?”
Mr. Bisso’s response stated that the focus of urban highways in New Orleans was transportation
and that the other elements were of “incidental importance.” Speaking for the City of New
Orleans, he further stated that:
Of primary importance is the assurance that [a]n Express Way
System functions as a unifying force for the community and not a
disruptive element. Our primary concern is providing an adequate
circulation program with a minimal amount of disruption of
community integrity. … In addition, approximately 78% of the
Interstate System in the City of New Orleans will require little if
any expropriation of property and structure demolition.103
It is impossible to state what unspoken motivations may have been at play, but what is
clear is that while destruction of this community may not have been the anticipated outcome it is
the lasting end result of this project. In 1950, North Claiborne Avenue, from Canal Street to St.
Bernard Avenue, was home to 123 businesses and by 1996 businesses within the same section of
North Claiborne Avenue numbered only 44. A full inventory of businesses from 1950 and 1996
can be found in Appendix 5.4. This number is certainly only one which illustrates the decline of
this once-thriving neighborhood commercial area.
Recognizing the impact of this project and the steady decline of the community which
began in the 1960s following construction of this highway and today the community and the
municipal leadership have agreed to explore the possibility of removing the elevated highway
and restoring what was once a grand boulevard, though any final decision-making lies with the
State’s Department of Transportation.104
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Chapter 6
The New Orleans Cultural Center:
‘Culture’ as Defined by Bureaucracy
The New Orleans Cultural Center, known today as Louis Armstrong Park, was New
Orleans’s second attempt at urban renewal, following the Civic Center. While the land
acquisition for this project began in the late 1950s, the space would not be developed or become
usable until the early 1970s. Through the years, this project has come to symbolize the
institutional disregard for New Orleans’s indigenous culture in favor of ‘culture’ as defined by
national and international trends, as well as a disregard for the city’s African-American culture
by the white establishment. Additionally, this is an example of top-down planning that has been
imposed on a community with little regard for the impact on those most affected.
The Cultural Center concept was based on the Bartholomew Civic Center plan from the
1920s (discussed previously in Chapters 2 and 4) and grew from the construction of the
Municipal Auditorium. This project was part of Mayor deLesseps S. Morrison’s strategy to
modernize New Orleans to strengthen the local economy as well as to bolster the civic amenities
available to New Orleanians. The Cultural Center, initially proposed to house a theatre, an opera
house, a sports arena, and museums, was never made a priority by municipal government outside
of acquiring the requisite land for Municipal Auditorium parking. Figure 6.5 (page 183) indicates
the location ultimately selected for the development of the Cultural Center.
Other projects during the 1950s were considered higher priorities in the City and region,
resulting in a lack of inertia for the Cultural Center project. The International Center, consisting
of the Rivergate Convention Center and the New Orleans International Trade Mart, was
proposed at the same time as the Cultural Center and was deemed to be a greater need by the
business community and the City Planning Commission. Subsequently, the Louisiana
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Superdome was proposed and constructed, negating the need for the sports arena which had been
proposed for the Cultural Center.
The Vision
By the late 1940s, the vision for a Civic Center, outlined by Harland Bartholomew and
Associates in 1925 in the vicinity of North Rampart Street and Orleans Street, had been shelved
in favor of the Civic Center being constructed at Loyola Avenue and Poydras Street (see Chapter
4). In 1951, the City’s planning consultants, Harland Bartholomew and Associates, presented
their ‘Public Buildings’ report to the City Planning Commission which proposed an assembly
center to be developed near the Municipal Auditorium. This assembly center would generally
comprise the existing auditorium, a new sports arena and a building to house exhibits.1 This
initial vision was further refined through the 1950s, and in 1961 a report entitled Public
Buildings Report II was published by the New Orleans City Planning Commission outlining a
more detailed description of those uses which would be located at the Cultural Center.
While the exact plans for what was to be located within the Cultural Center were not
defined until the 1960s, land acquisition for the project began in 1955 when the City Council
appropriated one million dollars of the annual Capital Outlay for the purpose.2 This land
acquisition began prior to the development of a plan for the site, and over the objection of the
City Planning Commission; however, City leadership believed that the land acquisition was
necessary for two reasons: to replace parking for the Municipal Auditorium (which was being
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lost to street improvements),3 and because the land value would rise once the proposed street
improvements were completed.4
Figure 6.1 – Basin Street – Orleans Avenue Connection in Relation to the Cultural Center.5

These street improvements were necessary to improve access to both the proposed
Cultural Center complex and to the Central Business District. This new connection, modern-day
Basin Street, would connect the new interstate highway to the Vieux Carré and the CBD as well
as compliment and tie into the ongoing street widening project on Loyola Avenue as part of the
Civic Center project (see Chapter 4). In order to make this connection part of the grand
boulevard connecting the Union Passenger Terminal, Civic Center and Cultural Center to the
Interstate Highway, three existing municipal squares of parking for the Municipal Auditorium
3
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would be at least partially converted to roadway.6 In addition to the immediate physical needs of
the City relative to parking and street improvements, the federal government was providing
funding for land acquisition for eligible projects. By utilizing the available federal dollars, the
City would be able to acquire the land needed for these immediate goals and for the long term
goals of the Cultural Center in a manner less costly to the municipal coffers.7
According to the Public Buildings Report II, “[t]he “Cultural Center” [was] to provide a
nucleus for recreation, entertainment and culture in New Orleans, and ultimately a high density
dwellings area in the core of the city.”8 As proposed, the Cultural Center would include an opera
house, concert hall, “legitimate” theater, museum, community facilities building, high rise
apartments, and restaurants, shops, stores, schools, churches and green areas.9 The location of
this center was proposed to be in the area generally bounded by North Rampart Street, Esplanade
Avenue, N. Claiborne Avenue and St. Louis Street.10
The Cultural Center was envisioned as a civic meeting place and an environment for
education, recreation and the exchange of ideas; the Center would be developed as a 24-hour
space to attract both tourists and locals with an eye to the cultural and historical landscape of the
City. Interestingly, city leaders felt it their duty to provide this forum not only for New Orleans,
but also for the metropolitan area. In a document prepared by the City Planning Commission in
1973 outlining the Cultural Center project, it was noted that “[c]ultural facilities are virtually
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absent in the parishes surrounding New Orleans; therefore, New Orleans has the responsibility of
providing cultural attractions for the entire metropolitan region.”11
With this recognized responsibility, the City envisioned a Center that would serve the
needs of a growing metropolitan region. The population of the region at the time of the project’s
conception was approximately one million with a projected total population of 1.5 million by the
time the full Cultural Center would be completed based on a 25-year development schedule.12
Since this would be a Center to serve the needs of a region, rather than the community in which
the complex would be located, the diverse needs and wants of a large population were
considered.
The goal of the Cultural Center, as it developed from concept to functioning plan, was for
it to “become the center of cultural activities in the New Orleans Metropolitan region”13 and to
cater to “the educational and recreational needs of families for miles around.”14 In addition to
the creation of a regional attraction, the proposal called for the development to minimize impacts
on adjacent neighborhoods by including parking garages accessible from the adjacent major
streets and fully utilizing its location with respect to existing public transportation lines.
In the City Planning Commission’s Public Buildings Report II, the benefits of the
proposed Cultural Center were broken into bullet points outlining the goals of the project with
respect to the development of the City as a whole. The goals of the project are summarized
below:15
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Remove ‘blight’ on the site of the Cultural Center and influence the improvement
of the surrounding neighborhood.



Implement the City’s Master Plan through careful site selection.



Create a complex of buildings which both civic design and open space.



Group public functions while allowing some private development



Provide tangible evidence of the City’s accomplishments.

In addition to these goals, the character of the proposed development would allow the expression
of history, tradition and culture of the City through site design and architecture.16 Additionally,
the Cultural Center could be designed in a way that would bring day and night activity to the area
and designed to “relate to human scale by the inclusion of uses that will attract the general
public.”17
In their Public Buildings Report II, the City Planning Commission outlined five physical
factors that were considered in selecting a site for the Cultural Center: the creation of a growth
boundary on the northeastern side of the Central Business District, the redevelopment of an area
whose potential was not being realized, creating a visual relationship with both the Union
Passenger Terminal and St. Louis Cathedral, creation of parking areas, and suitability of the
location for assembly activities.
In line with the first of these criteria, the Cultural Center was proposed in the vicinity of
the Municipal Auditorium to serve as a barrier between the Central Business District (CBD) and
nearby residential neighborhoods. The City Planning Commission noted that there were uses
being established on the periphery of the CBD which are more suited to the historic commercial
center. They believed that the establishment of a large public space at the edge of the CBD
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would serve as a deterrent to business interests expanding beyond that area and would therefore
encourage development in the core area of the City. The Public Buildings Report II notes that
this was part of the strategy employed in selecting the site of the Civic Center and that by doing
so the City had successfully encouraged new development in both the area of the Civic Center
and between the historic commercial core and the new Civic Center complex.18
The selection of the Municipal Auditorium area as the new Cultural Center shared a
second common element with the Civic Center as well: the complete rehabilitation of a
neighborhood which “was not fulfilling its potential as Central Business District property.”19
The City Planning Commission envisioned that this renewal would not only involve removal of
blighted property which would increase the values of adjacent properties, but would also spur the
private redevelopment of commercial structures along North Rampart Street. The anticipated
positive impacts of the proposed Cultural Center were not limited to North Rampart Street or the
Tremé neighborhood. They extended to the “accelerate[d] rehabilitation of the Vieux Carré” and
“protection against the infringement of incompatible uses.”20
The aesthetic reasoning for selecting the location was to create a grand civic boulevard
(Loyola Avenue/Basin Street/Orleans Avenue), extending from the Union Passenger Terminal to
the Cultural Center, with the new Civic Center as the mid-point. This location afforded the City
the opportunity to highlight the new Basin Street/Orleans Avenue connection to the proposed
Interstate Highway (see Chapter 5) as well as the newly-expanded Loyola Avenue which
connected the Union Passenger Terminal and the Civic Center to Canal Street. Additionally, this
location also provided convenient access from around the metropolitan region to the Cultural
Center, via the proposed Interstate Highway. The location also served a second aesthetic
18
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purpose in connecting the sight-line from the St. Louis Cathedral to a public building complex
via a “visual axis along Orleans Street through the Vieux Carré.”21
Figure 6.2 – Cultural Center site in relation to the proposed Interstate Highway.22

Parking concerns drove the acquisition of land in this area without consideration of the
larger Cultural Center project. The need for land in this area only served to provide another
reason for the selection of the Municipal Auditorium area to house the proposed Cultural Center.
As previously noted, the City was constructing the Basin Street/Orleans Avenue connection to
the Interstate Highway which caused the loss of existing Municipal Auditorium parking for the
new roadway. While the Interstate Highway was not yet constructed, the route had been
21
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approved in 1958 and construction of the highway was seen as imminent. The City recognized
the need to provide adequate parking for the Auditorium and the growing Central Business
District, and the City Planning Commission concluded that this area could serve both; the needs
of the CBD would be met during the day and the needs of the Auditorium would be met at night
and on weekends.23
The final element of site selection, according to the Public Buildings Report II, was the
“suitability of the area for major public assembly facilities.”24 The City Planning Commission
determined that this site was within walking distance of Canal Street and the historic commercial
core of the City and was connected to major streets and the Interstate Highway. This location
was therefore deemed ideal in that it would “relate to urban facilities to become an interesting
cosmopolitan area.”25
Proposed in tandem with the City’s new Cultural Center was an International Center,
which would be comprised of a convention center (the Rivergate Convention Center, now the
site of Harrah’s Casino), a hotel, and an office building, the International Trade Mart, which
would provide office space for the Dock Board, International Trade Mart, and foreign
consulates.26 This proposal was seen as critical to maintaining New Orleans’s position both as a
tourist and convention destination and as a major international trading center due to the Port of
New Orleans. This International Center was introduced not as a competing proposal with the
Cultural Center, but as a complementary one in which the International Center would serve the
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commercial and tourism interests while the Cultural Center would be designed to serve the
citizens of the region.27
The initial discussions of the projects included consideration of combining the
International and Cultural Centers. In 1961, the City’s Chief Administrative Officer, Glenn
Clasen, sent a memorandum to Mayor Victor Schiro effectively ending consideration of
combining the facilities. In evaluating the proposals, several issues were raised which made
consolidating the proposals either impractical or impossible. Specifically, the Chief
Administrative Officer determined that: 1) the uses proposed within the two proposals were
incompatible; 2) there was no duplication of services created by moving forward with both
proposals separately; 3) consolidating the proposals into a single location would generate parking
and traffic issues; 4) the Municipal Auditorium site had existing needs that would have to be met
regardless of the eventual fate of the Cultural Center; and 5) the Federal assistance available for
the Cultural Center site would not be available for the proposed site of the International Center
due to its location in the commercial core of the City. In addition to these findings, Mr. Clasen
also noted that moving forward with the Cultural Center in its proposed location would also
allow the Municipal Government to eliminate substandard housing.28
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Figure 6.3 – Times-Picayune Illustration of the Relative Locations of the Proposed Cultural
Center and International Center.29

The Planning
As stated previously, the planning for what would become the New Orleans Cultural
Center (initially the Assembly Center and later Louis Armstrong Park) began with the
Bartholomew Plan for New Orleans in the 1920s. This initial proposal called for the construction
of a grand civic center in the area now occupied by the Cultural Center but the plan was shelved
in the 1930s as the nation struggled through the Great Depression, and the municipal priorities of
New Orleans changed through the years. The New Orleans Civic Center (Chapter 4) was
developed in the early 1950s at a different location that was more in line with encouraging
growth in the Central Business District. Through the years, however, the original plan for
Bartholomew’s civic center was not forgotten and the Municipal Auditorium (Chapter 2) served
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as an ever-present reminder of the grand plans for the redevelopment of the Tremé neighborhood
at the backdoor of the Vieux Carré.
Beginning in 1955, the Morrison administration began including land acquisition for the
Cultural Center in its Capital Budget proposals to the City Planning Commission and the City
Council.30 The Capital Budget process is required to outline capital expenses on a five year
schedule pursuant to the City’s Charter; however this outline can be changed yearly as priorities
change. The table below reflects the dollar amounts for land acquisition budgeted by the City
Planning Commission and the City Council only in the year immediately following adoption of
the Capital Budget in order to reflect the actual amounts available rather than the projected
amounts that were included in previous budget years.
Table 6.1 – Budgeted Capital Expenditures for Land Acquisition for the Cultural Center31
Capital Budget
City Planning
City Council Total Budgeted
Year
Recommendation
Action
Expenditures
1955
0
$1,000,000
$1,000,000
1956
$1,000,000
$500,000
$1,500,000
1957
0
0
$1,500,000
1958
0
$200,000
$1,700,000
1959
0
$250,000
$1,950,000
1960
0
$100,000
$2,050,000
1961
0
$250,000
$2,300,000
1962
$500,000
$500,000
$2,800,000
1963
$1,000,000
$500,000
$3,300,000
1964
$500,000
$200,000
$3,500,000
1965
0
$500,000
$4,000,000
1966
$500,000
0
$4,000,000
The acquisition of property in the decade from 1955 through 1965 represented a leap of faith
with respect to the Cultural Center project, but also served to accommodate the immediate
perceived need of providing adequate parking for the Municipal Auditorium which was going to

30
31

Summary of Planning Commission Actions Relative to Municipal Auditorium and Cultural Center.
Ibid.

177

be lost to the construction of the Basin Street/Orleans Avenue connection to the new Interstate
Highway.32
Interestingly, this land acquisition began even before there was a formal selection of a
site for the Cultural Center. Again, this is partially attributable to the parking needs associated
with the Municipal Auditorium, but also to the strong-mayor style administration of deLesseps S.
Morrison. In the City Planning Commission’s Report relative to the proposal of consolidating the
International and Cultural Centers, the Commission’s staff outlined the history of the Cultural
Center proposal and the City Planning Commission’s attitude regarding same. It noted that the
Commission was opposed to beginning acquisition of land in 1955 based on the “absence of a
plan for the center.”33 Following the City Council’s approval of the Capital Budget including
land acquisition, the City Planning Commission acted to limit land acquisition to the four squares
adjacent to the Municipal Auditorium, which were the likely areas upon which the Cultural
Center would be developed.34
Over the course of the next several years, the City Planning Commission took small steps
toward crafting a plan for the Cultural Center. These steps culminated in the adoption of the
Cultural Center as part of the City’s Master Plan on April 11, 1961. Prior to the adoption of the
proposal, the City Planning Commission held a public hearing on the Cultural Center on October
25, 1960 and the Commission’s Report noted that “[t]here was no opposition voiced at the
hearing.”35 The coverage of the public hearing by the Times-Picayune corroborates this claim by
the City Planning Commission. The only points of contention relative to the Cultural Center
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proposal related to the timing and priority of the proposal with respect to the simultaneous
International Center proposal.36 According to the transcript of this hearing, the only individuals
requesting to speak on the proposal were Louis Brown, Director of the Central Area Committee
(Chamber of Commerce of the New Orleans Area); Harry England, Greater New Orleans Tourist
Comission; E. B. Benjamin, Cultural Attractions Fund of Greater New Orleans; and Ray
Scheuring, Manager of the Municipal Auditorium. There were no speakers either in support or
opposition from the general public.37 Interestingly, Mayor Morrison appeared at this public
hearing and spoke in support of the proposals, noting to the Commission that he, the City
Council and the electorate of New Orleans had “overruled you” by including land acquisition in
the Capital Budget over the opposition of the City Planning Commission and by voters’ approval
of the three separate successful Bond Issues to fund the acquisition.38
An additional point of contention was the site plan presented in Figure 6.4, below. The
concern was not for the neighborhood or residents that would be displaced, but rather in that the
proposal would convert Congo Square (formerly Beauregard Square)39 to a parking lot, which
the Louisiana Landmarks Society decried as a ‘tragedy’ and a ‘calamity.’40 In his letter to the
Mayor, Harnett T. Kane, President of the Louisiana Landmarks Society, stated that the Society
had yet to take a position on the overall proposal, but that the City should take immediate action
to ensure that Congo Square is preserved in the overall plan for the site.
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Figure 6.4 – First Cultural Center site plan (1963)41

Following the City Planning Commission’s acceptance of the Cultural Center plan and
the City Council’s subsequent ratification of it, the Administration began the process of trying to
gain funding for the project. At this time the federal Housing and Home Finance Agency’s
(HHFA) Urban Renewal Administration was authorized to reimburse local governments for
“75% of the difference between the cost of acquiring and clearing the needed site, plus the cost
of installing public improvements and the reappraisal value of the cleared site.”42 In the
particular case of the New Orleans Cultural Center, this reimbursement was anticipated to
amount to $7,250,000 for the project as a whole, including the land acquisitions and
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improvements to construct the Orleans/Basin Street highway connection.43 This assistance from
the federal government was available for the Cultural Center only if it were to be developed
adjacent to the Municipal Auditorium because the city would “automatically be eliminating
existing sub-standard housing conditions in acquiring the needed site.”44
As part of the City’s application to the HHFA, the City Council adopted a resolution on
July 6, 1961 outlining the existing conditions of the Cultural Center site as well as stating the
City’s ability and willingness to comply with the standards of the HHFA program. First, the City
Council resolved “that the proposed Cultural Center Area … is a slum, blighted, deteriorated, or
deteriorating area appropriate for such project.”45 While no comprehensive analysis of the area
was located within the City’s records for this project, the following was the summary provided
by the City Planning Commission in their Public Buildings Report II:
The … area houses approximately 5,000 persons and consists of substandard
dwellings, 63% of which have no bath and 47.8% of which have no running
water. Median income is less than $2,000/year and more than 75 cases of juvenile
delinquency were reported in the area during one year. The commercial area
behind the Auditorium is used for shops, restaurants, service stations, and
warehouses; the general condition of improvements is substandard.46
What was not mentioned in this analysis was the racial breakdown of the chosen site.
Approximately 410 families were displaced from the Cultural Center area, of which 80% were
low-income African-Americans; the average income in the neighborhood was less than half of
the average income for Orleans Parish as a whole.47
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An analysis of the Sanborn Maps of the Cultural Center area illustrates the general
development pattern of the neighborhood. It does not provide an accurate portrayal of the
conditions, but does describe the overall existing development of the neighborhood.
Table 6.2 – Development pattern of Cultural Center site (1940).48
Residential Units
Commercial Units
Square 113
46*
10
Square 114
25
6
Square 137
49*
7
Square 138
46
5
Square 147
48*
5
Square 148
47
9
Square 167
16
6
Square 168
45*
6
Square 169
67
2
* Indicates the presence of an apartment building with an unrecorded unit count.

Also within the Council’s resolution of July 6, 1961, the City stated its understanding of
the federal government’s requirements as to the process to be undertaken with respect to the
residents of the Cultural Center site. Section three of the Council’s resolution stated, in part, the
following:
That [the City] is cognizant of the conditions that are imposed in the undertaking
and carrying out of such projects with Federal financial assistance under Title I,
including those relating to the relocation of site occupants and the provision of
local grants-in-aid and the requirements that as a condition of the execution of a
contract for a capital grant for such project the locality must present to the
Housing and Home Finance Administrator a workable program… for utilizing
appropriate public and private resources to eliminate and prevent the development
or spread of slums and urban blight.49
Further, the resolution stated that it was the sense of the Council that:
(a) A feasible method for the relocation of families could be prepared.
(b) Local grants-in-aid could and would be provided in an amount not less than ¼ of the
project cost.

48

Sanborn Map Company (1940). Sanborn Fire Insurance Maps of New Orleans, Volume 2. Sanborn Map
Company, New York. Accessed via Louisiana Library Connection Databases on September 4, 2011.
49
City Council Resolution of July 6, 1961, at 2.
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(c) In addition to the grants-in-aid there would be adequate funds available to pay costs
associated with the project that are excluded from the federal grant.
The final portion of this resolution “authorized and directed” the Mayor to file an
application for assistance with the Administrator of the HHFA. By June of 1962 the application
had been filed with the HHFA and the review of the request was all but approved. On June 21,
1962, the Acting Urban Renewal Commissioner for the HHFA sent a letter to the City in which
the agency questioned the legal ability of the City to engage in urban renewal projects due to the
State Legislature’s repeal of urban renewal authorization legislation. In response to this
precarious legal situation, the City Attorney replied to the Urban Renewal Commissioner on July
26, 1962, outlining the legal standing of the City of New Orleans to engage in urban renewal
with respect to state law.
In 1954, the Louisiana Legislature had repealed a portion of state law relative to urban
renewal projects; however, the State did not, in the City’s opinion, act to nullify all attempts at
federally-funded urban renewal. Act 709 of the 1954 Regular Session removed portions of the
state’s existing urban redevelopment enabling statutes which would allow the expropriating
redevelopment authority to transfer the newly-acquired property to a third-party by resale, lease,
or any other means. The City believed this to only eliminate participation in federally-funded
urban redevelopment where a part of the plan was to sell or lease the property to private parties
in furtherance of the redevelopment project.
Specifically, the changes made in 1954 were relative to Section 40:481 of the Louisiana
Revised Statutes, which were originally adopted in furtherance of the state’s ability to participate
in federally funded public housing under the Housing Act of 1949 (see Chapter 3).50 The New

50

Letter from City Attorney Alvin Liska to Urban Renewal Commissioner William Slayton, July 26, 1962.
Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – Mayor Victor H. Schiro
Records, File S62-7.
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Orleans City Attorney’s Office, in an undated internal memorandum, clarified that the ability of
the state or its political subdivisions to expropriate property needed for public improvements was
found under Section 19:1-2 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes. Further, the City Attorney’s
Office stated that public parks are an acceptable ‘public use’ for which to expropriate property,
as previously determined by the Louisiana Supreme Court in 1931 and reinforced in the initial
five expropriations on Square 137 within the Cultural Center site.51
Based on these factors, the City Attorney opined that the restrictions enacted by the
Legislature in 1954 would not hamper redevelopment in cases where land was to be expropriated
for actual public uses. The City underscored this position by citing to subsequent state legislation
in which the Legislature revised regulations for expropriation of property (1956) and for the
acceptance of outside financial assistance (1960).52 The HHFA found this to be an acceptable
analysis of the law and the legal questions raised by the agency were resolved and the application
was allowed to move forward.53
The Land Assembly
Site acquisition continued following approval of the application for federal assistance.
Property records indicate that Square 137, directly behind the Municipal Auditorium, was the
first acquired by the City, with purchases and expropriations taking place between 1958 and
1960. This was the only square where land was acquired prior to 1966, before the availability of
federal dollars. The table below indicates the timeline of acquisitions by square. A full inventory
of property acquisitions for the Cultural Center is available in Appendix 6.1.
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Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission,
File 331, at 5.
52
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Table 6.3 – Summary of Property Acquisition for Cultural Center site54
Municipal
Square
113
114
137
138
147
148
167
168
169

Number of
Lots
28
20
24
22
25
22
15
24
27

Number of
Expropriations
4
1
5
0
1
1
2
6
0

Acquisition
Date Year(s)
1970-71
1968-69
1958-60
1970-71
1970-71
1966
1966
1966-67
1970-71

In all, the City acquired 207 individual parcels for the Cultural Center site and only
resorted to expropriation in order to take possession of 20 of these. The City was able to utilize
federal assistance in the acquisition of 183 of the 207 total parcels and of the total 20
expropriations, 15 were prosecuted with the assistance of federal funds. What is interesting
about these numbers is that by the time the last four squares were acquired in 1970-71, there was
relatively little resistance to the City’s efforts to purchase the requisite property (102 parcels
acquired, 5 expropriations). While it is impossible to say why there was less resistance in the
latter part of the acquisitions, it could be because, as Assistant City Attorney Posey Bowers
noted in a memorandum of explanation, the courts had consistently ruled that political
subdivisions of the State can expropriate property needed for government projects. More
specifically, in the initial Cultural Center expropriation cases from the 1950s, “in every instance
where there was no subsequent agreement of the parties, the City’s prayer for a judgment in “fee
simple” was granted.”55 Therefore, by the 1970s it may have been a foregone conclusion in the
minds of the residents and property owners that regardless of the fight, resistance would prove
futile.
54

City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property
Files for indicated Squares, Second Municipal District, Seventh Assessment District.
55
“Cultural Center (Effect of Zoning Thereon) Memorandum of Explanation, and Citations Thereon” undated
(emphasis in original).
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The planning for the Cultural Center continued through the 1960s. The City amended the
site plan several times throughout this period as it became apparent that it would not be able to
fund the grand projects envisioned for the site. Though there was realization that the
improvements may be a long way off, the City proceeded with property acquisition in phases
which were divided by the availability of federal dollars.
Figure 6.5 – Current aerial photograph with Municipal Square Numbers overlaid for reference.56

Sq. 169

Sq. 147
Sq. 168
Sq. 138
Sq. 148
Sq. 167
Sq. 113
Sq. 137
Sq. 149
(City Owned
since 1902)
Sq. 114
Municipal
Auditorium
Congo
Square

56

Aerial photograph from the Orleans Parish Assessor’s Office, square numbers added by author.
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The first phase of acquisition (not including the initial acquisition of Square 137 in the 1950s)
was broken down as follows: Phase I – Squares 147, 167, 168; Phase II – Square 114; Phase III
– Squares 113, 138, 147, 169. There was nothing noted in the records indicating why the site
was phased in this manner, but it appears to have been purely a matter of acquiring the site
moving east from the location of the Municipal Auditorium. Figure 6.5, above, indicates the
locations and bounding streets for the Cultural Center site acquisition.
The extended planning and acquisition process served not only to cause residents to
relocate without assistance, but also enraged absentee property owners. In a letter delivered to
occupants of properties in Squares 113, 138, 147 and 169 in June of 1968, the City advised
tenants that their dwellings would be acquired by the City and that they would be forced to
relocate at a later time. The letter explained that no one was being required to relocate yet and
that further information would be made available once properties were bought by the City. This
letter also explained that a relocation office would be available in the vicinity of the Cultural
Center to address the questions and concerns of neighborhood residents.57
As a result of this notice sent to residents of the Cultural Center site, Mr. Frederick
Forstall, a property owner within the proposed Cultural Center site, sent a letter to Mayor Schiro
stating that the notice was premature and that the result would be that tenants would be driven
out by the impending relocation.58 The Mayor replied in agreement with Mr. Forstall’s position
but noted that the letter was sent out by the Relocation Office in compliance with federal
regulations relating eligibility to receive federal funding.59 Indeed, Mr. Forstall’s prediction
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Relocation Letter to Cultural Center Occupants, June 10, 1968. Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal
Archives, New Orleans Public Library – Mayor Victor H. Schiro Records, File S68-3.
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Letter from Frederick J. Forstall to Mayor Victor H. Schiro, June 24, 1968. Accessed from the New Orleans
Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – Mayor Victor H. Schiro Records, File S68-3.
59
Letter from Mayor Victor H. Schiro to Frederick J. Forstall, June 27, 1968. Accessed from the New Orleans
Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – Mayor Victor H. Schiro Records, File S68-3.
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came to pass; in many cases residential units were abandoned more than a year before the City’s
appraisals and purchase negotiations occurred. Landlords found it difficult to rent the properties
because of the pending acquisitions. During this period, property owners were left with
responsibility for maintaining and making mortgage payments on the properties with no rental
income to cover the costs.60 It is likely that this situation also factored into the relatively few
expropriations which occurred in Phase III of land acquisition, as discussed previously. The
reason that this extended acquisition period likely resulted in fewer expropriations is that by the
time the City tendered offers to property owners those with rental properties had been having
difficulty renting their properties for years and they would have been relieved to unload the
burden of these unprofitable properties. The same relief was likely felt by owner-occupiers
within the area, in that they had been living for years knowing that the City would acquire their
property but with no timetable.
The Legacy
By 1971, the City had acquired all land within the Cultural Center complex. Much of the
space had been lying dormant for a number of years after the city acquired it. With the death of
musician and native New Orleanian Louis Armstrong, Mayor Moon Landrieu assembled a
committee of prominent citizens to evaluate public suggestions regarding an appropriate tribute
to Armstrong. In the 1972 report of Mayor Landrieu’s Citizen’s Committee for a Memorial to
Louis Armstrong, the Committee describes the Cultural Center site as a “disaster area, serving as
a depressant to the Tremé neighborhood, the Vieux Carré, and the Central Business District.”61 It
was as a result of this report that the plan for the Cultural Center shifted from a collection of
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Christovich, M.L. & Roulhac, T. (1980). New Orleans Architecture, Vol VI: Faubourg Tremé and the Bayou
Road. Pelican Publishing, Gretna, LA.
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Mayor Moon Landrieu’s Public Relations Office, Press Release of June 30, 1972. Accessed from the New Orleans
Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 471, at 4.
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structures to public green space.

While the Committee recommended that the Cultural Center

be rededicated as a tribute to Armstrong, they called for a public planning process to determine
the most appropriate elements and design for the space.62
The result of this planning process was to revise the approved site plan for the Cultural
Center, which was a formal complex along the lines of New York’s Lincoln Center, and
reconstitute the space as a less formal, flexible park that could be used as open space
immediately and later adapted for the construction of the cultural buildings that had long been
anticipated.63 This revised site plan, which was developed by consultants Lawrence Halprin and
Associates, included proposals for four acres of lakes to be dredged within the 27 acre site and
for the installation of covered walkways and indigenous landscaping throughout the space. In
addition to these basic improvements the consultants proposed both participatory and performing
facilities. The participatory facilities would include restaurants, an ice rink, a carousel, a Ferris
wheel, and other attractions based loosely on Copenhagen’s Tivoli Gardens; the performing
facilities would include, in addition to the Municipal Auditorium and Theatre of the Performing
Arts, a 400-seat “legitimate” theatre and a 600-seat outdoor amphitheatre.64 The City Counciladopted plans for the space eliminated the Tivoli Gardens element of the plan and would allow
the community to determine the best uses for the park over time.65
By the end of 1973, the 25-year planning process for the New Orleans Cultural Center
was nearly at its end. The City Planning Commission and the City Council adopted the revised
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site plan for Louis Armstrong Park and construction commenced on the covered walkways,
lakes, landscaping, and a fence.
The legacy of the Cultural Center, now Armstrong Park, is generally one of top-down
planning where the ideas of bureaucrats were imposed on a generally powerless community.
While the official records of the planning and execution of the Cultural Center project do not
reflect opposition from the community that would house this development, later records reveal
significant resentment on the part of the surrounding neighborhood to the City’s indifference
towards this culturally significant community.
In 1972, as plans were coming together for recreating the Cultural Center as a tribute to
Louis Armstrong, the community found a voice in the Tremé Community Improvement
Association (TCIA). The position of this organization and the residents was outlined in an
article in the Times-Picayune on March 5, 1972. According to Jim Hayes, the Director of the
TCIA “The City, in efforts to build a cultural center has seen fit to destroy and uproot our
community,” 66 the irony of this situation, the article pointed out, was that the City’s Cultural
Center was destroying the culture of the Tremé community.
Not only was the neighborhood slighted in the planning and implementation of the
Cultural Center plan, the TCIA estimates that approximately 80% of site residents relocated
without the assistance they were entitled to under the urban renewal guidelines. The City’s
position on this situation was that the residents vacated the site based on knowing that the project
was coming and not as a direct result of the City’s acquisition of the site.67
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The legacy of the Cultural Center does not end with the displacement of the community;
those remaining in the neighborhood surrounding the park continue to struggle with certain
elements of the end result of this project. In an effort to appease the neighborhood after the
debacle surrounding the relocation of residents and acquisition of the last four squares, the City
agreed to construct a community center for the Tremé community within the Cultural Center site.
This community center is one of the few benefits that the community has realized from the
presence of the park.
One of the most discussed elements of the present development of the Cultural Center is
the presence of the concrete and iron perimeter fence. During the latter part of the Armstrong
Park planning stage, the need for a fence was discussed in the City Planning Commission’s Staff
Report of 1973:
The entire park is proposed for enclosure by a fence allowing five controlled entry
points. This fence would provide security from vandals and permit the park to be
closed off, vis a vis Jackson Square, to facilitate maintenance. Nothing is
inappropriate about this fence concept as it is currently applied throughout the
City.68
Perhaps the problematic legacy of the fence is more perception than reality, but whatever the
situation, the Tremé community has come to view the fence as a barrier, separating the
community and the Cultural Center. Many efforts to have the fence removed have been made in
the interceding years, but to no avail. The space remains fenced, serving as a barrier between the
traditional residents of Tremé and the Vieux Carré.69
The debate over the fence continued as the park was rebuilt following damage suffered as
a result of Hurricane Katrina. While the Theatre of the Performing Arts was quickly renovated
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and returned to use, Armstrong Park remained off-limits to the general public until mid-2011.
Through bureaucratic delays and contractor incompetence, the simple return of public open
space in Tremé has been delayed for years. On August 17, 2011, the Times-Picayune published
an article entitled “Locked-up Armstrong Park lamented as 'neglected jewel' of Treme, French
Quarter area.” In this article, Ben Harwood of People United states that the organization has
spoken to numerous community organizations and hundreds of individual neighbors about the
future of Armstrong Park, and the fence in particular. The perception remains that the fence acts
as a barrier to neighborhood use of the space and advocates for the park have asked the City to
delay the official reopening of the park to address concerns of the community. Mayor Mitchell
Landrieu’s spokesperson, responding to a press inquiry for the article, stated that the
Administration is committed to reopening the park on schedule but is willing to hear community
concerns.70
Figure 6.6 – The Armstrong Park Fence at Congo Square71
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The New Orleans Cultural Center was an idea that has not been and likely never will be
realized. What started out as a civic improvement project with urban renewal has become a
monument to a City’s indifference to the intrinsic value of a people and a culture that is at the
root of what makes New Orleans unique. Just as the Civic Center project destroyed the physical
foundations of jazz music, the Cultural Center removed almost 200 years of a unique part of
New Orleans’s African-American culture to build an opera house. This space was taken from the
community to create an island of bourgeois culture within the city of New Orleans while
neglecting the authentic culture of the community.
Figure 6.7 – Theatre of the Performing Arts from the N. Rampart Street entrance of the park.72

Perhaps most importantly, the project failed insofar as the Cultural Center was initially
contemplated. As has been discussed previously, the City’s Public Buildings Report II outlined
the five proposed functions of the Cultural Center:73
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1) Create a barrier to prevent the spread of the Central Business District.
2) Rehabilitate an area which is not fulfilling its potential and Central Business District
property.
3) Complete the public building mall extending from the Union Passenger Terminal to
the Municipal Auditorium and create a visual axis from St. Louis Cathedral down
Orleans St.
4) Accommodate the growing need for parking in the Central Business District and
create a day and night use environment.
5) Create an environment of uses relating to the existing urban infrastructure.
With the exception of completing the Theatre of the Performing Arts, the City was unable to
meet any of the goals that were specifically outlined for the project. However, with respect to
the first goal, a barrier was created – though it was between the neighborhood and community
services rather than stemming the growth of an expanding Central Business District.
The community has never taken ownership of the green space that resulted from the
City’s eventual realization that the Cultural Center would never materialize. The installation of
the fence has inhibited use of the space for anything other than organized events, but has not
allowed the day-to-day use that is seen in many of the neighborhood and regional parks in New
Orleans. This lack of availability, paired with the fact that the community had this development
imposed on them, makes it understandable that there is not greater acceptance of what is
otherwise valuable passive parkland in the middle of a densely populated urban area.
It is interesting to note is that underutilized green space was also created in conjunction
with the Civic Center project. There has not been community pushback on the project as there
has been with the Cultural Center, but that may be a result of historic residential uses being
wiped out by the mid-century growth and eventual decline of the Central Business District.
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Moving forward, the City should work with the community to develop uses for the park
that will benefit the neighborhood and the City as a whole. The space was conceived as a place
for New Orleanians to celebrate culture, and later the goal shifted to making the space accessible
to tourists wishing to experience authentic New Orleans. It is impossible to bottle that which
makes New Orleans unique into convenient tourist packaging, and it is not this author’s
suggestion that anyone should try. This should be a space dedicated to the residents of New
Orleans and to the Tremé community specifically; the City should work with the adjacent
community organizations to encourage use of the site for cultural events and actually make the
New Orleans Cultural Center a center for New Orleans culture.
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Chapter 7
The Bio-Medical District:
Removing a Community to Provide for their Well-Being
The history of public hospitals in New Orleans dates to the founding of the city and has
remained a function of the government since Bienville, a founder of the city, brought hospital
equipment to New Orleans from Biloxi in 1723. The first building to house such a public
hospital was constructed in 1736. Charity Hospital as an institution traces its roots to the
hospital constructed by Don Andres Almonester y Roxas1 on North Rampart Street, between
Toulouse and St. Peter Streets in 1782. The Hospital of St. Charles, as this facility was named,
remained in use until it burned down in 1809. In 1814, the State of Louisiana built a replacement
hospital on Canal Street, between Baronne and Dryades Streets, where Charity Hospital operated
until 1832. In 1832, a new structure was provided for the State’s public hospital on Tulane
Avenue, in the location where it would remain until 2005.2
The hospital constructed in 1832 was subsequently expanded as the needs of the medical
profession changed, and was entirely reconstructed beginning in 1937 through the financing of
the Works Progress Administration. The outdated hospital structures were removed and the
redevelopment, the sixth structure to house the legacy of Charity Hospital, resulted in a modern,
20-story hospital tower with attendant support structures.3 By 2003, Charity Hospital had
become outdated and failed to meet the standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations (JCAHO), the agency tasked with certifying healthcare facilities across
1
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city, in addition to the construction of the first public hospital, included construction of the first public school in the
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1788. Munster, J. E. (2004). Fire & Flood: How the Lessons of the Past can Apply to the Present to Build the
Future. Thesis, University of New Orleans Electronic Theses and Dissertation Collection.
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the United States. Following a reaccreditation survey in December of 2002, the administrators of
the Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO), the entity responsible for the
operation of Charity and University Hospitals in New Orleans, were informed of numerous
deficiencies in the operation of Charity Hospital that threatened future reaccreditation if not
sufficiently addressed by the next scheduled survey, which would have occurred in December of
2005. JCAHO encouraged the leaders of MCLNO to “strongly consider seeking from the state a
more modern facility to improve patient safety, environmental safety, patient privacy and
infection control,” as a replacement for the aging Charity Hospital structure.4
Following this notification, the administrators of MCLNO, in conjunction with Louisiana
State University (LSU) which operated the medical school affiliated with Charity Hospital,
sought and obtained $1.8 million for the creation of a master plan to guide the development of a
new Charity Hospital complex. This appropriation was made during the 2003 Legislative
Session with the goal of having the project “well underway toward completion in 2008.”5 This
master plan was completed and presented to MCLNO administrators in May of 2005, just
months before the devastation of Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent levee breaches that
flooded vast swaths of the city of New Orleans.
In addition to a replacement for Charity Hospital being constructed by the State of
Louisiana, the federal government has chosen to invest in a replacement hospital for the
Department of Veterans Affairs. The new United States Department of Veterans Affairs Medical
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Center (VAMC) is being constructed adjacent to the new public hospital, as indicated in Figure
7.1 (below).
Figure 7.1 – Medical Center Site Relationships, as indicated by the VA.6

The existing VAMC in New Orleans was originally constructed in 1949 and was
expanded in phases through the subsequent decades. The location occupied by the current
facility is generally bounded by Perdido Street, Freret Street, Gravier Street and South Claiborne
Avenue. In 2004 the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) identified projected long-term gaps
in both inpatient and outpatient service delivery in the existing New Orleans VA facility.
Following damage from Hurricane Katrina and the subsequent flooding of New Orleans, the VA
evaluated their options relating to the delivery of medical services in New Orleans and along the
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entire Gulf Coast and reached the conclusion that investment in a new medical center would be
preferable to reinvesting in a facility that would not adequately serve their needs into the future.7
The ‘Bio-Medical District’ is the collective name for the concentrated medical industry in
New Orleans, comprising not only the sites of the new MCLNO and VAMC hospitals, but also
affiliated institutions such as the LSU Health Sciences Center (medical school), the Tulane
University hospital and medical school, the Louisiana Cancer Consortium, and the BioInnovation Center on Canal Street. However, though this refers to the collective whole of the
medical industry in New Orleans, it is the common term used to refer to the specific
redevelopment plans relating to the joint MCLNO-VAMC redevelopment in lower Mid-City.
This lower portion of Mid-City, officially designated as the Tulane-Gravier neighborhood
by the City Planning Commission (CPC), which was targeted for redevelopment is generally
bounded by South Claiborne Avenue, Tulane Avenue, South Broad Street and Canal Street. The
Mid-City neighborhood, as defined by the CPC, is directly northwest of Tulane-Gravier across
South Broad Street.

7
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Figure 7.2 – Mid City National Register Historic District, with MCLNO and VA sites indicated. 8

While these neighborhoods are separately designated for City Planning purposes, they are
commonly referred to as Mid-City in reference to the Mid-City National Register Historic
District, which covers substantial portions of both neighborhoods, as indicated in Figure 7.2
(above).
This chapter will discuss the planning and creation of New Orleans’s ‘Bio-Medical
District’ in terms of the concept, the physical development, and the assembly of the real estate
needed to execute the overall vision. The footprint of this project is reminiscent of urban
renewal projects such as the Civic Center (Chapter 4) and the Cultural Center (Chapter 6), as
were the arguments presented by proponents of the location as to the underutilization of land
under its present ownership. Unlike these previous projects, the selection of a site was to be
publicly debated and analyzed through regulatory schemes designed to prevent disparate impacts
on communities; despite this, the research reveals that while processes were legally followed the
intention of the requirements were not.
8
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As with the previous projects discussed in this dissertation, governmental actors appear to
have only resorted to eminent domain in instances where negotiated purchases failed mainly due
to the understanding that exercising this authority is highly unpopular. Unlike the previous
projects, the prospect of exercising eminent domain was a major topic of discussion throughout
the planning phases of the project, resulting in early cooperative agreements among various
levels of government as to how exercise of this authority was to be handled.
The Vision
As stated above, the planning for replacing both Charity Hospital and VAMC began
years prior to Hurricane Katrina. Both facilities were projected to become obsolete due to either
physical structures, standards of patient care, or projected patient loads. Similarly, both MCLNO
and VAMC took long-term perspectives in determining how to deal with the deficiencies of their
respective institutions; both wanted new facilities, both wanted room for future expansion, and
both wanted modern medical centers that would serve to attract physicians, medical students, and
patients well into the future.
MCLNO began planning for replacement of the aging Charity Hospital facility in 2003
when MCLNO administrators hired ADAMS Management Services Corporation to evaluate
their existing facilities and develop a strategic long-term plan for future growth of the medical
center. This initial report led to the Site and Facility Master Plan for Consolidation of Charity
and University Hospitals at Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans. This document, which
outlined the location for a new hospital and a projected timeline for this development was funded
by a legislative appropriation of $1.3 million in 2003.
The resulting master plan for MCLNO was developed in response to ADAMS and
MCLNO’s own findings that “the Charity Hospital structure was no longer suited for healthcare
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services delivery”9 and that a “preliminary analysis of University Hospital facilities suggest that
its best long-term usage would be primarily for non-clinical activities.”10 With this in mind, the
ADAMS planning team encouraged MCLNO to construct a replacement medical center “north
of Tulane Avenue, with an address facing Canal Street.”11 The ‘north option,’ as this location
was referred to, was encouraged for several reasons: image, transportation access, and to tie into
the “urban redevelopment efforts of the community.”12
Figure 7.3 – “North Option”13

ADAMS also evaluated a second site in this initial master plan; the ‘south option’ would
have kept MCLNO on the south side of Tulane Avenue and called for constructing a new patient
tower adjacent to University Hospital on land within and immediately adjacent to the existing
campus of the medical center. This location would also require the complete renovation of
University Hospital for ambulatory care functions to supplement the inpatient services provided
within the proposed adjacent patient tower. This location was discouraged due to the lack of
space for future expansion.
9
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Figure 7.4 – “South Option”14

In terms of projected cost, ADAMS estimated that the north option would result in a
higher initial cost, approximately $775 million, with the south option having an estimated cost of
$753 million. Though the initial cost would be higher, MCLNO would see returns in image,
future growth potential, and long-term operating costs. The consultants from ADAMS believed
that south option would “provide an image challenge”15 to the renewed facility because of the
land-locked nature of the location and the reuse of the existing, historic University Hospital
structure.16
The last consideration voiced in the ADAMS report was that of project timelines. The
north option, for which the consultants noted a reasonable expectation of complexities insofar as
land acquisition, was projected to actually be faster than utilizing the south option, where a
portion of the facility would be new construction and another part renovation. Though the north
option was projected to be faster overall, the report does note that “the design and construction
schedules for pursuing either site option are almost identical.”17
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At this same point the VA was also evaluating the conditions of its facilities across the
country. In 2004, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs released his Capital Asset Realignment for
Enhanced Services Plan (CARES Plan) which provided a comprehensive analysis of the VA
medical system as a whole and identified issues that needed to be addressed from facilities to
systemic changes. Through this study, the VA Secretary determined that there would be longterm gaps in both inpatient and outpatient care at the VAMC in New Orleans.18
In addition to the concerns of the CARES evaluation regarding the ability of the facility
to adequately care for veterans into the future, the VA also determined that there were physical
deficiencies in the existing facility and site that were not compliant with the Department’s
Physical Security Design Manual for Mission Critical Facilities. The requirements of this
manual provided minimum distances away from a facility that a vehicle may park or travel,
emergency utility provisions, and ability to adequately supply food, water and fuel to the facility
should it be isolated for a prolonged length of time.19 Combined, these deficiencies in physical
plant and service delivery led the VA to evaluate the possibility of fully replacing the existing
VAMC with a modern facility that would address all of the noted problems.
While the plan for the replacement VAMC was seen as a long-term capital improvement,
the plan to replace MCLNO was projected to come to fruition by 2013. This 2013 target date was
based on ADAMS projection that the State of Louisiana would act to fund the master plan for the
facility during the 2006 Regular Legislative Session.20 What could not be projected at this time
was the devastation which would befall New Orleans in August of 2005 as a result of Hurricane
Katrina.
18
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Due to the weeks of flooding that followed Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, both Charity
Hospital and the VAMC sustained significant damage to their electrical and plumbing systems.
Once this damage was sustained, a major concern beyond the pre-existing deficiencies became
the ability to adequately remediate the damages to the facilities. The VA outlined the damages
incurred within the VAMC in a report to Congress in early 2006, noting that there was no
electric service to the building for weeks and that there had been extensive water and moisture
damage to the building and the medical equipment contained therein. Further, the water and
moisture infiltration caused mildew and mold to spread, “creating unacceptable conditions for a
medical facility.”21 The VA’s report noted that similar conditions were reported in other nearby
medical facilities as well.
In September of 2006 the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report to
Congress entitled Hurricane Katrina: Status of Hospital Inpatient and Emergency Departments
in the Greater New Orleans Area explained that the State of Louisiana, through MCLNO, was
working to reopen University Hospital to bring some medical services back online in the New
Orleans area. There were, however, no plans to reopen Charity Hospital due to a combination of
flood damage and the existing deficiencies that were viewed as impediments to modern medical
care.22
The self-reported need for new facilities led MCLNO and the VA to create the
Collaborative Opportunities Study Group (COSG) to begin exploring options for the
development of a joint medical facility.23 The project, as envisioned by this group, would allow
each entity to create individual patient towers while connecting the two with shared services that
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would accommodate both medical centers. Interestingly, while there was no firm plan developed
nor had a site officially been selected, the VA reported to Congress in February of 2006 that they
were evaluating the possibility of a joint medical facility with MCLNO to be located in the
general area bounded by South Claiborne Avenue, Canal Street, South Broad Street, and Tulane
Avenue.24
MCLNO and VA joined to form a vision of modern medical care for post-Katrina New
Orleans early in 2006. This vision, as stated by the VA, would allow for the replacement of both
VACM and Charity Hospital with a “hurricane hardened, single campus / shared support services
model… with a state of the art medical center”25 that would “be more cost-effective than LSU
and VA operating stand-alone facilities.”26 It was with this vision in mind that the VA,
MCLNO, and State of Louisiana proceeded with post-Katrina facility planning and site selection.
The Planning
While the need and general concept for these replacement medical facilities was
established in the years prior to Hurricane Katrina, the disaster was seized upon as an
opportunity to bring this vision to life. In February of 2006, in his Report to Congress on Plans
for Re-establishing a VA Medical Center in New Orleans, VA Secretary R. James Nicholson
outlined the options being considered by the Veterans Administration for providing medical care
to veterans in southeastern Louisiana. Four separate options were being evaluated and even at
this early stage a ‘preferred option’ had emerged. The options under consideration were:
1)
2)
3)
4)

Restoration and hardening of the existing facility.
Renovation and remodeling of the existing facility.
Construction of a new ‘shared’ facility in the general area of the existing hospital.
Construction of a new ‘stand-alone’ facility in a location to be determined.
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Among the options under consideration by the VA, the preferred option was clear: a new facility
should be constructed in conjunction with the proposed replacement MCLNO complex. While
final site selection was still years away, the VA included in their report a map (Figure 7.3),
below, indicating the ‘general area’ in which the new VAMC would be constructed should their
‘preferred option’ be exercised.27
Figure 7.5 – “Building Site for Option 3”28

Required as part of this ‘preferred option’ was that a sufficient site would have to be
provided by the State of Louisiana for the project to move forward; at this stage, specific site
requirements had not been developed but “sufficient land to ensure adequate hurricane hardening
of the campus”29 was a priority. The VA noted that there were three assumptions critical to the
selection of this option, one being obtaining the required land, and another being the mustering
of Congressional support for the project, in terms of funding.
The third assumption was that the State of Louisiana would be able to create a funding
package to actually construct the MCLNO sections of the overall complex. Without this
27

Department of Veterans Affairs (2006)
Ibid.
29
Ibid, at 11.
28

207

element, the benefits to be realized through the construction of a shared facility would be lost;
particularly, at this stage in planning for the new complex, it was assumed that certain physical
improvements and medical-related services would be shared between the facilities, lowering the
initial cost of development and the long term operating costs. Among these ‘shared’ elements
would be
common areas [that] would provide space for shared non-clinical
support services such as parking, food services, laundry, energy
and utility management, and helipad – these would be located in
sections of the facility convenient to the bed towers. Separate,
though contiguous, diagnostic, major therapeutic and
interventional areas such as laboratory, radiology, catherization
(sic) labs, and operating suites would be built for both the VA and
[MCLNO].30
With the assumption made regarding the State of Louisiana’s ability to finance the
replacement MCLNO, the VA signed an agreement with MCLNO officials in February of 2006
to “explore the feasibility of jointly building a teaching hospital and Level I trauma center in
downtown New Orleans.”31
According to the General Accountability Office (GAO), when they visited with MCLNO
officials early in 2006, there were a number of planning efforts underway but no consensus on
plans to move forward with reestablishing a public hospital in New Orleans. The most difficult
element of moving forward at this time appears to have been the availability of basic
information. There were many unknowns: population to be served, full extent of damages in
existing facilities, post-disaster funding to be made available by the Federal Emergency
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Management Agency (FEMA), and what, if any, capital improvement dollars may be made
available by the State.32
In order to begin addressing these issues, MCLNO again contracted with ADAMS, the
same firm that had previously been contracted to develop a master plan for the replacement of
Charity and University Hospitals, to evaluate the damages to the existing facilities and develop a
cost estimate for their complete restoration. The goal was to convince FEMA that MCLNO was
entitled to replacement facilities rather than funding for restoration of the existing hospital.33
In order to understand the distinction between restoration and replacement funding
though FEMA, it is important to ascertain the guidelines of the Stafford Act, which established
the assistance protocol for FEMA post-disaster assistance. The Stafford Act, or more formally
the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.),
is the law which enables FEMA to administer disaster assistance and defines how that assistance
is to be administered. Under the Stafford Act, public and non-profit entities are aided in the
reestablishment of the services or facilities to pre-disaster levels. Immediately following a
presidentially-declared disaster, FEMA mobilizes to assess public facilities to determine the level
of funding required to restore governmental or non-profit functions in an affected area. As part
of this assessment, FEMA is not only calculating the dollar value of repairing damages facilities,
but is assessing the replacement cost of the facility itself. This replacement cost is key to
establishing the level at which FEMA will fund the reestablishment of the impacted facility.34
As outlined in the Stafford Act, FEMA will aid in the repair of a disaster-damaged
facility if the cost of that repair does not exceed 50% of the replacement cost of the facility as a
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whole. If the projected repair cost does exceed that 50% threshold, FEMA will aid in the
complete replacement of the facility. The assessment of damages is initially conducted by
FEMA but the owner of the facility retains the right to dispute FEMA’s findings through an
independent assessment of damaged facility.
It is important to note two additional factors which play into the FEMA-funding
mechanism. The first is code-required upgrades and the second is that FEMA’s assistance
reimburses actual costs. While FEMA is statutorily limited in providing assistance to return a
facility to its pre-disaster condition and level of service, the Stafford Act requires that FEMA
cover the cost of required code upgrades, the cost of which in an older structure could be
substantial; however, regardless of the price tag associated with these upgrades, this is not
included in the repair versus replacement calculation. Secondly, FEMA’s Public Assistance
program provides reimbursement for the full value of work required to return a facility to predisaster condition. This means that regardless of the initial assessment of damages, if further
damage is discovered during repair which increases the cost of the work FEMA will still pay the
actual cost associated with the repairs; this increase in cost also does not impact the 50% repair
versus replace calculation because both FEMA and the eligible applicant have already agreed to
repair the facility.35, 36
With this understanding of the Stafford Act and the costs eligible for FEMA assistance,
MCLNO, in conjunction with the ADAMS consultation team fully assessed the damages to
Charity and University Hospitals and determined that there were substantial disaster-related
damages present in both facilities to warrant the complete replacement of these structures under
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FEMA’s disaster assistance guidelines. FEMA’s initial damage assessments of these facilities
indicated far less in damages than the MCLNO/ADAMS team indicated. The estimated costs are
reported in Table 7.1 (below).37
Table 7.1 – LSU (MCLNO) versus FEMA Cost Estimates for MCLNO Hospitals38
LSU’s Estimates FEMA’s Estimates
Charity Hospital
Repair Estimate (in millions)
$257.7
$27
Replacement Estimate (in millions)
$395.4
$147.7 - $267.3
Repair Cost as a percentage of
65%
10% - 18%
Replacement Estimate
University Hospital
Repair Estimate (in millions)
$117.4
$13.4
Replacement Estimate (in millions)
$171.7
$57.4 - $103.9
Repair Cost as a percentage of
68%
13% - 23%
Replacement Estimate
The GAO notes that the disparity in these figures is partially attributable to ADAMS
determination that the “mechanical, electrical, and plumbing systems were beyond repair” and
that “there were significant environmental safety problems” in the facilities.39 While FEMA did
note that these issues were present, they assessed the damages as repairable and estimated a far
lower cost than the ADAMS team was proposing for similar work.40
While financing for the replacement VAMC was appropriated by Congress in June of
2006,41 funding for MCLNO would not be finalized until 2010 following a lengthy appeals
process where the State of Louisiana, LSU, and MCLNO appealed FEMA’s assistance offers to
the United States Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. This Board determined that the
MCLNO/ADAMS estimate of damages was more accurate than the FEMA assessment and that
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in light of this determination MCLNO was entitled to the full replacement cost of Charity and
University Hospitals, which was determined to be $474.7 million.42
Even with financing not-yet-determined, MCLNO moved forward with planning for a
new hospital complex in conjunction with the proposed VAMC. In selecting a location for the
new MCLNO facility, the hospital administrators and state officials referred back to the ADAMS
report of 2005 which advocated locating a new facility in the area roughly bounded by Canal
Street, South Galvez Street, Tulane Avenue, and South Claiborne Avenue. This area was
initially studied by ADAMS and MCLNO because of the presence of a large amount of vacant
and underutilized property, but the initial plan to occupy four municipal squares, as indicated in
Figure 7.3, had since grown to encompass all squares within the general boundaries of the site.
These fifteen squares, comprising approximately 37 acres, were essentially selected by the time
that MCLNO entered into their feasibility study with the VA in 2006. In addition to the 37 acres
to be occupied by MCLNO, an additional, contiguous 29 acres was recommended for the VAMC
in the area bounded by Canal Street, South Rocheblave Street, Tulane Avenue, and South Galvez
Street.43
Although MCLNO and VA officials appear to have decided on their location prior to
doing so, the VA released a public Request for Proposals soliciting a site of 25 to 75 acres in
size, within a geographic area bounded by the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain, the east bank of
the Mississippi River, the Jefferson/St. Charles Parish line and Franklin Avenue (in New
Orleans).44 In light of this request, the RPC coordinated a response from State, City, and regional
officials to formally propose the Mid-City location directly adjacent to the MCLNO site to the
42
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VA.45 In addition being contiguous to the location selected for the construction of MCLNO, the
RPC notes that the site proposed to the VA was selected due to “its proximity to downtown
amenities, public transportation, existing housing and…existing institutions of higher
learning.”46
In response to the VA’s site requirements, the RPC proposal called for the State to
acquire the property on behalf of the City. This arrangement was established in a Cooperative
Endeavor Agreement between the City of New Orleans and the State of Louisiana which called
for the State to acquire property with financing to be provided by the City;47 the purpose of this
arrangement was to allow use of the State’s “quick-take” expropriation authority to avoid delays
in the assembly of the development site being proposed to the VA.48 The Cooperative Endeavor
Agreement called for the state to use “any authority available” to acquire the needed property for
the “public purpose” of the proposed VAMC and appears to have been written to avoid the
express mention of expropriation.49 The RPC’s formal response to the VA, however, was far
more direct, and in outlining the Site Acquisition Strategy, indicating that “the State of Louisiana
(via LSU) will utilize quick-take authority to acquire the 34 acre site…. Acquisition will occur
immediately and will not hinge on the proposed LSU teaching facility.”50
This ‘quick-take’ authority is a legal mechanism available to the State of Louisiana (but
not the City of New Orleans) where land can be immediately expropriated without a final
determination as to the true ‘just compensation’ value of the property. Essentially, the
45
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government petitions the court for immediate transfer of title and if the petition is granted the
government deposits the appraised property value with the court and acquires clear title to the
property. The property owner from whom the property was taken retains the right to pursue
legal action to increase the ‘just compensation’ value of the property following this action but
allows property acquisition and subsequent redevelopment to occur without prolonged legal
action.51
Once land assembly was complete, title would be transferred to the VA for development
of their medical center. This was particularly important in creating an expedited timeline for the
construction of the VAMC. Additionally, the RPC outlined supplementary ‘economic
incentives’ to the VA in the form of infrastructure improvements in the vicinity of the proposed
VAMC site. The City of New Orleans pledged $2.4 million in infrastructure upgrades within the
proposed Medical District, which could be used for off-site improvements such as sidewalks and
pedestrian lighting.52
Within the RPC’s proposal, the courting of the VAMC and the vision of the new
MCLNO campus was painted as “THE critical economic development project for the City of
New Orleans.”53 The economic development potential of these combined facilities was seen as
the motivating force in the City’s acquiescence in clear-cutting a section of a National Register
Historic District to provide land for the proposed VAMC. When combined with the MCLNO
project, the RPC estimated that the capital investment would total approximately $2 billion and
provide an annual economic impact of $1.26 billion with an estimated 20,000 construction jobs
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and 10,000 permanent jobs.54 This impact would be experienced not only by New Orleans, but
by the entire metropolitan area. The breadth of this impact was, as the RPC indicated, also a
motivating factor in the proposal of this location. Under Executive Order 12072, signed by
President Carter in 1978, site selection for federal facilities must give “serious consideration to
the impact a site selection will have on improving the social, economic and environmental
conditions of an urban area.”55
Following submission of the RPC’s proposal to the VA in April of 2007, the VA and
FEMA, on behalf of the State, moved forward with preliminary studies relative the federallymandated Section 106 Review process, since much of the proposed MCLNO/VA site was within
a National Register Historic District. On July 17, 2008, MCLNO and the VA separately
submitted letters to the State Historic Preservation Officer outlining the “Areas of Potential
Effect” for development of the MCLNO and VAMC facilities on the proposed Mid-City sites.
These assessments, which evaluated every structure within the proposed footprints, outlined
those structures individually listed on the National Register, those eligible for listing, and those
ineligible for listing in order to determine the scope of the potential impact on the historic
resources of the Mid-City National Register Historic District.56,57
These initial inventories led to Findings of No Significant Impact (FONSIs) by the VA
and FEMA, both issued on November 24, 2008. While both noted that there would be impacts to
the Mid-City National Register Historic District, including the demolition of contributing
elements, the belief was that through the Programmatic Environmental Assessment (PEA) any
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adverse effects could be minimized.58 Immediately following release of the FONSIs, MCLNO
and the VA, on November 25, 2008, held an event at which they announced the final site
selection for the new medical facilities.
In a press release touting the announcement of the site selection, the Deputy Secretary of
the VA stated that the site was selected “because it offers the best solution for our veterans, today
and into the future” and that “the site, located within a robust medical district with affiliate heath
care teaching universities, promotes long term operational synergy and efficiency.”59 LSU
officials, speaking of the medical district and the MCLNO site selection stated that “building
these hospitals within close proximity to each other assures the future of top quality health care,
research, and medical education not only for the New Orleans area but for the entire state” and
added that the facilities “are destined to be models of health care reform for the nation.”60
In the midst of the fanfare by local officials which accompanied the announcement, there
was a strong resentment within the community which had been growing for some time.
Although the press conference of November 25, 2008 marked the announcement of the official
site selection, it signified the end of a protracted process where state and federal officials all but
declared that this area was the only site under consideration. The MCLNO site was essentially
targeted through the 2005 ADAMS report and the VAMC site was selected in early 2007 due to
its proximity to MCLNO’s favored location. The first time there was a public forum for
discussion of either location was November of 2007. Although State officials presented the
meeting as one of a series where the public would have the chance to guide decision-making,
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residents noted that LSU and hospital officials had announced as early as the summer of 2006
that they would build a new flagship medical complex in lower Mid-City.61
The lack of firm statements or public involvement left the community mired in confusion.
Mayor C. Ray Nagin was consistently on message calling on New Orleanians to return to the city
and participate in rebuilding, noting a “right to return” for all citizens62 while the administration
simultaneously coordinated with the RPC to propose razing nearly 70 acres of a primarily
residential historic neighborhood. To this end, following the April 2007 proposal of the Mid-City
location to the VA, the New Orleans City Council adopted a moratorium on building permits
within the tentative MCLNO and VA sites. Ordinance 22,900 MCS, adopted by the City Council
on November 20, 2007 enacted the ‘Regional Medical District Redevelopment Moratorium’
which served to prohibit the “the issuance of any building permits for construction, renovations,
repairs, or for demolition of buildings.”63 In preparation for the eventual property acquisition
and to demonstrate the need for enactment of a permit moratorium, the City extracted data on the
active permits within the medical center footprint to determine how many structures were
undergoing renovation. Figure 7.4 (below) shows the active permits outstanding as of August
30, 2007, which was four months after this site was proposed for clearance and three months
before the adoption of the permit moratorium to slow redevelopment in this area. It can be
inferred from the Ordinance that this measure was essentially enacted to stop people from
improving flood-damaged properties which would then lead to increased appraisals when the
time came for purchase or expropriation; the ordinance, using the tell-tale language of impending
expropriation, stated that “the purpose of this temporary measure is to enable the development of
61
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the VA Hospital and LSU Medical Center, thereby serving the public purpose of providing
healthcare to the citizens of New Orleans.”64
Figure 7.6 – Regional Medical Center – Proposed Expansion, Valid Permits as of 8/30/200765

Following the first public meeting and adoption of the permitting moratorium in
November of 2007, city, state and federal officials held several additional meetings before
formally making their site selection announcement on November 25, 2008. These meetings,
while posed to the public as opportunities to have a voice in the process, were generally regarded
as appeasement of a process more than actual opportunities for involvement. From June through
64

Ibid.
Map of the Regional Medical Center – Proposed Extension, indicating valid building permits as of August 30,
2007. Accessed via the New Orleans City Planning Commission, Files of Deputy Director Leslie T. Alley.
65

218

August of 2008, several public meetings were held to provide the public with an opportunity to
voice their positions relative to the MCLNO and VAMC proposed facilities.
According to the PEA, of the comments received through these public meetings as well
as via email, letter and website postings, 11% of all comments were relative to a lack of public
involvement in the site selection process. Comments falling under this category ranged from
lack of available information as to criteria being used to select a final location to the belief that a
site had already been selected to belief that incorrect information was being disseminated to the
public in the meetings. Officials responded to these criticisms by noting that public involvement
is a required element of both the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Historic
Preservation Act, to that end a project website was developed that allowed all relevant
information to be publicly posted for review and comment. They added that while “[n]o decision
has been made as to final site selection” the site must “meet a number of criteria in order to
achieve the purpose and need of the project.”66 The PEA summarizes the site selection criteria
for both MCLNO and VAMC facilities as:


Proximity to Louisiana State University (LSU) Health Sciences along Tulane
Avenue and other related health education providers.



Access from Interstate-10 and local collector streets.



Area and geometry of the site.



Adequate growth and expansion potential.

Although there were, officially, alternative sites under consideration at this time, the
criteria clearly indicated that there would only be one location in contention for final site
selection. Of the two alternative sites being reviewed for selection by the VAMC, one was in
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Jefferson Parish and the other located further north in Mid-City along North Jefferson Davis
Parkway at the site formerly occupied by the Lindy Boggs Medical Center, which was
abandoned following Hurricane Katrina. Neither of these locations appears to have met the
narrowly crafted criteria for site selection set forth by the State and the VA. From the PEA it
appears that no other sites were under consideration by the State for development of MCLNO,
the only alternative presented was the restoration of Charity Hospital.67
Of the remaining comments received during these three months of public input, the PEA
breaks them down generally as: 17% indicating need for additional/improved health care in New
Orleans; 14% relating to preservation of historic structures; 17% in support of the proposed MidCity location; 13% in opposition to the Mid-City location; 13% in support of the Lindsey Boggs
location; 1% opposed to the Lindsey Boggs location; 1% in support for the Ochsner (Jefferson
Parish) location, 1% opposed to the Ochsner (Jefferson Parish) location; 6% relating to
renovation of Charity Hospital; 3% relating to renovation of the existing VAMC; and 3%
classified as ‘miscellaneous.’68
Although 11% of all comments related to lack of true public involvement, these concerns
were brushed aside in the crafting of the final PEA, leading many to question if the ultimate site
selection was ever actually being evaluated through this process.69 Following the announcement
of site selection, an announcement that certainly offered no surprises for those involved in the
public meetings, preservationists and neighbors united in decrying the choice and panned City,
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State and federal agencies as failing to recognize the impact the decision would have on
individuals and their historic community.70
Citizen activists and local elected officials similarly questioned if the public meetings
were envisioned as meaningful opportunities for public involvement or merely held in fulfillment
of federal regulations. According to Derrick Morrison, a citizen involved in the public meeting
process and a co-chair of an organization calling for the renovation of Charity Hospital, the
public meetings “were a sham,” 71 noting the existing memorandum of understanding between
the City and the State regarding land acquisition and another memorandum of understanding
between the City, State and VA which called for the VA to suspend alternative site evaluations
provided that the City met its obligations with respect to the Mid-City site. Likewise,
Councilmember Stacy Head, who represented the selected area, stated that she was unsure if
officials were “truly going into [the public meeting process] with an open mind” and noted that
“there was little the Council could have done, short of shutting down the plan altogether.”72
Conversely, the State and VA officials believed that the public hearing process was valid
and that the community should not be discouraged by the ‘preference’ of the Mid-City locations
over other alternatives. Further, they noted that there were valuable results of the public meeting
process, among those being that LSU and the VA were able to move forward with their preferred
sites and that the State came to favor making the Charity Hospital structure available to
developers for non-hospital uses.73
Within the areas ultimately selected for the development of MCLNO and VAMC,
surveys revealed that approximately 618 individuals resided within the proposed footprint of the
70
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facilities in 265 individual housing units. Of the 618 individuals, 88% were minority and 46%
qualified as low income. Due to these percentages of minority and low income residents, the
area qualified as a “community of concern” for purposes of PEA environmental justice
evaluation. The PEA determined that while there were environmental justice concerns for this
population, the impact of the proposed projects could be sufficiently mitigated through relocation
assistance. This would include replacement housing payments which would offset increased cost
in obtaining comparable housing or placement in ‘housing of last resort’ (public housing) if such
comparable housing was deemed unavailable or if the individual’s financial means dictated.74
The physical development of the site was surveyed to determine the number and types of
structures that would be removed. The results of this survey were also used to reinforce the
position that the proposed sites were underutilized and generally in blighted condition, making
them ripe for redevelopment. In all, the combined site contained a total of 460 parcels, with a
total of 184 parcels on the proposed VAMC site and 276 on the MCLNO site. Table 7.1 outlines
the findings of this survey, which is also visually represented in Figures 7.5 and 7.6.
Table 7.2 – VAMC / MCLNO Site Land Use Survey Results75
VAMC
MCLNO
Property
Property
Use
Use
Count
Count
Occupied
Occupied
63
31
Residential
Residential
Active
Active
16
27
Commercial
Commercial
Vacant
Vacant
65
27
Residential
Residential
Inactive
Inactive
17
17
Commercial
Commercial
Vacant Lot
23
Vacant Lot
174

74
75

Final Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Site Selection
Final Programmatic Environmental Assessment for Site Selection, data compiled from text pp 3-14.
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Figure 7.7– Proposed VAMC Site Land Use Survey, with legend.76

Figure 7.8 – Proposed MCLNO Site Land Use Survey, with legend.77
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Based on the physical survey of the proposed hospital sites, a total of 323 parcels were
considered ‘vacant’ due to either being entirely undeveloped or uninhabited. Using these
development numbers, the total number of vacant properties amounted to 57% of the VAMC site
and 79% of the MCLNO site.78
In addition to the use of individual properties, the PEA also provided an analysis of the
historic character of the overall site as well as the notable structures within the area. The location
selected for MCLNO and VAMC facilities are within the boundaries of the Mid-City National
Register Historic District and several structures within the footprint were individually listed or
eligible for inclusion on the National Register of Historic Places. The area comprising the MidCity National Register Historic District was developed between the 1880s and early 1900s, with
most residential structures falling into the shotgun and Bungalow styles, and accounting for
55.3% and 31.4% of the ‘contributing’ structures within the District, respectively. The
remaining architectural forms include Queen Anne Revival (17.6%), Italianate (15.7%), and
Creole cottages (15%).79
Within the VAMC footprint, the Pan-American Life Insurance Building, located at 2400
Canal Street, and the Dixie Brewery, located at 2401 Tulane Avenue, are individually listed in
the National Register and it was determined that there would be no mitigation possible to offset
the loss of these structures so they are to be retained, renovated and integrated into the VAMC
campus.80 As of the date of this dissertation, renovation of the Pan-American Life Insurance
Building is nearing completion and the renovation of the Dixie Brewery has yet to begin.
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Figure 7.9 – Dixie Brewery81

In the MCLNO site, there were no individually listed buildings at the time of survey, but
it was determined that three properties were eligible for individual inclusion on the National
Register: the Deutsches Haus, located at 200 South Galvez Street; the McDonogh Number 11
school, located at 2001 Palmyra Street; and the Orleans House, located at 1800 Canal Street.
The eligibility of the Deutsches Haus was determined based on cultural rather than architectural
significance, so mitigation measures including photographic documentation and a public display
within the MCLNO complex were proposed to allow for the demolition of this structure. The
McDonogh Number 11 school was determined to be architecturally significant and is to be
relocated from the site. The significance of the Orleans House, and its presence as the last
remnant of the original residential character of this section of Canal Street, was determined to be
of such importance that the structure and the land it occupies was removed from the MCLNO
footprint and the State contributed to the rehabilitation of the structure to return it to productive
commerce.82
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Figure 7.10– Orleans House83

Figure 7.11 – McDonough Number 1184

The remaining area of the proposed MCLNO/VA sites located within the Mid-City
National Register Historic District was analyzed by the VA and FEMA in consultation with the
Louisiana State Historic Preservation Officer and issued a determination that of the District’s
3,710 contributing structures, only 165 were within the boundaries of the proposed
redevelopment, with 123 within the VAMC site and 42 within the MCLNO site. This accounted
for approximately 4.4% of the total contributing building stock within the District. In order to
minimize the impact on the Historic District, the City and VA agreed to establish an $800,000
fund to allow for the relocation and rehabilitation of one-story buildings of “exceptional
architectural importance” from the VAMC site to new locations within the Mid-City National
Register Historic District.85
The Land Assembly
The State of Louisiana, following official site selection began the process of obtaining
third-party appraisals on all properties within the MCLNO/VA footprint. As the ultimate
operator of the MCLNO facility, the required land would be directly acquired by LSU. The
VAMC properties would be acquired by LSU and the Division of Administration of the
83
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Governor’s Office with funding by the City of New Orleans, and turned over to the federal
government once the site was fully acquired and cleared. As previously discussed, the goal of the
City essentially contracting with the State for the acquisition of the VAMC site was so that
expropriations, where necessary, could be accomplished through the State’s ‘quick-take’
authority, which is not available to the City of New Orleans.
The State (though LSU and MCLNO) and the VA established a timeline on property
acquisitions which called for acquisition of all required properties to be completed by July of
2010.
In the overall property acquisition plan, property acquisition within the VAMC site was
to be complete by July 13, 2010 in accordance with the priority overlay indicated in Figure 7.12
(below).86 Site acquisition for the VAMC was essentially completed by October 25, 2010, with
the final parcel, the Dixie Brewery not acquired until February 25, 2011.87 As of November 30,
2009, one year following the official site selection, only two properties within the VAMC site
had been acquired with three closings in process and 26 offers being considered.88
The MCLNO property acquisition timeline called for complete control of their site by
May 21, 2010; however, as of November 30, 2009 no properties had been acquired, five closings
were in process and 45 offers were being considered.89 Property acquisition within the MCLNO
site was completed on June 17, 2011, more than one year after the targeted end-date for that
stage of the project.90
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Figure 7.12 – VAMC Site Acquisition Priority Overlay91

Once the State and LSU started assembling the required real estate, they proved to be not
at all hesitant about exercising their eminent domain authority. A review of property transfer
records relative to the MCLNO and VAMC sites, summarized in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 (below),
shows that the State filed expropriation actions 123 times to acquire property. Due to the way
these transfers were recorded, it is unclear how many individual ‘parcels’ of the 460 indicated
above were expropriated; however, to complete land assembly there were a total of 294
transactions recorded with the Orleans Parish Office of Conveyances. With 123 expropriation
actions out of 294 total property acquisitions, the rate at which the State and LSU exercised their
power of eminent domain amounts to 42%.
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Table 7.3 – Total Acquisitions and Expropriations for MCLNO. 92
Number of
Square
Number of Acquisitions
Expropriations
433
9
8
434
13
6
435
1
1
436
10
5
437
13
5
438
6
4
466
9
1
467
12
2
468
12
1
469
7
2
470
13
3
471
2
1
520
5
2
521
22
7
522
4
1
Table 7.4 – Total Acquisitions and Expropriations for VAMC. 93
Number of
Square
Number of Acquisitions
Expropriations
523
6
3
524
17
8
525
24
9
526
2
2
549
5
4
550
21
10
551
25
11
552
3
2
553
1
1
554
25
11
555
26
6
556
1
1
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Through an analysis of the overall property acquisition timeline, it does not appear that
the State and LSU chose to exercise their power of eminent domain solely as a time-saving
measure to complete the land assembly process based on the project timeline; instead, they
appeared to exercise this authority when attempts to reach a negotiated purchase met an impasse.
If the state were solely looking to complete land assembly in an expeditious manner, they would
have been within their legal authority to file for ‘quick-take’ on all properties within the
designated footprint. As an example, Table 7.4 details the acquisition of Square 437 from within
the MCLNO site and is excerpted from Appendix 7.2; this Table indicates that property
acquisition within this single municipal square began on May 18, 2010 and concluded on April
8, 2011. Within this time frame there were five individual expropriation actions filed through
the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans and eight privately negotiated sales.
Table 7.5 - Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Square 437 for the Medical Center of
Louisiana at New Orleans.94
Square
437

Undesignated
12
16, 21
17, 18, 28, 29,
30, A
R
24
11, 13, 14, 15
10, B, 11
7, S
25
A
24
23

1836 Cleveland Ave
1822 Cleveland Ave
1837 Palmyra St.
228-30 S. Roman St.
216-18 S.Roman St.
219 S. Derbigny St.
211 S. Derbigny St.
1827 Palmyra St.
1826-34 Cleveland Ave
210-12 S. Roman St.
1812-20 Cleveland Ave
1800-04 Cleveland Ave
1823 Palmyra St.
1808-10 Cleveland Ave
1827 Palmyra St.
1829-31 Palmyra St.

$18,700
$33,400

5/18/2010
10/7/2010

X

10/19/2010

X

$550,600

10/29/2010

X

$4,250
$138,600

10/29/2010
2/14/2011

X

$118,612

2/23/2011

$90,600
$41,000
$65,000
$35,700

2/23/2011
2/25/2011
3/21/2011
4/8/2011
3/9/2011
3/29/2011

$180,000

X

Certainly, as with other projects evaluated in this dissertation, it is clear that the State
sought to avoid expropriation in favor of negotiated sale when possible. According to the New
94
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Facilities for the LSU Academic Medical Center Monthly Report for November of 2009, beyond
the outstanding offers noted previously, there were a total of 42 offers being prepared and
another 166 parcels where just compensation determinations had been made but where formal
offers had not yet been written.
The Legacy
While this project is too recent to draw any meaningful conclusions as to the overall
benefit that New Orleans will realize from these projects either in terms of improved health
service delivery or economic impact, what is certain is that these projects will move forward and
their legacy will shape health care in New Orleans and the surrounding region for many years to
come. Notable in the debate which surrounded both the vision and the planning of these
facilities was general agreement as to the need for improved medical service in the city; not only
an improvement in the physical environment but an improvement in the delivery of care itself.
Certainly there were differences in the overall vision as to what a new medical center
should look like and where it should be placed. This is expected in any major civic project, and is
especially true in a situation where people stand to be displaced. What is disappointing and
troubling is that there was no meaningful public participation in the ultimate decisions which
were made regarding this project. It is often thought that planning has come so far since the
Urban Renewal days of the 1950s and 1960s, but in evaluating the timeline of events
surrounding the MCLNO/VA project, it is clear that this is no different than the projects that
have been evaluated in previous chapters. The letter of the law may have been followed, but the
spirit and intent of public participation requirements were completely ignored as governmental
leaders informed the community what would be in their best interest rather than allowing them to
determine that for themselves.

231

From the perspective of expropriation authority exercised in furtherance of the project,
the effective expropriation percentage of 42% is substantially higher than the rate at which
properties were taken for previous projects studied in this dissertation. This is somewhat
remarkable as this project took place entirely after eminent domain laws in Louisiana were
changed to protect private property from governmental takings in response to the U. S. Supreme
Court’s Kelo decision. In reality, at least in the scope of this particular project, these newlycreated constitutional protections did nothing to protect property owners who actually saw the
state lose patience and expropriate at a higher rate than found even at the height of Urban
Renewal.
Between the development of the Cultural Center (Chapter 6) and the formulation of a
vision and subsequent planning for the MCLNO/VA hospitals, a number of federal laws have
been enacted to force governmental entities to take a closer look at what impact their
redevelopment plans will have on people. The National Environmental Protection Act and the
National Historic Preservation Act were briefly discussed in this chapter; both require extensive
analysis and public comment prior to allowing a project to go forward, the goal of this process
being to prevent projects from moving forward where there are viable options that will not
negatively impact a community or the overall environment.
The criteria used in site selection made the ‘preferred’ sites the only ones that could be
realistically considered. Certainly for the VAMC there were other viable options in terms of
available land, but the requirements set forth for both hospitals that the location have immediate
access to Interstate-10 and be located in close proximity to the existing LSU Health Sciences
Center made any site other than the eventual selection non-compliant with the selection criteria.
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It is hard to blame New Orleans officials for their complacency in allowing the
decimation of an historic neighborhood when the alternative was that they would have to
concede defeat to losing the economic drivers found in two large, modern hospitals. What is
disturbing in their complacency is that, from the available evidence, they did not even try to
devise a solution that would have provided equal benefits to residents in terms of retaining their
homes while accommodating the development of the medical complex within the same general
area.
Looking back on this project in twenty years with the benefit of hindsight may prove that
these decisions, while difficult, were truly best for the City, or perhaps not. What is certain is that
the legacy of the MCLNO/VA hospital complex, as a project and as a development process, will
likely continue to be met with some level of resentment from those displaced and those ignored
in the series of ‘public meetings.’ A possible benefit from this experience may be that the public
will no longer allow powerful government entities to skirt public input requirements to ramrod
projects into communities; unfortunately, it is likely that there will simply be more of the same.
Figure 7.13 – MCLNO, under construction.95
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Chapter 8
Conclusion:
What is taken, Why, and by Whom?
Through the previous six chapters, this dissertation has discussed the vision, planning,
and property acquisitions which shaped major projects in New Orleans from 1929 through 2011.
These projects run the gamut from localized projects, such as the Municipal Auditorium which
impacted only two municipal squares of property, to city-wide undertakings, such as the
Interstate Highway System which either directly or indirectly impacted every neighborhood in
New Orleans. Regardless of the initial scope of the individual projects, all have shaped the
physical, cultural, social, and political landscape of the city in some manner.
The primary finding of this dissertation research is that the exercise of eminent domain
has never been used a principal tool in the implementation of redevelopment proposals in the city
of New Orleans. All projects throughout the established research period required the use of
governmental expropriation authority to complete land acquisition, but in all cases the
government’s authority was used conservatively and only when privately negotiated purchases
failed. This chapter will summarize the findings of the six cases researched in the previous
chapters in the context of the research goals and questions presented in Chapter 1. Additionally,
the specific cases studied in this document will be comparatively analyzed to determine what, if
any, change occurred to the government’s exercise of eminent domain authority over the course
of the research period.
Chapter 1 of this dissertation set forth three primary research questions which will be
addressed individually, but are restated below:
1) To the extent that the City of New Orleans over the last century has pursued
specific land use policies through the use of its eminent domain power, what
have those policies been?
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2) What particular factors have played a role in the City’s determination as to
which areas were suitable for municipal projects, and specifically, to what
extent was the impact of such projects on the surrounding community a factor
in policy-making?
3) What land use strategies, if any, might have been employed by the City that
would have been effective in accomplishing the same policy goals without the
need for exercising the eminent domain power, and do these strategies present
realistic and viable alternatives today?
Before discussing the findings directly relative to these questions, the specific language of the
questions must be addressed. The terminology of the questions limits their scope to the actions of
the City of New Orleans as a corporate entity. These research questions should be read as
inclusive of governmental actors at all levels, federal, state, and city. The placement of projects
was not always purely within the purview of the City as the local governing body; for example,
in the routing of the Interstate Highway System through New Orleans (Chapter 5), the State
Highway Department determined the best route and Mayor Morrison conceded to their perceived
expertise in declaring that “the best place to put the highways is where the engineering
determines it should be put.”1 To move forward in time by approximately sixty years, the
placement of the Bio-Medical District (Chapter 7) was determined by actors outside of city
government, specifically Louisiana State University and the U. S. Department of Veterans
Affairs, with City leadership blessing the site selection for fear of losing the hospitals as
economic drivers to neighboring Jefferson Parish.
1) To the extent that the City of New Orleans over the last century has pursued specific land use
policies through the use of its eminent domain power, what have those policies been?
Over the course of this research period, there were several broad land use policies which
were manifested in specific projects where eminent domain was utilized. Generally, these
1

Official Transcript of Proceedings of the Department of Highways, State of Louisiana: Federal Interstate Highway
Hearing for all of Jefferson and Orleans Parishes, February 11, 1958. Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal
Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 296, at 23.
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policies are categorized as improvements in housing and transportation, and slum clearance. The
institution of public housing within New Orleans (Chapter 3) was accomplished through the
Housing Authority of New Orleans’s (HANO) mission of providing safe, sanitary housing to the
citizens of the city. To accomplish this goal, HANO undertook the city’s first slum-clearance
projects to clear land for the construction of public housing.
The first sites selected for redevelopment by HANO were determined to be
neighborhoods with the highest proportion of substandard housing, as determined by housing
surveys conducted both by HANO and third-party social research organizations. These findings
were summarized in HANO’s statement that “there is on every hand desolation, despair, squalor,
poverty, frustration – the whole sordid and dangerous group of sinister elements that form the
component parts of a slum.”2 The removal of these substandard, slum conditions was seen as a
necessity and the provision of housing to relieve people from those same conditions was
determined to be a priority by all levels of government. Unfortunately, the full scope of eminent
domain use in the creation of the St. Thomas and Magnolia Housing Developments could not be
determined due to property transfer records being purged from the City’s Office of Real Estate
and Records following the redevelopment of these sites in the past decade.
The transportation element of land use policy which drove the exercise of eminent
domain in New Orleans was the individual automobile. The Mississippi River Bridge and
Interstate Highway System in New Orleans resulted in the largest land acquisition of the projects
studied, and also resulted in the largest number of expropriations of the six cases. Not only did
these projects have the largest impact on citizens at an individual level, through loss of property,
but also the largest, and longest lasting, impact on the daily life of metropolitan New Orleans.

2

Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Period March 15, 1937 to December 31, 1938, at 26.
Accessed from the New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division.
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The Mississippi River Bridge and Interstate Highway System facilitated ‘White Flight’ that came
to define the 1950s and 1960s, causing the rapid growth of adjacent Jefferson Parish and the
decline of New Orleans’s population and tax base.
Transportation infrastructure, particularly to accommodate automobiles, was seen as
critical to the survival of New Orleans as a major city in the 1940s and 1950s. These highways
were rooted in a document produced in 1926 by Harland Bartholomew and Associates, entitled A
Preliminary Report on a System of Major Streets which outlined the needs of New Orleans in
terms of adequately handling the growing number of cars on urban streets. In terms of this report,
‘major streets’ were considered to be wide boulevards that were conducive to traffic flow;
however, this initial report was updated in 1947 and again in 1951 by the City Planning and
Zoning Commission. These revisions recognized the need for regional highways to not only
improve traffic flow within New Orleans but that a coordinated highway system would be
required to serve the entire metropolitan area.
It was this adopted plan which laid the foundation for the route proposed by the state for
construction of the Interstate Highways in New Orleans. As noted previously, the City was not
in a position to dispute the state’s proposed highway routes, but the routes were generally
consistent with the City’s approved plans for transportation infrastructure. In the case of the
Mississippi River Bridge and Interstate Highways, the required rights-of-way were acquired by
the Mississippi River Bridge Authority, as a state-enabled entity, and the state Highway
Department, respectively. The City’s involvement in actual property acquisition for these
projects was minimal.
The third broad land use policy which was furthered by the use of eminent domain was
slum clearance, popularly termed urban renewal. There were two projects undertaken in New
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Orleans during the research period that specifically fell into this category, the New Orleans Civic
Center (Chapter 4) and the New Orleans Cultural Center (Chapter 6). Both of these projects were
promoted as being civic improvements that, at least in the case of the Civic Center, had the
added benefit of ridding New Orleans of “one of the worst slum conditions that now exists in
New Orleans.”3 Not only did these projects offer to clear areas determined to be ‘slums’ but
would also offer civic amenities in terms of consolidated municipal government in the Civic
Center and civic meeting place and an environment for education, recreation and the exchange of
ideas in the Cultural Center.
More than the amenities offered in terms of what the residents of New Orleans would
seek, there was also financial motivation in these projects for the City as an entity. The sites
selected for these projects were seen as not being developed or used to their potential, and this
was problematic because if the uses were not being maximized, neither were assessments for
property taxes. The City was not shy about stating that private development in conjunction with
these projects was seen as a motivator in the planning and ultimate execution of the proposals.
2) What particular factors have played a role in the City’s determination as to which areas were
suitable for municipal projects, and specifically, to what extent was the impact of such projects
on the surrounding community a factor in policy-making?
Across the six cases studied in this dissertation, there were a number of factors which
contributed to the selection of sites for government projects. With the exceptions of the
Mississippi River Bridge and Interstate Highway System, where the routes were determined
primarily based on adopted street plans, all projects were specifically located based on predetermined selection criteria. In the cases of public housing, the Civic Center, and the Cultural
Center, the sites were selected based on presence of ‘slum conditions’ as determined by City

3

A Proposed Plan for a Central Municipal Center, rev. April 10, 1945. Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal
Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 431, at 4
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officials and, particularly in relation to the latter two, the ability to realize returns on investment
in terms of increased property values in the areas immediately adjacent to these undertakings.
In the case of the Municipal Auditorium (Chapter 2) the selected site was chosen based
purely on its adjacency to Congo Square, where the City initially wanted to place the structure.
The record reveals that the Congo Square site proposal was partially based on ease of access and
early proposals for a civic complex centered roughly at Orleans and North Rampart Streets;
however, a combination of community opposition and an unclear ruling by the state supreme
court waylaid use of this site for the Auditorium. In reaction to these factors, the City chose two
municipal squares immediately adjacent to Congo Square as the location for the structure with
little discussion beyond saving Congo Square as a park for the surrounding community.
Differing from these earlier projects, the site selection process for the Medical Center of
Louisiana at New Orleans (MCLNO) and the United States Department of Veterans Affairs
Medical Center (VAMC) was officially based on defined site selection criteria which was to
result in the most suitable location for the joint facilities. Unofficially, the selection of the
MCLNO site was determined by LSU years before the location would be officially announced
and the VAMC site was chosen purely due to its adjacency to MCLNO. LSU stated its
preference for what was termed the “North Option” in a 2003 facilities master planning report.
This option, with frontage on Canal Street, would present the hospital with a more prominent
location that would add to its image as an institution and would allow for the complex to tie into
existing transportation infrastructure, most importantly the Canal Street streetcar line and
Interstate-10.
Though it played a role in the decision-making, the vanity of MCLNO’s desire to have
Canal Street frontage did not seem to be the only factor which played into the ultimate site
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selection. ADAMS Management Services Corporation, the facility planners for MCLNO,
analyzed the selected site in terms reminiscent of the urban renewal projects of an earlier era.
The land on which MCLNO has been placed was comprised largely of vacant land or vacant
structures, with occupied homes and businesses interspersed. The conclusion reached was to
redevelop this tract, which if untouched, would prove to be a hindrance to the development of
medical industry-related uses. By redeveloping this area, across Tulane Avenue from the exiting
LSU Health Sciences Center, the State would be able to control the type of development within
close proximity to their investments while also retaining the ability to foster a unified image for
medical training in New Orleans.
As previously stated, the site selection for the VAMC was largely based on adjacency to
the MCLNO site. The official solicitation for site proposals in 2007 called for a site of 25 to 75
acres in size, within a geographic area bounded by the south shore of Lake Pontchartrain, the east
bank of the Mississippi River, the Jefferson/St. Charles Parish line and Franklin Avenue (in New
Orleans). In addition to these geographic limitations, the other criteria included: 1) clear title to
the property; 2) full disclosure of any hazardous conditions; 3) access to existing or planned
major streets and public transit; and 4) adequate utility service to support the hospital’s needs.4
Though these were the official criteria indicated in 2007, the VA stated in 2006 in a report to
Congress that their primary objective was to create a joint facility with LSU and MCLNO
adjacent to their proposed new campus in the Mid-City area of New Orleans (see Figure 7.5).
The impact of these projects, from the Municipal Auditorium through the
MCLNO/VAMC hospital complex, was routinely evaluated in terms of the potential impact on
surrounding communities. However, this evaluation of impact almost always turned on the

4

Veterans Administration Request for Site Proposals. Accessed via the New Orleans City Planning Commission,
Files of Deputy Director Leslie T. Alley.
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economic impact rather than the impact to those who actually lived within or adjacent to the
project footprints. In discussion of site selection for the Municipal Auditorium, the focus was on
the potential loss of a public park (Congo Square) and how to replace it, rather than on how the
presence of a large convention and performance hall would impact adjacent property owners,
though clearly this was considered by some members of the community that intended to
capitalize on the presence of the auditorium. What makes the lack of consideration for the
community clear in this case is that when the Congo Square site became politically impractical,
City leadership quickly offered the privately-held property across St. Claude Street from Congo
Square with no discussion as to the impacts on the property owners or the community.
In terms of public housing developments, particularly the first two which were
constructed in the most densely developed areas of the city, HANO believed that the presence of
modern, safe, and sanitary housing would improve the overall communities. No longer would
people be content to live under slum conditions and the market would require upgrades to private
low-priced rentals in order to make them competitive with public housing. Though HANO stated
the belief that the public housing developments would improve surrounding communities, it is
important to note that HANO’s mission is to provide housing, not foster community
development.
The Civic Center and Cultural Center, as discussed previously, were seen as mechanisms
to aid in elevating property values, which would theoretically help adjacent private property
owners just as much as it would aid the City in terms of increased property taxes. In addition to
this factor, both projects were seen as key to guiding the growth of the Central Business District
in a manner that official City Planning found appropriate. The Civic Center was to guide growth
north towards Charity Hospital and Tulane Avenue while the Cultural Center was envisioned as
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creating a barrier to prevent the future expansion of the Central Business District into the historic
Tremé neighborhood. The Civic Center project did accomplish the goal of guiding growth. The
Central Business District expanded to the north along Poydras Street where numerous office
buildings and the Mercedes-Benz Superdome stand today. Conversely, the Cultural Center has
resulted in a barrier between the French Quarter and the Tremé neighborhood rather than
between the Central Business District and a residential community.
One other note regarding the Civic Center’s potential impact on its surrounding
community is that the goal of the project was to guide the growth of the Central Business District
to the north, which necessitated the complete elimination of the community. The Civic Center
project was proposed atop the only pocket of residentially used land in the downtown area. The
stated goal of the project was to guide commercial growth in that direction and City leadership
determined that this could only be accomplished by removing residential uses. So one could infer
from this that the ramifications on the surrounding community were fully considered and the
decision was made to eliminate the neighborhood in favor of commercial growth.
The MCLNO/VAMC project presents the most evidence of consideration on the impact
the projects would have on the surrounding community. This is a result of legally-mandated
studies that were required prior to the release of federal funds to undertake the projects. It should
be noted that just because the impacts were considered does not mean that governmental actors
were necessarily concerned about the potential negative consequences. Requirements of both the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA)
require governmental actors to fully evaluate the impact of government projects prior to their
approval to prevent harm to communities surrounding new facilities. In evaluating the potential
impact of the MCLNO/VAMC project, Findings of No Significant Impact were issued based on:
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1) that the proposed changes to land use designations (zoning) within the site were not
substantial; 2) no federal, state, or local agency was in opposition to the project; 3) potential for
environmental impact was minimal; and 4) mitigation measures would be taken to reduce the
harm to the Mid-City National Register Historic District.5
3) What land use strategies, if any, might have been employed by the City that would
have been effective in accomplishing the same policy goals without the need for
exercising the eminent domain power, and do these strategies present realistic and viable
alternatives today?
After reviewing the historical materials relative to these particular projects, the answer to
this research question is troublingly simple. There were no alternative strategies available that
could have been employed to prevent the use of eminent domain in carrying out the policy goals
that these projects represented. In every case, the governmental entity tasked with property
acquisition attempted to negotiate purchases to prevent having to resort to use of expropriation.
In every case, there were parcels that could not be acquired through negotiation. In the majority
of individually documented cases the reason negotiated purchase failed was because the property
owner wanted more for the property than was justified by appraisals. The only way to avoid
expropriations in these situations would have been to offer more money to the property owner,
but in doing so the government would be acting irresponsibly as a steward of tax dollars.
Certainly it is impossible to infer that large public projects cannot proceed without the
exercise of eminent domain; doing so is simply highly unlikely. There will always be someone
holding out for more money than a property is truly worth and in doing so preventing a project or
facility from being constructed. The tool of eminent domain is a necessary evil in terms of
planning and governing. Political leaders realize that the threat of expropriation is unpopular, and
in New Orleans there has been a long history of taking steps to avoid use of the power of
5

Federal Emergency Management Agency, (2008). Finding of No Significant Impact for Site Selection for the LSU
AMC Project (FEMA-1603-DR-LA). Accessed via www.valsumedcenters.com, on May 24, 2012.
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eminent domain. In none of the studied cases was there a requirement to negotiate purchase. The
government could have expedited projects by filing expropriation suits against all property
owners within an area and obtaining title through the courts.
What is the most interesting finding is that the use of eminent domain was higher in the
case of the MCLNO/VAMC project than in any other project studied. This project was
undertaken in a post-Kelo environment where there was substantial political opposition to
infringing on property rights for what is perceived as the common good. The Kelo-responsive
laws passed in Louisiana following Hurricane Katrina did not limit expropriation authority where
the project met a strict standard of ‘public use;’ it is indisputable that both medical center
projects met that definition. However, it should be noted that all layers of government
approached these hospitals from an economic development standpoint; this is significant because
consideration of the economic development potential of a project was not a permissible factor in
determining if a taking is for a ‘public purpose.’6
Comparison across Projects
Across the cases studies as part of this research, there are several similarities and
contrasts that merit note insofar as assembling the full picture of eminent domain use in New
Orleans during the research period. To begin this comparison, it is important to evaluate the
expropriation rates found within the several projects to serve as a baseline for discussion of the
other factors which may have factored in to these percentages.
Through all cases studied, it is clear from the official historical record and through
journalistic coverage of the events that negotiated purchase of property within these project sites
was always preferable to expropriation. In every instance, the proposed project was a ‘public
use’ as operationally defined in this dissertation and as recognized by the courts through
6

Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 851 of the 2006 Regular Session
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challenges to takings. The overall reluctance of the government to take property can be seen in
the effective expropriation percentages determined for each project as part of this research.
Table 8.1, below, illustrates the effective expropriation percentages calculated for each of the
cases studied.
Table 8.1 – Effective Expropriation Percentages for Researched Projects7
Project
Expropriation Percentage
Municipal Auditorium
17%
Public Housing
unavailable
Civic Center
6%
Mississippi River Bridge / Pontchartrain
24%
Expressway (original span)
Interstate Highway System
15%
Mississippi River Bridge (second span)
21%
Cultural Center
10%
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans /
42%
Veterans Affairs Medical Center
With the effective expropriation rates for the projects established, one can more readily
explore the individual projects and the circumstances of those projects which may have factored
into the use of eminent domain, or lack thereof, with respect to particular projects. Three
particular factors which are addressed are: time, participation, and race/ethnicity.
The factor of time, which this dissertation will identify as the interval between formal site
selection and full property acquisition, appears to have played a role in the rate of expropriation
found within each of the cases studied, with the exception of bridge and highway projects. As
indicated in Table 8.2 (below), the longer period between site selection and complete property
acquisition commonly results in lower expropriation rates for land acquisition. The apparent
relationship between time and expropriation could have many elements, but the most likely, as
previously discussed in the context of the Cultural Center is that through the City’s inability to

7

Data summarized from previous chapters, full property acquisition information may be found in the appendix to
each chapter.
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Table 8.2 – Property Acquisition Timeline Comparison across Cases8
Years Between
Property
Site Selection
Site
Project
Acquisition
and Complete
Selection9
Timeframe
Property
Acquisition
Municipal Auditorium
1928
1929*
1
Public Housing
1937
1938 - 1939
2
Civic Center
1947
1947 – 1955
8
Mississippi River
Bridge/Pontchartrain
1953
1955 – 1957
4
Expressway
(original span)
Interstate Highway
1958
1963 – 1967
9
System (Interstate-10)
Interstate Highway
1958
1959 - 1971
13
System (Interstate-610)
Mississippi River Bridge
1974
1979 – 198810
14
(second span)
Cultural Center
1951
1958 - 1971
20
Medical Center of
Louisiana at New
2008
2010-2011
3
Orleans / Veterans
Affairs Medical Center

Expropriation
Percentage
17%
unavailable
6%
24%

15%

21%
10%
42%

* Municipal Auditorium property acquisition was not complete until 1934 due to appeals; construction began in
1929 and was complete in 1930.

move quickly on the site acquisition for a designated project, it caused the population of the area
to dwindle and property values to decline to the point where property owners would have likely
welcomed the City’s purchase offer in order to relieve themselves of the burden of a soon-to-bevalueless piece of property.
In contrast to the Civic and Cultural Center projects, where property acquisition lingered
for many years, the Municipal Auditorium site was acquired in only one year, resulting in a 17%
expropriation rate, opposed to the 6% and 10% rates found in the City’s Urban Renewal projects.

8

Data summarized from previous chapters, full property acquisition information may be found in the appendix to
each chapter.
9
“Site Selection” column denotes the year of the official site selection.
10
The property at 1061 Magazine Street was acquired in 1992. No explanation was found in the record regarding
why this property was not acquired earlier. This acquisition was a negotiated purchase.

246

While the smaller property acquisition window appears to bear a relationship to the number of
expropriations performed, there is no evidence to demonstrate that there is a direct relationship
between a shorter period of property acquisition and the percentage of expropriations required to
complete the land assembly.
As seen in the MCLNO/VAMC project, the property acquisition timeframe was three
times that of the Municipal Auditorium project, the expropriation rate was 42%, approximately
250% higher. In researching the particular cases there is not documentation which speaks to the
very high expropriation rate in this project. From media reports and local, experiential
knowledge, the most likely cause for this substantially higher rate of expropriation was the factor
of time combined with a lack of community buy-in of the project. This lack of buy-in was
primarily caused by the lack of true public involvement in the site selection process and a lack of
engagement on the part of the State in illustrating the alleged need for the project to be located in
this neighborhood.
With respect to the bridge and highway projects, time, as defined for this discussion, did
not seem to be a relevant or determining factor in the overall expropriation rates for the projects.
However, timing does appear to have at least played a role in individual expropriations within
particular areas. By evaluating the property transfer records contained in Appendices 5.2 and 5.3,
one can clearly see that timing of acquisition remained an element contributing to expropriations.
In completing property acquisition for these projects, the Louisiana Highway Department phased
the acquisition over the full property acquisition timeframe, purchasing or expropriating property
comprising several municipal squares at a time. In taking this raw transfer data, it is clear that the
State’s position regarding acquisition was that when they were ready to acquire your square they
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would make an initial attempt to negotiate the purchase and not hesitate to expropriate when
required.
The second factor to be evaluated is that of participation. Participation and meaningful
community engagement were not found in any of the cases studied within this dissertation,
though in one case the community did have an impact in having the location for a project
changed. In the case of the Municipal Auditorium, public outrage at the proposed repurposing of
Congo Square caused the City to locate the structure on two adjacent municipal squares rather
than causing the loss of historic park space. This outrage was voiced both in meetings of the
Auditorium Commission and the City’s Commission-Council when they were considering an
ordinance to designate Congo Square as the home of the City’s new auditorium. As a result,
Mayor O’Keefe proposed acquiring property for use as an auditorium site. This decision was met
with approval from the business community that was seeking the auditorium and those wishing
to preserve the Square, but was done with no regard to those who would be displaced as a result.
The same lack of consideration is found in the Civic Center and Cultural Center projects,
where large numbers of low-income persons, mainly minorities, were relocated from areas
determined to be ‘blighted’ without the benefit of public engagement to determine if the selected
location was truly best to accomplish the project goals. In the case of public housing, community
engagement was also not a concern, but HANO did appear to consider the needs of those being
displaced in furtherance of the projects. Particularly, HANO would, conceptually, provide
replacement housing to those low-income individuals displaced from the city’s slums in the
modern, sanitary housing which would occupy those sites. While this may have been the case,
there was no provision made to house those displaced while new housing was under
construction.
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In the case of the Interstate Highway System through New Orleans, a requirement of the
Interstate Highway Act was a public hearing. This hearing was held in 1958 at the New Orleans
City Council Chambers and during this meeting the State presented its highway plans and
comments were received. There were individuals rising to speak in opposition at this hearing but
it seems likely that those concerns were disregarded as the State moved through the approval
process with federal officials.
The final case studied is perhaps the most troubling as far as participation is concerned.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were numerous federal regulations in place
calling for studies, community engagement, and comment periods before a site could be selected
or a project would be permitted to move forward if federal dollars were to be used. The State of
Louisiana, in selecting their MCLNO/VAMC sites technically followed these legally prescribed
processes; however, they successfully managed to marginalize any opposition to their preferred
findings. As a result, and via an evaluation of the projects studied in this dissertation, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that people fighting to preserve a park in 1929, with no formal
participatory mechanism, were more successful than an organized coalition trying to save a
community in 2008, where there are legally mandated considerations that must be given.
The participation factor cannot be evaluated in terms of its effect on the expropriation
rate found across the cases studied. There was no substantive participation or community
engagement in any of the cases, therefore the effect of meaningful engagement on creating buyin for the projects among those being displaced cannot be determined. What is documented,
however, is City leadership’s position that opposition to one of these projects was seen as being
an obstructionist to the betterment of the community. This is illustrated first in HANO’s
coordination with the press regarding “the grave civic risk being incurred by some scattered
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instances of unreasonable selfishness on the part of a few owners” within areas identified for
redevelopment with public housing.11 And again in Mayor Morrison’s statement to the
assembled crowd at the Interstate Highway hearing where he deemed acquisition or property and
removal of homes as “incidental consequences” to progress in the city.12
The final factor to be evaluated is race and ethnicity. Whether displacement of poor
African-Americans was a goal of these projects or not, that was the clear end result that can be
seen across all site-specific projects studied in this dissertation. The exception is in the bridge
and highway projects where all groups within the New Orleans community – white, AfricanAmerican, rich, and poor – were impacted by acquisition of right-of-way, as discussed in
Chapter 5. The remaining projects, from the Municipal Auditorium through the
MCLNO/VAMC Hospitals all imposed a disproportionate impact on African-American
neighborhoods. While site-specific demographic data is not available for the Municipal
Auditorium of Public Housing projects, it is clear, as illustrated in Table 8.3, that all cases
Table 8.3 – African-Americans as Percentage of Population within Project Footprints13
African-Americans as Percentage
Project
of Total Site Population
Not Available
(Area selected had highest number of
Municipal Auditorium

African-American children of four areas
studied)

Not Available
Public Housing

(Sites were densely concentrated
African-American areas)

Civic Center
Cultural Center
Medical Center of Louisiana at New Orleans
Veterans Affairs Medical Center
11

100%
80%
87% (minority)
88% (minority)

Report of the Housing Authority of New Orleans For the Year Ending December 31, 1939, at 13. Accessed from
the New Orleans Public Library, Louisiana Division.
12
Official Transcript of Proceedings of the Department of Highways, State of Louisiana: Federal Interstate Highway
Hearing for all of Jefferson and Orleans Parishes, February 11, 1958, at 23.
13
Data summarized from previous chapters; MCLNO/VAMC data from Final Programmatic Environmental
Assessment for Site Selection: Veterans Affairs Medical Center (VAMC) and Louisiana State University Academic
Medical Center of Louisiana (LSU AMC), November 2008, at 3-65. Accessed via www.valsemedcenters.com.
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studied as part of this dissertation were located in predominantly African-American
communities. This comparison across cases is fairly simple, and the change over time
nonexistent. Whether in 1929 or 2008, the presence of African-Americans was a common
element to all large public projects throughout the research period. In relation to the use of
eminent domain within these projects, race and expropriation is difficult to correlate; however,
this researcher proposes a connection between the two which would exist just below the surface
of raw population and property transfer data.
In the case of the Civic Center, the project with the lowest effective expropriation rate of
the cases studied, data from HANO indicates that the population of this area was 100% AfricanAmerican; however, the names of property owners do not reflect names generally found in the
African-American community. For example, the largest individual property owner within the
area was the Deichmann family, other owners of multiple properties within the site were the
Locicero family, the Lichtentag family, and Gervais Favrot, Chairman of the City Planning and
Zoning Commission.14 These names, paired with the ownership of multiple pieces of residential
property within the redevelopment site, begin painting a larger picture indicating that while the
population may have been 100% African-American, the ownership of the site certainly was not.
These holdings may have been investment properties or rentals, or may have been purchased due
to the impending redevelopment in hope of cashing in on the government’s purchase, this cannot
be known. What one is left to infer, however, is that regardless of the motivation of ownership
those being displaced were not the same individuals that were willing to sell their property for
the development of the Civic Center.

14

Large Parcel Map with Ownership as of October 8, 1946. Accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives,
New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File 412.
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While this level of ownership data is not available for the other sites, one would presume
that due to the social and legal circumstances of the era (Jim Crow, etc.), most low-income
African-Americans would have been renters of structures owned by whites. These property
owners would likely have been primarily concerned with compensation for the property and
rental units rather than the displacement of the poor, minority population inhabiting the
structures. This is not to say that landlords were never concerned about their tenants, but this is
to say that their relationship was, generally, a purely economic one where the owner of the
property is principally concerned with the return on his investment.
Through this cross-case comparison, it can be inferred that there are two distinct elements
of redevelopment projects which have served to reduce the instances of expropriation during the
property acquisition phase. The first element, time from site selection to complete property
acquisition appears to be the single largest factor in the need to exercise eminent domain;
however, this is the most difficult element to build into a redevelopment project. These large
timespans were not intentional on the part of the City, and in reality most modern government
projects would not initiate land acquisition until the project is fully funded and a firm
construction timeline established. The second element, participation, can be seen as the most
practical element to reducing instances of expropriation. By bringing the community together
early on in a project and allowing the public to have a true voice and ownership of a proposal,
the government is less likely to experience delays and keep the property acquisition process out
of the courtroom.
Race and Redevelopment
The third common element seen in these cases, prevalence of minorities in project areas
merits further discussion, and is a matter of concern, not a strategy for reducing the need for
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expropriation. Areas with dense minority populations have historically been the areas chosen for
these large-scale redevelopment projects, particularly during the mid-century Urban Renewal
era. This was so wide-spread that historians have deemed Urban Renewal to truly be “negro
removal.”15
The disproportionate impact on the African-American community cannot be viewed as a
matter of chance. While there is no firm documentation to indicate that these minority
communities were targeted by redevelopment projects, it is highly unlikely for every major civic
project to be located in predominantly African-American neighborhoods purely by happenstance.
Not only would these projects serve to displace, and in come instances eradicate, AfricanAmerican communities; these projects, by and large, were to serve the white population of the
City. In the case of the Cultural Center, the indigenous culture of the Tremé neighborhood was
destroyed to build an opera house. At the Civic Center, the neighborhood that served as the
birthplace of jazz was bulldozed to encourage the expansion of the Central Business District. In
lower Mid-City, a community was removed to build a modern medical complex that would
enable the Bio-Medical industry to recruit higher-profile professionals.
Additionally, as indicated above, the owners of the property within these predominantly
African-American communities were white, as were adjacent property owners who were likely
to see their property values improve once ‘slums’ were removed from the community. The goal
of increased property values is made clear in every project addressed in this document, from the
Municipal Auditorium through the MCLNO/VAMC hospital projects. Generally this goal of
increased valuation is couched in terms of ‘higher assessments’ to bring more revenue to the

15

Hirsch, A. R. (1993). With or Without Jim Crow: Black Residential Segregation in the United States. Urban
Policy in Twentieth-Century America, Hirsch, A.R. and Mohl, R.A., eds. Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick,
NJ, at 90
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municipal coffers or ‘highest and best use’ to indicate that the present owners are not utilizing
property in a manner that the civic leadership deems appropriate.
While the site selection for these municipal projects resulted in a disparate impact on the
African-American community in New Orleans, all official documentation indicates that the
municipal government was predominantly concerned with the removal of slums from the city.
Slum clearance was emblematic of the era and certainly there are housing surveys and other
studies to corroborate the position that these areas were in a very poor state of repair.
The overlap between slums and low-income African-Americans during the mid-twentieth
century was substantial. As a general principle, particularly in the American South in this era,
African-Americans were relegated to declining areas of the community that were being
abandoned by whites. This situation was partially attributable to Jim Crow laws, but also
community standards which served to emphasize segregationist attitudes. As these
neighborhoods shifted from white to African-American, there was generally an institutionalized
neglect of these areas which, in turn, produced the poorly maintained ‘slums’ that would later be
seen as so detrimental to the community. This situation certainly has to be noted as contributing
to the disproportionate impact on African-Americans found in every localized case studied as
part of this research.
There has been no evidence uncovered, either within the City’s archives or through the
review of newspaper coverage of these projects, to support the position that the City of New
Orleans or other entities intentionally targeted African-American communities through these
redevelopment proposals. What is clear is that the City targeted areas that could quantifiably be
identified as ‘slum’ or ‘blighted.’ As previously mentioned, the disproportionate impact on New
Orleans’s African-American community presents what can best be described as a violent,
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circular scenario where the most disadvantaged residents of the City occupied the housing in the
worst condition, which then led to further disadvantage in the form of displacement for
redevelopment projects and the strongly disparate impact on the African-American community.
There is also no evidence in the record of the City expressing any particular concern for
the people being removed from these project sites. This lack of consideration possibly served to
reinforce the plight of the African-American community at the time because of the limited
options available for relocation. Additionally the element of property acquisition timelines, as
discussed previously, also added to the burden of these individuals. This is clearly illustrated in
the discussion of the Cultural Center where 80% of eligible residents self-relocated without the
governmental support to which they were entitled. Primarily renters, these residents chose to
move as leases expired rather than being placed in the situation of having to quickly find suitable
housing. It is highly probable that the same situation occurred in projects both prior and
subsequent to the Cultural Center project.
Planning and Eminent Domain
The relationship between professional planning, site selection for public projects, and the
exercise of eminent domain in New Orleans during the research period is found to be very close.
With the rise of modern, professional planning in New Orleans, it became possible for the City to
bring large proposals to fruition that otherwise may not have been feasible. Certainly, the City of
New Orleans exercised its authority of expropriation prior to undertaking the Municipal
Auditorium project and prior to the establishment of the City Planning and Zoning Commission
in 1923, but moving forward from the first case studied, the projects became larger and more
complex as time progressed. Funding for these projects became available from multiple levels of
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government and there had to be a coordinating force behind the ideas to bring them from concept
to reality.
To track the relationship of planning and expropriation, one must refer back to the
Bartholomew Report which was commissioned by the City Planning and Zoning Commission
shortly after its creation. Planning, as a professional municipal undertaking, began in New
Orleans with the creation of the New Orleans City Planning and Zoning Commission in 1923.
Among the first substantial actions of this Commission was retaining the services of Harland
Bartholomew and Associates, of St. Louis, Missouri; the Bartholomew Report was the first
document created by this new commission and served as the foundation of planning in New
Orleans.
Of the cases researched in this dissertation, the origins of four can be traced directly back
to this Report; Bartholomew recommended the creation of a municipal center, complete with
new buildings to modernize city services.16 Bartholomew proposed this center to focus on
Orleans Avenue in the Vieux Carré; this report and its recommendations were adopted by the
Planning and Zoning Commission but were not acted upon. While the specifics of the proposal
never came to fruition, the selected locations of the Municipal Auditorium and later the Cultural
Center were partially attributable to this plan encouraging a government complex centered
approximately at Orleans and North Rampart Streets. The Civic Center, eventually located at
Loyola Avenue and Poydras Street also draws from this initial planning document. While the
location shifted out of the Vieux Carré, the concept of a new centralized municipal center is
directly attributable to the Bartholomew Report.

16

Fields, W. (2004). Urban Landscape Change in New Orleans, LA: The Case of the Lost Neighborhood of Louis
Armstrong. Dissertation, University of New Orleans Electronic Theses and Dissertation Collection.
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A separate element of the initial Bartholomew Report, entitled Preliminary Report on a
System of Major Streets, provided an analysis of road conditions and the need to improve traffic
flow through the city. This first major streets plan for the city, while not as ambitious as its
successors, called for the designation and creation of major arterial roads to effectively and
efficiently move people to and from the Central Business District.17 At this point in the
development of transportation planning in New Orleans, Bartholomew and the City Planning and
Zoning Commission were primarily concerned with creating a system of streets in the city that
would allow for the free flow of traffic. In the Preliminary Report, Bartholomew lamented the
piecemeal and haphazard development of the city, and resultant varying street widths, jogs, and
dead ends. These odd configurations in the street grid were caused by the historic development
pattern of the city, reflecting New Orleans’s growth across antiquated plantation and municipal
boundaries. Later this Preliminary Report would be revised into the City’s Major Streets Plan
which became the baseline planning document for the State Highway Department’s Interstate
Highway route.
Public housing in New Orleans combined elements of social policy planning with
physical planning’s blossoming attraction to slum clearance and urban redevelopment. Socially,
local housing advocates partnered with the Institute of Social and Religious Research in 1925 to
compile the first housing conditions survey of poor African-American neighborhoods in New
Orleans. These private organizations commissioned proposals for private housing developments
to aid these families, but the onset of the Great Depression ended the possibility of finding
private donors to fund these developments. Government recognition of the need for improved
housing followed these private initiatives, in 1937 the Louisiana Legislature enabled the

17

Harland Bartholomew & Associates, (1926). A Preliminary Report on a System of Major Streets, New Orleans,
Louisiana. Accessed through the Historic New Orleans Collection, Williams Research Center.
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formation of local housing authorities later that year Congress passed the Wagner-Steagall
Housing Act which provided funding for local entities to redevelop slum areas with modern,
sanitary housing.
By the 1940s urban redevelopment became known as Urban Renewal, seeking to remove
often arbitrarily-defined “slums” from the cityscape, to be replaced by the amenities of ‘modern’
life. The Civic Center removed a functional, living, but poor neighborhood from the Central
Business District to clear a path for commercial development and to provide a centralized home
for municipal government. The Cultural Center, similarly, cleared a swath of Tremé to provide
space for the construction of a centralized home for theatre, opera, and museums; this resulted in
the destruction of culturally significant space to create an island of bourgeois taste which would
not reflect the neighborhood on which the project was imposed.
In the spirit of mid-century Urban Renewal, the MCLNO/VAMC project is being
constructed atop what was a neighborhood just a few short years ago. In this instance, there is no
available information which connects the selection of this site to any larger planning process.
What the evidence reveals, however, is that the planning was undertaken solely by Louisiana
State University to serve their institutional interests and potential impacts on the community and
surrounding neighborhoods were only considered during the federally mandated NEPA and
NHPA reviews, which were conducted after the sites had been chosen.
To clarify, this author is not arguing that the rise of professional planning resulted in an
increase in projects where eminent domain was utilized; rather, the assertion is that professional
planning made large-scale projects feasible where previously the government would have
focused on constructing a single building rather than large projects calling for the redevelopment
of many acres. It is undeniable that the ability of the various levels of government to take on
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such projects has led to increased property acquisitions and, likely, an increase in the exercise of
eminent domain to complete these acquisitions.
The Effect of Kelo
Following the U. S. Supreme Court’s Kelo decision in 2005, the State of Louisiana, along
with numerous other states quickly sought to modify takings enabled under their state
constitutions to prohibit the exercise of eminent domain for economic development purposes.
This change was successfully accomplished by two separate constitutional amendments placed
before voters in September, 2006 which restricted the use of eminent domain to a more narrowly
tailored conception of ‘public use.’ While the language of the amendment remained fairly vague
(see Appendix 8.1 for full text), it clearly indicated that “[n]either economic development,
enhancement of tax revenue, or any incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in
determining whether the taking or damaging of property is for a public use.”18 This constitutional
change translated into a shift in the scrutiny of eminent domain proceedings from the ‘just
compensation’ element of the Takings Clause to an analysis of whether a use is ‘public’ enough
to qualify for use of the government’s expropriation authority.
Prior to this Kelo-responsive legislation, challenges to governmental expropriation
revolved solely around the compensation due to a property owner. As can be seen in all cases
studied, from the Municipal Auditorium through the MCLNO/VAMC hospitals, the largest point
of contention in the governmental acquisition of property had to do with the dollar amount that a
property owner should reasonably expect from the government due to displacement. In the
media coverage of the takings studied between 1929 and 2005, not once was there a legal
challenge to either the purpose or public nature of the taking, the conflict was purely one of
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Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 851 of the 2006 Regular Session, Page 2. See appendix 8.1 for full text of Act
851.
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financial compensation for loss. With respect to the MCLNO/VAMC project, there is only one
challenge to expropriation that was covered by the press where the potential ‘public purpose’ of
the taking was at issue, and even then the question was not one of whether a medical use
constitutes a taking, but rather that the proposed use of that particular portion of land was set as
open space for future expansion and not proposed as immediate, active use as part of the medical
complex.19
Notable in the MCLNO/VAMC project is that not a single challenge was made to the
project under the state constitution’s prohibition on consideration of economic development or
enhancement of tax revenue. It is impossible to argue that a public hospital, generally, does not
comply with the requirement that the result of expropriation be a “public building in which
publicly funded services are administered, rendered, or provided.”20 However, due to the facts
surrounding the site selection process, the possibility of a successful challenge could have been
raised regarding the constitutionality of site selection under the aforementioned prohibition on
consideration of economic development implications.
There was no need for the project to be located at the site ultimately selected, and based
on the initial planning documents contracted by LSU and MCLNO, the reason this area was
targeted was to redevelop underutilized and generally blighted property which would have
otherwise presented a barrier to the creation of a cohesive medical district. Further, official
records of the site proposal process from the Regional Planning Commission consistently tout
the economic development implications of the joint MCLNO/VAMC venture and the RPC
explicitly termed the project as “THE critical economic development project for the City of New

19

Barrow, B. (2011, December 16). Grand Palace Hotel demolition gets OK from judge. Times-Picayune, accessed
via www.nola.com on November 2, 2012.
20

Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 851 of the 2006 Regular Session, Page 2.
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Orleans”21 and invoked President Carter’s Executive Order 12072 which requires “serious
consideration” be given to potential improvements to the economic conditions of an area in the
federal facility site selection process.22
The economic development considerations of the MCLNO/VAMC project
notwithstanding, all projects studied as part of this dissertation would qualify as valid ‘public
purposes’ under the adopted language of Act 851. The Legislature’s attempt to define what
constitutes a ‘public use’ added, in part, the following language to the Louisiana Constitution:
(b)

(c)

Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or more
of the following objectives and uses:
(i)
Public buildings in which publicly funded services are
administered, rendered, or provided.
(ii)
Roads, bridges, waterways, access to public waters and
lands, and other public transportation, access, and
navigational systems available to the general public.
(iii)
Drainage, flood control, levees, coastal and navigational
protection and reclamation for the benefit of the public
generally.
(iv)
Parks, convention centers, museums, historical buildings
and recreational facilities generally open to the public.
The removal of a threat to public health or safety caused by the
existing use or disuse of the property.

Under this language, every project studied during the research period would defeat comply with
modern constitutional requirements. This is notable due to the fact that these restrictions were
supposed to provide additional protection to property owners from governmental actions. The
language of the Act is even so broad as to encompass convention centers, which was part of the
proposed use at issue in the controversial Kelo decision23 and which constitute a quasi-publicly
accessible use at best. When completed, even under governmental ownership, the general public
21

Regional Planning Commission (2007). Rebuild, Redevelop, Renew, In Response To: Expression of Interest
Regarding Land Assembly for the Veterans Affairs Hospital, at 1. Accessed via the Regional Planning Commission.
22
Ibid, at 2, quoting Executive Order 12072.
23
It is important to note that the convention center was an element of the issue at hand in the Kelo decision, it was
not the only factor. The case hinged on the government’s ability to expropriate property from one individual and
turn it over to another under the auspices of economic development where the general public would see no actual
use of the facility.

261

will not normally see the interior or such a facility and entry would be restricted to ticket-holders
and conventioneers.
Research Goals
As set forth in Chapter 1, the purpose of performing a case study of eminent domain in
New Orleans is two-fold. The first goal of this research is to create a chronicle of eminent
domain utilization in New Orleans from 1929 through 2011. This time period has been
established in order to incorporate the development of public housing, urban renewal, and the
City’s recovery from Hurricane Katrina. The second and primary purpose of this research is to
better understand the history of eminent domain in New Orleans. By better understanding the
past uses of eminent domain and the policies that drove the exercise of this power, researchers
and planning practitioners will be better informed in making decisions that will impact the
rebuilding and future of New Orleans. While this dissertation does not provide a complete
inventory of properties expropriated or projects undertaken through the entire research period, it
does offer a comprehensive perspective on the priorities and goals of governmental actors at all
levels during the research period and offers insight into the history and practice of takings within
the context of New Orleans.
Through better understanding the history and past applications of eminent domain,
planners, governmental leaders, and the general public can be better informed of the strategies
which have been and can be implemented both in exercising this authority and avoiding the
application of this authority. Eminent domain will always be a necessary tool in the overall
governmental toolbox because without it a single individual would be able to halt what may be a
truly needed government project. It is impossible to eliminate the possibility of exercising this
authority altogether without the risk of bringing all public projects to a standstill. What the
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government can do is better communicate with the public to illustrate the need of a project and
ensure that the site selection process is transparent and all interested parties have been brought to
the table prior to decision-making.
In the six individual cases studied within this dissertation, not a single one revealed true
elements of public participation, particularly in the determination of sites. The location of the
Municipal Auditorium was selected to save an adjacent park based on public pressure; bridges
and highways were located based on engineering studies that subjectively determined the best
locations for these improvements; public housing, the Civic Center and the Cultural Center were
located in neighborhoods that civic leaders believed were not being used to their potential; and
the MCLNO/VAMC project was sited, in part, to fuel the ego of hospital administrators that
wanted a Canal Street address rather than a Tulane Avenue address.
In many of these projects there was no formal mechanism for seeking public input, but
the most troubling finding of this dissertation, as it relates to the participatory elements of site
selection, is this: the MCLNO/VAMC hospital project had to follow clearly defined federal
criteria as to participation in site selection in order to utilize federal dollars for the projects.
These criteria were met with nominal compliance but the goals of such standards were
essentially ignored. The hospital administrators created site selection criteria that could only
result in one possible location and, much like the state highway department with respect to the
Interstate Highway System in 1958, the proposed site was presented to local officials with the
message of ‘agree or we will go elsewhere.’
With respect to the application of eminent domain within the context of these projects,
the restraint shown by governmental actors over the course of the research period was
remarkable. In every case the government made a concerted effort to acquire the necessary
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property through negotiated purchase rather than expropriation. As previously stated, the use of
eminent domain will always be necessary in the property acquisition phase of projects, even if
only as a Sword of Damocles to compel good-faith negotiations based on the appraised value of
property.
The evolution of eminent domain as a tool within the context of New Orleans, and
Louisiana more generally, shows that the government, while ostensibly taking steps to protect
private property from expropriation, has actually made the exercise of this power easier and
more convenient for itself. Through the creation of the state’s ‘quick-take’ authority, state
agencies can seize title to property by simply depositing its appraised value with the court. If the
now-former property owner wants to contest the value of the property or the legitimacy of the
expropriation they are legally able to do so but are unable to stop the government from taking
control of the property and doing with it as they wish while the wheels of justice slowly turn.
This researcher believes that the ‘quick-take’ authority of the state is the direct cause for
the substantially higher rate of expropriations found in the MCLNO/VAMC project than in
previous undertakings. Prior to the creation of the ‘quick-take’ authority a government entity
would file an expropriation action with the courts and have to wait for a final result in the case
before obtaining title to the necessary property. Certainly from the government’s perspective,
and to an extent the public’s perspective, there are substantial benefits in not having to wait for
these legal cases to conclude, which can take years. With this authority in place there is no
motivation on the government’s part to exhaust all negotiations with a property owner, aside
from the unpopularity of actually seeing the word “expropriation” in a headline.
In all, the findings of this dissertation reveal two truths about eminent domain in New
Orleans over the course of the research period: 1) the use of the power has always been
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politically unpopular and restricted to exercise when there were no other options to complete
property acquisitions; and 2) progress, in terms of the legal process and participatory
requirements prior to the exercise of eminent domain, has resulted in no more protection to the
average property owner than was available in 1929 when the site was selected for the Municipal
Auditorium. Eighty-two years of public projects and expanding the legal protections of
communities and property from those projects have resulted in no change whatsoever in the
ability of the government to arbitrarily select a site for whatever they deem important at a given
moment. In Chapter 1, I asserted that “the United States Supreme Court’s split-opinion in the
case of Kelo [truly brought] to light the breadth of eminent domain powers, and the harsh reality
that the only thing standing between the homes of the populace and a shiny new convention
center was the restraint of local governments;” the unfortunate result of the research undertaken
for this dissertation is that I did not realize how correct I was.
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Appendix 1.1 – New Orleans, Louisiana Urban Renewal Areas (Undated).1

1

New Orleans Urban Renewal Areas map, undated, prepared by the City Planning Commission. Accessed
from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – City Planning Commission, File
419.
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Appendix 2.1 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Municipal Auditorium Site1

Square
135

Lot Number

Address

1

703 St. Claude St.
709-13 St. Claude St.,
1214 Orleans St.
1218-20 Orleans St.
1217 St. Peter St.
1221 St. Peter St
1225 St. Peter St.,
1222 Orleans St.
1228 Orleans St.
1233 St. Peter St.,
706 N Liberty St.
1230-34 Orleans St.
1229 St. Peter St.

2
A or 12
B
C
5
6
B or 8
Undesignated
Undesignated

Square
136

1 or 6
2 or 7
3 or 8
4
5 or 10
6
7
8 or 12
9 or 13
10
11 or 3
12 or 2
13 or 4
14

733 St. Claude St.
727-29 St. Claude St.
723-25 St Claude St.
717-19 St Claude St.
1203-07 Orleans St.
1215-17 Orleans St.
1219-21 Orleans St.
1223-25 Orleans St.
1227-29 Orleans St.
1233-35 Orleans St.
726-30 N Liberty St.,
1232-34 St. Ann St.
1226-28 St. Ann St.
1222-24 St. Ann St.
1218-20 St. Ann St.
1214-16 St. Ann St.

1

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost
X
8/7/1934
11/21/1928
$13,650

11/9/1928

$5,500

2/27/1930

$5,000

11/21/1928

X

X

$5,775
12/5/1928
12/5/1928
$35,000

11/13/1928

$10,000

2/2/1929

$14,500

11/28/1928

$7,350

12/11/1928
8/14/1929
12/5/1928
1/22/1928
12/19/1928

$6,900
$9,000

X

11/28/1928
$6,300
$7,350
$6,500

12/5/1928
11/27/1928
11/14/1928
11/22/1928

Table 2.2 is the result of combining data from two sources: 1) Written offers for the purchase of real
property accessed from the New Orleans Municipal Archives, New Orleans Public Library – Mayor Arthur
J. O’Keefe, Box 1, and an internal City memorandum outlining the dates of acquisition of individual
parcels, accessed from the Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City
of New Orleans – Municipal Auditorium file.
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Appendix 4.1 - Times-Picayune Illustration of the Civic Center and other public
improvements.1

1. New City Hall
2. Municipal Center building with plaza
3. Central Fire Station
4. Central Fire Alarm
5. Traffic offices – park and parking
6. Veterans Administration Hospital Nurses’ Home
7. L.S.U Medical Center
8. V.A. Hospital
9. Union Station Terminal
10. downtown post office
11. Charity Hospital Nurses’ Home
12. Charity Hospital
13. Tulane Medical Center

1

Times-Picayune, September 29, 1946, accessed via www.newsbank.com, at 2.
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Appendix 4.2 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Civic Center Site1
Lot Number
Square
304

A, B, C, D
6
5
4
1, 2, 3
A
3, 7
Undesignated
16
4
1, 2, 2, 3
2, 3, 4, 24
11, 25
10
8
9
5, 6
11

Square Undesignated
305
A
B, 273, 275,
C, 271, 269
265, 267
A, B
Y
X, N, O
17
18, 19
20
4
2
3
24
A, B
18, 19
17
16
15
A, B, 31

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost
Exchange 11/19/1948
$18,750
6/3/1949
■
$15,000
11/24/1948
†
$36,600
12/6/1948

Address

$16,120
Exchange

10/6/1949
3/8/1950
10/6/1949
6/3/1949
8/23/1949
12/30/1949
7/21/1950
5/10/1949
2/14/1949
4/28/1949
4/28/1949
7/10/1950
11/19/1948

$29,900
$9,700

1/14/1953
5/6/1949

$17,275

319-21 S. Saratoga St.

$15,000
$9,500
$85,000
$27,500

410-16 Loyola St.
$5,050
426-28 Loyola St.
422-24 Loyola St.
436-42 Loyola St.
444-46 Loyola St.
1227-33 Poydras St.
1221 Poydras St.

X

9/14/1954

433-35 S. Saratoga St.
417-19 S. Saratoga St.
421-23 S. Saratoga St.

1214-16 Perdido St.
1218-20 Perdido St.
500-02 Loyola St.
1232 Perdido St.
504-06 Loyola St.

534 Loyola St.
538 Loyola St.
540 Loyola St.

1

$36,600
$10,700
$13,600

12/6/1948
8/25/1948
5/9/1949

$44,990

12/6/1948

♠

8/25/1948
12/6/1948
4/28/1949

♣

‡

$8,000
Exchange
$12,480
$15,500
$4,800

10/31/1951
4/28/1947
9/19/1949
8/24/1953
3/4/1955
2/21/1955
5/3/1949

$10,890

10/12/1949

$15,100

X

X
X

City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property
Files for indicated Squares.

279

Square
332

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost

Lot Number

Address

1, 2, 3, 6

1329-31 Perdido St.
544-48 S. Liberty St.

3
4
5
6-A, 3
Undesignated
1, 2
A
B
8
9, 10
11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16
N
17
16
14, 15
A
O
11, 12
10
9
8 or 33,
7 or 34
6
Square
333

1, A, B, 30
7, 8
5, 6, A
1
2
3, A
C
D, 15
Z
D
U, V, W,
X, Y, 1, 2,
3, 4, A

1315-17 Poydras St.
539-41 Loyola St.
1311-13 Poydras St
535-37 Loyola St.
533 Loyola St.
529 Loyola St.
523-25 Loyola St.

1318 Perdido St.
1320 Perdido St.
1324-26 Perdido St.

520 S. Liberty St.
524 S. Liberty St.
516-18 S. Liberty St.
530 S. Liberty St.
534 S. Liberty St.
538 S. Liberty St.

$57,500

4/13/1955

$13,500
$13,750
$14,350

5/6/1949
7/6/1949
4/18/1950

$52,100

4/28/1949

Exchange
$13,600
$18,750
$16,100
$4,150
$15,100
Exchange
(OPSB)
$6,000
$3,750
$4,750

5/31/1954
11/22/1949
6/3/1949
8/25/1948
6/21/1949
10/31/1951

$1,250
Exchange
Exchange
+ $6,250
Exchange
$6,915
$14,000

X

■
♣
‡

7/22/1949
6/15/1949
6/22/1949
4/27/1949
5/10/1949
2/4/1955
6/26/1951

X

5/31/1954
5/13/1949
5/31/1949

♦

9/29/1950
4/13/1955

$31,550

$13,000

3/29/1950
8/10/1948
3/10/1950
8/10/1948
6/17/1949
6/7/1949
11/24/1948
8/20/1948
8/20/1948
10/26/1948

$57,500

8/20/1948

$16,850
$6,150

8/20/1948
5/23/1949
8/20/1948

$31,090
445 Loyola St.
$6,800
15,025
$15,000
$11,700

433 Loyola St.

415-17 Loyola St.
1300 Gravier St.
1304 Gravier St.
1306-12 Gravier St.
1314-20 Gravier St.
1322-30 Gravier St.
416 S. Liberty St.

12-B, 13
Undesignated
Undesignated
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†
^

^

Lot Number

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost
$16,100
8/25/1948
♣
$5,775
2/16/1950
5/10/1949

Address

Square
27
333
Undesignated
(cont.)
29
Square
340

Square
341

23, 24, 25
26
27
28
Undesignated
Undesignated
Undesignated
Undesignated
2
3
4
5
6
7
8, 9
10
11
12
13, 20
14
Undesignated
16, 17
18
19
20, 21, pt. 22
Undesignated
1
2, 23
4, A
5,
Undesignated
1
1, 2, 19, 20
X
B, C, D, E
4 or 19
3
1, 2
Undesignated
Undesignated
3, 4, 8

1427-29 Perdido St.

1405-07 Perdido St.
1409-11 Perdido St.
447-49 S.Liberty St.
445 S. Liberty St.
441 S. Liberty St.

$20,000
$5,600
$6,250
$6,000
$4,800
$7,250
$3,300
$3,350
$5,500

$4,500
$8,800
$3,500

6/27/1949
8/30/1948
8/9/1948
8/5/1948
8/3/1948
8/3/1948
7/27/1948
5/31/1949
8/18/1948
8/10/1948
7/29/1948
5/10/1949
5/10/1949
5/10/1949
5/10/1949
12/6/1948
8/10/1948
9/7/1949
7/27/1948
7/29/1948
10/22/1948
5/26/1950
5/10/1949
8/10/1948
7/27/1948
5/24/1949

$18,000
$16,500

4/4/1953
10/19/1949

$41,250

9/14/1954

Exchange
+ $8,250

4/15/1954

$4,000
431-33 S. Liberty St.

417-21 S. Liberty St.
$44,900
1404-06 Gravier St.
$7,650
$8,000
$4,200
$9,000
$13,000

1418 Gravier St.

420 LaSalle St.

1425-27 Poydras St.
1417-19 Poydras St.
1400-08 Perdido St.

1401 Poydras St.
$30,000
$11,500
$12,500
$5,000
1418 Perdido St.
$50,500
$4,900
$8,000
524-34 LaSalle St.
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11/19/1952
4/6/1950
9/23/1953
5/3/1949
6/1/1949
5/25/1949
12/7/1950
11/18/1949
5/3/1949
5/13/1949

♠

X

●

Appendix 5.1 – Proposed Improvements under the Bartholomew Major Streets Plan (1926)1
1) Immediate widening of Dryades Street from Canal Street to Howard Avenue.
2) Establishment of a building line upon Danneel and Dryades Streets above St. Andrew
Street.
3) Immediate widening of S. Rampart Street from Tulane Avenue to Calliope Street.
4) Immediate widening of N. Peters and Decatur Streets below Canal Street.
5) Connection of Decatur and Chartres Streets below Almonaster Avenue.
6) Widening and connection of Chartres Street to Poland Avenue.
7) Development of Poydras and Howard Avenues.
8) Connection of Melpomene and Calliope Streets.
9) Widening of Calliope Street from S. Rampart Street to S. Peters Street.
10) Connection of Howard and Washington Avenues near S. Jefferson Davis Parkway.
11) Connection of Palmetto Street and Metairie Road at the Orleans-Jefferson Parish Line.
12) Widening of Metairie Road.
13) Connection of Canal Street with Canal Boulevard.
14) Connection of Fontainebleau Street to S. Claiborne Avenue.
15) Widening of Rousseau and Tchoupitoulas Streets above Felicity Street.
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Appendix 5.2 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Mississippi River Bridge and
Pontchartrain Expressway Right-of-Way.1
Lot Number

Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date

Address

Expropriation

Algiers / West Bank
Square
280

Square
275

Square
276

Square
281

21
12
3 or D
4
5, 6
16
3, hf. 2
pt. 1
1, hf. 2

419 Bringier St.
415-17 Bringier St.
423-25 Bringier St.
427 Bringier St.
441 Bringier St.
1721 Nunez St.
210 Monroe St.
200-02 Monroe St.

1,2
1
2
pt. 8
3
4
5
6
7
8
9, 10
12
3
4, 5
6
7
F
9B, 10B
11
12

400 Bringier St
1600 Teche St
1606 Teche St.
1601-03 Nunez St.
410 Bringier St.
414 Bringier St
416-18 Bringier St.
420 Bringier St.
422-24 Bringier St.
426 Bringier St.
1627-41 Nunez St.
1610 Teche St.
1620 Teche St.
411 Lawrence St.
417-19 Lawrence St.
421-23 Lawrence St.
1607 Nunez St.
1615 Nunez St.
1617 Nunez St.
1621-23 Teche St.

$3,150
$10,500
$16,500
$6,600
$10,850
$3,700
$11,000
$7,000
$10,000

7/28/1955
4/28/1955
9/6/1955
6/20/1955
12/7/1955
6/10/1955
8/16/1955
3/16/1956
8/5/1955

$176,500

3/1/1982

$91,000
$31,300
$36,000
$66,000

6/26/1981
7/28/1981
10/21/1981
12/3/1981

$110,000

7/6/1981

$25,000
$52,300
$45,000
$66,500
$29,500
$32,900
$33,000
$54,500
$34,000

7/27/1981
7/24/1981
10/6/1981
2/11/1983
4/30/1981
3/10/1981
7/1/1982
7/28/1981
12/14/1981
4/9/1980
2/23/1981
1/23/1980
8/9/1979
10/2/1979
10/12/1979
9/21/1979
1/27/1981
7/1/1955
6/14/1955

8-A, 9
18
19
20
21
pt. 22
pt. 22
23, 24

1609-11 Teche St.
1605-07 Teche St.
1601-03 Teche St.
321-23 Lawrence St.
315-17 Lawrence St.

$53,000
$38,600
$8,400
$20,500
$47,700
$14,000
$13,000
$34,200

A, B
C, D

1719-23 Hermosa St.

$15,000
$15,000

1

X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property
Files for indicated Squares.
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Square
281
(cont)

Square
274

Square
270

Square
271-A
Square
282

Lot Number

Address

1, 2
3, 4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

1714-16 Nunez St.
1700 Nunez St.
519 Bringier St.
521-23 Bringier St
525 Bringier St.
1701 Hermosa St.
1705-07 Hermosa St.
1715 Hermosa St.

1, 2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
14, pt. 3
A, B
C
D
N
H
D
3
2
1
4B, 5B
6

538-40 Bringier St.
530 Bringier St.
528 Bringier St.
526 Bringier St.
522-24 Bringier St.
516-18 Bringier St.
508 Bringier St.
506 Bringier St.
500-02 Bringier St.
1626 Nunez St.
1600 Nunez St.
613 Lawrence St.
615 Lawrence St.
619 Lawrence St.
625 Lawrence St.
629 Lawrence St.

1, 2
3, 4
5, 6
7, 8
9, 10
11, 12
13, 14
15, 16
17, 18
19, 20

931 Lawrence St.
927 Lawrence St.
917 Lawrence St.
911 Lawrence St.
901 Lawrence St.
900 Bringier St.
908 Bringier St.
918 Bringier St.
922 Bringier St.
928 Bringier St.

1
1
2
3, 4
5, 6

1700 Hermosa St.
1704-06 Hermosa St.
1714 Hermosa St.
1720 Hermosa St.
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Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date
$10,500
6/7/1955
$13,000
6/20/1955
$5,750
4/28/1955
$4,620
5/9/1955
$1,150
3/4/1955
$9,000
3/25/1955
$28,500
5/11/1982
$6,600
6/16/1955
$1,600
5/31/1955
$1,000
5/17/1955
$105,600

8/10/1981

$43,000

7/7/1981

$24,500
$32,200
$26,000
$25,500
$32,000
$87,500
$21,800
$63,000
$21,000
$4,500

10/10/1980
10/21/1981
6/17/1981
7/6/1981
7/23/1981
3/10/1982
1/22/1982
8/31/1982
12/14/1981
9/19/1981

$29,500
$6,400
$7,000
$6,000
$113,100
$53,000
$75,000

12/18/1981
10/29/1982
9/20/1982
8/11/1981
3/10/1982
7/20/1982
6/26/1981

$46,000
$33,000
$52,500
$34,150
$42,000
$27,500
$46,000
$29,500
$46,000
$33,500

11/30/1981
7/10/1981
10/19/1981
2/2/1982
5/28/1981
6/25/1981
8/27/1981
9/25/1981
8/20/1981
4/23/1981

$37,500

1/12/1987

$26,500
$37,500
$17,000
$13,300

4/2/1982
3/24/1982
2/16/1955
4/29/1955

Expropriation

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

Square
282
(cont.)

Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date

Lot Number

Address

7-A

1722-24 Hermosa St.

pt. 8, 9, 10,
12, 13, 16

$100,000

8/17/1956

$13,000

2/2/1955

$20,000
$1,500
$14,050
$22,500

6/13/1955
7/12/1955
10/18/1955
3/8/1956

$11,300
$14,400
$3,300
$15,350
$7,500

9/1/1955
6/20/1955
4/4/1955
5/23/1955
5/23/1955

17, 20, 21-A,
21-B
24, 25
24
7, 8
pt. 3, 4, 5, 6
G
22, 23
23, 26
18
14, 15
11

1815 Evergreen St.
1813 Evergreen St.
1801 Evergreen St.
701-03 Bringier St.

A, B
1, 2
3, 4
5, 6
7, 8

1725 Bodenger St.
1801 Bodenger St.
1807 Bodenger St.
1811 Bodenger St.
1815 Bodenger St.

$40,050
$53,500
$15,500
$15,250
$17,000

8/25/1981
4/20/1981
10/23/1955
2/10/1956
1/9/1956

C, D
pt. 7, 8, 9, 10
1, 2, 3, 4
5, 6

1720 Bodenger St.
1814 Bodenger St.

$35,200
$31,664
$18,750
$12,000

6/18/1981
9/30/1957
2/6/1956
3/5/1956

Square
270-A

21, 22
19, 20
17, 18
15, 16
13, 14
11, 12
9, 10

1718 Bodenger St.
1712 Bodenger St.
1708 Bodenger St.
1706 Bodenger St.
1702 Bodenger St.
1622 Bodenger St.
1618 Bodenger St.

$31,666
$40,750
$34,000
$46,000
$48,500
$64,000
$123,000

5/24/1983
6/5/1981
4/24/1981
6/1/1981
3/18/1981
3/10/1988
1/30/1987

Square
A
(284A)

1, 2, 3, 4, 5,
pt. 6
7, 8

1806 Evergreen St.

$27,810

12/1/1954

1814 Evergreen St.

$9,850

6/10/1955

Square
C

1, 2
3, 4
5, 6
7, 8
10
11
14, 15
18
19
22
23, 26

1600 Hermosa St.

$62,500
$61,500
$45,500
$40,000
$21,700
$31,500
$52,000
$22,500
$33,000
$35,300
$30,000

5/11/1981
5/26/1981
2/4/1982
1/18/1982
10/8/1981
7/19/1982
7/28/1981
6/18/1981
11/17/1981
8/25/1981
6/17/1981

Square
285-A

Square
285-B

636 Magellan St.

1626 Hermosa St.
1630-32 Hermosa St.
616 Bringier St.
618 Bringier St.
620 Bringier St.
622 Bringier St.
624 Bringier St.
628 Bringier St.
630-32 Bringier St.
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Expropriation

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

Square
C
(cont.)
Square
7A

Lot Number

Address

12, 13
16, pt. 17
pt. 17, 20
21, 24, 25

831 Lawrence St.
833 Lawrence St.
835 Lawrence St.
845-47 Lawrence St.

C

1717 Le Boeuf St.

Square
7B

1-B
2
3-4-5
pt. 1

Square
8A

8, 9
10, 11
12, 13
14

Square
8B
Square
59

1629 Whitney Ave.
1635 Whitney Ave.
1641 Whitney Ave.
1645 Whitney Ave.

7
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
7, 8
9, 10
11, 12
13
14, 15, 16, 17,
pt. 18
pt. 18, pt. 19,
pt. 20
pt. 20
rear 21
22, 23
24, 25
pt. 29
pt. 27
19, 20, pt. 21
pt. 21
26, 27, 28
30, 31
32, 33
34
35, 36
37, 38
39, 40, 41, 42
43, 44, 45, 46

1719 Sumner St.
1721 Sumner St.
1725 Sumner St.
1727 Sumner St.

1740 Sumner St.
1744 Sumner St.

Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date
$55,000
7/20/1981
$11,300
1/22/1982
$16,500
1/22/1982
$71,000
3/24/1982

Expropriation

$10,300

3/16/1955

$13,000
$3,125
$5,200
$700

12/4/1981
5/10/1956
5/26/1955
8/6/1956

$7,000
$8,900

4/11/1955
3/3/1955

$4,445

1/24/1957

$22,000

12/7/1981

$56,500
$45,600
$42,600
$28,000

12/27/1985
12/11/1981
5/4/1982
2/8/1982

X

$58,750

8/17/1982

X

$750

12/5/1955

X

$42,000
$630
$4,200
$4,200
$750
$100
$9,000
$3,150
$2,250
$1,650
$1,675
$7,000
$1,500
$7,801
$6,808
$5,972

3/2/1982
8/28/1956
7/23/1956
6/20/1955
3/23/1955
5/30/1985
11/22/1982
11/22/1982
3/4/1955
8/24/1955
10/17/1955
5/26/1955
8/9/1955
8/29/1955
9/6/1955
2/2/1956

$2,100

8/18/1955

$18,100

10/18/1955

X

X

X
X

X
X
X

Lower Garden District / Central Business District
Square
46

A
1, 2

1234-36, 1238
Tchoupitoulas St.
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X

Lot Number
Square
46
(cont.)

Square
70A
Square
71

Square
72

Square
119

Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date
$12,480
8/8/1955

Address

5

Expropriation

3, 4, 6, 7, 14,
15, 16, D

$132,000

11/18/1955

(Part property
acquisition,
part perpetual
servitude for
air rights)

Undesignated,
Undesignated,
8

$182,000

11/19/1982

X

pt. A-1

$1,165

6/28/1982

X

1-B
1-A
30
6, 7, 8
1, A, B, C, D,
E, F, G, 2, 3,
4, 5
A
pt. B, pt. C
A
3
1, 2
C, D
pt. D
2

$29,133
$48,300
$49,500
$62,400

12/18/1981
1/26/1983
7/13/1982
10/4/1982

$1,135,320

5/11/1982

$145,000
$150
$7,150
$7,200
$24,600
$16,000
$16,000
$21,137

8/12/1982
9/6/1955
1/26/1956
4/28/1955
3/19/1956
9/15/1955
4/19/1960
9/30/1982

Undesignated

$135,000

11/17/1955

1, 2, 3, 4, 2, 3
3, 2
pt. 1, pt. 2
pt. 1, pt. 2, B
A, 11, 12
20
1, 2, C
B
3
pt. 23
4
2

$470,482
$40,000
$55,441
$46,614
$6,690
$46,000
$744,400
$16,520
$8,200
$6,000
$2,700
$11,650

9/30/1982
3/23/1955
8/30/1983
2/2/1987
8/7/1987
7/13/1982
6/28/1982
5/26/1982
7/5/1956
11/23/1956
3/24/1955
5/31/1955

X

$354,420

2/1/1983

X

$112,466
$95,768
$19,757

8/11/1982
12/22/1982
6/14/1982

X

6, 7, 8, 12, 13,
11, 12, 13
14, 15, 18, 19
16, 17
20
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X

X
X
X

X
X

Lot Number
Square
138

A, B, C, D, 2
C, 2
1A
pts. 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6, 7
15-1 or A

Square
139

Square
156

Square
157

Square
158

Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date

Address

1129 Constance St.

2A
A, B
rear C, rear D,
8, 9
front C, front
D
front A
pt. 9
pts. A, B, 8, 9
pt. 8, 9
7, pt. 8
4, 5, 6
1, 2, pt. 3
pt. 3, 4, 24,
Undesignated,
Undesignated
14, 24
3
7, 8, 9, R, S
Undesignated
Undesignated
C, rear 3, pt. 1
A
5
H
S
M, N
28, 98, 100,
Undesignated
B
1, 2
6, alley
2
7, pt. 6, 5, 4,
3, alley
A
X
3, pt. 2

1133 Magazine St.
1127-29 Magazine St.

pts. 35, 36
pts. 35, 36

1064 Camp St.
1131-35 Calliope St.

1127 Gaienne St
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Expropriation

$275,000

10/9/1955

$28,000
$15,500

3/12/1955
5/11/1955

$44,861

6/29/1983

$1,146,230

11/24/1982

X

$95,029
$33,350

11/29/1982
3/12/1956

X

$357,000

6/28/1982

X

$16,250

1/5/1956

X

$8,000
$47,000

10/27/1955
10/27/1955

$218,283
$23,126
$8,500
$31,500
$35,000

2/1/1983
6/29/1956
8/29/1956
2/27/1956
12/8/1955

$125,000

5/18/1956

$299,425
$7,000
$176,258

7/31/1998
8/29/1956
9/11/1997

$83,357

7/19/1955

$12,000
$600
$12,000
$17,000
$22,000

12/29/1955
3/12/1956
9/30/1955
8/4/1955
8/1/1955

$231,000

1/15/1982

$19,250
$30,000
$36,918
$14,059

10/25/1955
7/6/1956
6/14/1955
4/20/1955

$598,615

12/22/1955

$34,000
Land Swap
$11,140

6/9/1955
3/19/1986
5/20/1955

$150,000

2/20/1956

X

X
X

X

X
X

X

Square
158
(cont.)

Square
159

Lot Number

Address

37, 38
39, 40
41, alley
42
43
44
pt. 29, 30, 31
28
21, 48
A
pts. 31, 32,
33, 34

1042 Camp St.
1036 Camp St.
1034 Camp St.
1067 Magazine St.
1061 Magazine St.
1037 Magazine St.

Expropriation

$44,500

12/10/1954

$170,130
$10,770
$350,000
$293,946

1/5/1983
4/2/1992
1/16/1986
8/8/1983

$173,297

6/6/1983

pt. 34

$2,000

2/9/1956

1
19, 20
2, 3, 4
14
15
pt. 18

$27,500
$60,000
$99,736

9/8/1955
8/23/1956
4/1/1957

X

$76,625

4/9/1956

X

$28,000

12/28/1956

$147,561
$5,447
$602,200
$72,605
$117,542

2/10/1984
7/6/1983
8/11/1983
1/20/1982
5/31/1983

X

$40,000

8/17/1956

X

$266,700

8/1/1956

X

$44,000
$40,700
$42,000
$14,500
$7,307

9/28/1956
4/23/1956
8/16/1956
6/9/1956
12/9/1982

X
X

$6,500

8/16/1956

$51,500

6/25/1956

$25,000

5/11/1956

$22,200

3/8/1957

$24,000
$9,000

3/1/1956
4/16/1956

Square
183

1, 2, pt. 3
pt. 3 or 5
1, 4
2
pts. 1, 2, 3, 1

Square
214

6
10, hf. 9, 1, 2,
3, 5
16, 15, 4
Y or H-28
X
pt. A
pt. B

Square
238

Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date
$39,550
10/28/1955
$68,000
5/23/1956
$45,000
5/31/1955

pt. G
A
B
C
C
pts. 4, 5
6A
6B
H-23
Q

538-42 Howard Ave.
1030 Camp St.
1024 Camp St.

1060 St. Charles Ave.
1070 St. Charles Ave.
1525 Calliope St.
1123 St. Charles Ave.
1101-07
St. Charles Ave.
1630-34 Calliope St.
1100-02 Carondelet St.
1110-12 Carondelet St.
1118 Carondelet St.

1105-07 Carondelet St.
1109 Carondelet St.
1113-15 Carondelet St.
1712-14 Calliope St.
1716 Calliope St
1724 Calliope St.
1730 Calliope St.
1726-28 Calliope St.

2

X

2

Case was appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court. Court affirmed the Civil District Court ruling of expropriation
but increased the award to $99,736.10 from $70,000. This was the only expropriation record found in the City’s files
showing a ruling from any court other than the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. Louisiana State
Supreme Court ruling dated April 1, 1957.
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Square
238
(cont.)

Square
254

Square
277

Square
290
&
312

Square
325

Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date

Lot Number

Address

16
A or 17
18
1
A, B
1
Undesignated
10

1734-38 Calliope St.
1740 Calliope St.
1742-46 Calliope St.
1100-08 Baronne St.

X
3, 4
1, 2
7
1
2
H-12
H-11
A, B, C, 10,
pt. 9
4
2, 3

1113-15 Baronne St.
1107-09 Baronne St.
1101-03 Baronne St.
1816 Calliope St.
1818-20 Calliope St.

5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
14, 15, 16
1, 11
12
13
A
pt. G
1, pt. 5
pt. 1
2
4
8
5
6
1 through 14
pt. C
pt. 8
pt. D
pt. B
X, Y
A
pt. 1
N
A
Undesignated
5
6

1120 Baronne St.

1828 Calliope St.

1100-02 S. Rampart St.
1108-18 S. Rampart St.
1112 S. Rampart St.
1127-29 S. Rampart St.
1123-25 S. Rampart St.
1119-21 S. Rampart St.
1113-17 S. Rampart St.
1109 S. Rampart St.
1105-07 S. Rampart St.
1101-03 S. Rampart St.
1130-36 Simon Bolivar
1122-24 Simon Bolivar
1126-28 Simon Bolivar
1134-36 Simon Bolivar
2025-31 Clio St.

1117 Simon Bolivar
1111 Simon Bolivar
2114-16 Calliope St.
1105 Simon Bolivar
1101-03 Simon Bolivar

290

Expropriation

$22,700

3/13/1956

$19,000

5/21/1956

$30,000

8/9/1956

$15,000
$70,973

11/5/1982
3/3/1983

$16,200
$39,000
$20,000
$7,300
$8,500
$7,775
$12,000
$17,500

2/2/1956
3/8/1956
3/23/1956
3/8/1956
4/17/1956
3/23/1956
8/14/1956
4/17/1956

$67,827

7/6/1956

X

$48,134
$31,860

1/17/1984
3/15/1983

X
X

$140,500

8/21/1956

X

$50,250
$17,000
$15,000

5/14/1956
6/25/1956
4/16/1956

X

$4,500
$35,000
$28,000
$2,000
$9,000
$12,500

8/31/1956
1/20/1956
10/28/1955
1/20/1956
1/27/1956
8/17/1955

X

$46,403

9/1/1955

$32,500
$178,607
$7,912
$8,356
$11,484
$4,634
$17,800
$9,850

9/30/1955
5/31/1955
3/31/1955
5/24/1955
5/24/1955
6/2/1955
2/1/1956
4/10/1956

$1,500
$22,000

4/22/1957
5/29/1956

$26,200

6/27/1956

$17,200
$35,775

7/31/1956
6/20/1956

X

X

X

Lot Number
Square
325
(cont.)

B, 14, 15,
Undesignated
8
9, 10, 11, 12,
13

Acquisition Acquisition
Cost
Date

Address
2122-40 Calliope St.
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$66,000

9/28/1956

$35,500

8/17/1956

$62,000

1/3/1957

Expropriation
X

X

Appendix 5.3 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Interstate-10 and Interstate-610
Rights-of-Way.1
Lot Number

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date

Address

Interstate-10 - Tulane Avenue to Franklin Avenue (At I-10/I-610 Junction)
Square
403

Square
434

B
Undesignated
A
1, 4
2
3
5, 6, 7
8, 9, 10
11, 12, 13, A,
B, 16, 17, 18,
19, 20, B, 21
E
Y or 7
D
C
22
12
13
14, 15
26
27
28
19
2, 3
4, 5
F
E

1601 Tulane Ave.
1605 Tulane Ave.
1609 Tulane Ave.
200 S. Claiborne Ave.
202 S. Claiborne Ave.
206 S. Claiborne Ave.
212 S. Claiborne Ave.

$111,850
$116,950
$125,300
$29,176
$16,800
$17,445
$97,342
$162,650

4/28/1965
10/20/1966
2/2/1966
3/14/1967
5/3/1966
5/15/1967
11/7/1966
9/26/1966

$1,024,500

4/25/1966

$12,000

5/16/1966

223 S. Claiborne Ave.
221 S. Claiborne Ave.
215 S. Claiborne Ave.

$12,250
$17,500
$14,300
$12,100
$9,541
$24,975
$34,035
$20,800
$20,250
$21,050
$31,000
$56,440
$59,750
$34,900
$58,200

9/2/1966
6/4/1966
5/25/1966
8/10/1966
5/18/1966
4/7/1967
8/16/1966
8/22/1966
8/19/1966
9/7/1966
6/30/1966
8/22/1966
9/2/1966
8/23/1966
1/25/1967

230 S. Claiborne Ave
1621-23 Tulane Ave.
1728-30 Cleveland
Ave
1732 Cleveland Ave.
216 S. Derbigny St.
220-22 S. Derbigny St.
226-28 S. Derbigny St.
230 S. Derbigny St.
1731-33 Palmyra St.
1723 Palmyra St.
1719 Palmyra St.
241 S. Claiborne Ave.

Square
207

1, 2, 3, 2
4
5

901 N. Claiborne Ave.
913 N Claiborne Ave.
919 N. Claiborne Ave.

$188,250
$77,300
$13,975

9/24/1965
1/14/1966
3/17/1966

Square
208

13
12
9
T
9
6
11
4

819 N. Claiborne Ave.
823 N. Claiborne Ave.
827 N. Claiborne Ave.
831 N. Claiborne Ave.
835 N. Claiborne Ave.
839 N. Claiborne Ave.
1712 Dumaine St.
1718 Dumaine St.

$12,600
$14,800
$24,100
$19,650
$13,500
$23,000
$14,950
$12,300

1/28/1966
1/26/1966
11/10/1965
10/12/1965
10/14/1965
10/11/1965
10/4/1965
10/8/1965

1

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property
Files for indicated Squares.
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Lot Number

Address

3
2
1

1722 Dumaine St.
1726 Dumaine St.
1730 Dumaine St.

10A

826 N. Derbigny St.

11
14
15
2
1

822 N. Derbigny St.
820 N. Derbigny St.
814 N. Derbigny St.
1727 St. Ann St.
1731 St. Ann St.

Square
209

3
2
1

Square
225

A-2
1
2
1
13
12
L

Square
164

1, 2
3, 4, 5
4
1, A

Square
182

Square
193

Square
208
(cont)

Square
197

Square
198

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$13,500
9/20/1965
X
1/11/1965
$19,500
6/17/1965
$10,800
10/19/1965
$1,500
1/27/1966
X
$42,250

1/11/1966

X

$5,500

2/21/1965

X

1727 Orleans Ave.
1731 Orleans Ave.
1730 St. Ann St.

$11,500
$24,200
$10,150

6/3/1965
10/22/1965
10/26/1965

X

1805 St. Ann St.
1811 St. Ann St.
1800 Dumaine St.
819 N. Derbigny St.
815 N. Derbigny St.
811 N. Derbigny St.

$16,000
$13,400
$14,600
$16,500
$18,175
$13,400
$11,000

8/11/1965
8/17/1965
8/4/1965
8/24/1965
8/4/1965
8/9/1965
10/21/1965

1400 St. Peter St.

$62,713
$44,375
$10,000
Exchange

12/7/1966
12/20/1966
6/3/1965

4, 5, 6, 7, 8
8
6
4
2

1533 Lafitte St.
1510 St. Peter St.
1508 St. Peter St.
1504 St. Peter St.
1500 St. Peter St.

$64,000
$10,000
$10,500
$11,450
$17,850

2/8/1966
8/31/1965
3/14/1966
5/27/1965
11/4/1965

R, 1, 2
S
W
X
1, 2
17

1600 St. Peter St.

$80,750
$7,650
$11,000
$44,000
$28,139
$12,000

3/23/1967
3/23/1967
5/31/1965
5/27/1965
3/2/1967
5/27/1965

$16,200

8/13/1965

$62,000

8/13/1965

600 N. Claiborne St.

2
N, 30,
Undesignated
4
D
C
21

1622 St. Philip St.

924 N. Claiborne Ave.
916 N. Claiborne Ave.
912 N. Claiborne Ave.
910 N. Claiborne Ave.

$32,250
$28,100
$26,940
$14,863

10/22/1965
9/28/1965
11/15/1965
12/21/1965

1
29
L
M-2

1618 Ursulines Ave.
1622 Ursulines Ave.
1038 N. Claiborne Ave
1032 N. Claiborne Ave

$11,800
$20,500
$24,000
$25,000

8/3/1965
7/29/1965
12/15/1965
8/2/1965
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X

X
X

X

X

X

X

Square
198
(cont.)

Square
199

Square
753

Square
754

Square
755

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$13,000
9/20/1965
X
$27,000
12/21/1965
X
$127,100
10/6/1965
$46,225
10/18/1965
$46,000
6/22/1965
$21,000
12/21/1965
X

Lot Number

Address

N-3
3
A, B, 15
16
A-15
C

1028 N. Claiborne Ave
1024 N. Claiborne Ave
1020 N. Claiborne Ave
1010 N. Claiborne Ave

A
15
A-B
17
4
20
H
I
A-1
B-1
B

1608 Gov. Nicholls St.
1624 Gov. Nicholls St.
1628 Gov. Nicholls St.
1130 N. Claiborne Ave
1128 N. Claiborne Ave
1120 N. Claiborne Ave
1110 N. Claiborne Ave
1114 N. Claiborne Ave
1106 N. Claiborne Ave
1100 N. Claiborne Ave
1619 Ursulines Ave.

$46
$8,626
$95,000
$30,000
$118,700
$22,000
$14,100
$25,500
$37,000
$30,000
$3,282

12/17/1965
1/20/1966
12/6/1965
1/11/1966
11/29/1965
11/15/1965
7/21/1965
10/11/1965
1/14/1966
10/22/1965
11/12/1965

B, 1-B
14
15 or V
465A
A
C

1700 N. Derbigny St.

$15,500
$10,750
$23,500
$12,500
$142,900
$13,500

12/28/1964
8/17/1964
1/20/1965
3/5/1965
1/30/1964
9/2/1964

R
S
O
D
Undesignated
1, 2, 3, 4, 12
A, B, G
S
R
40
Q
P
O
M
N
T

1634 Allen St.
1630 Allen St.
1626 Allen St.

$12,600
$12,500
$14,500
$20,500
$144,500
$157,000
$70,000
$12,000
$8,750
$19,500
$9,100
$12,600
$12,500
$14,750
$16,400
$10,200

10/7/1964
6/15/1964
7/14/1964
8/3/964
10/7/1964
11/16/1964
12/7/1964
8/31/1964
6/11/1964
7/8/1964
6/22/1964
8/11/1964
6/29/1964
6/30/1964
6/24/1964
9/30/1964

$75,000
$26,000
$22,350
$31,000
$17,000
$12,300
$9,250
$14,500

11/12/1964
8/12/1964
12/21/1964
8/3/1964
8/11/1964
9/8/1964
10/19/1964
6/3/1964

H
D
X
37
A
4
2
E

1623 St. Philip St.

1625 Allen St.

1623 N. Claiborne Ave
1615 New Orleans St.
1619 New Orleans St.
1629 New Orleans St.
1631 New Orleans St.
1635 New Orleans St.
1637 New Orleans St.
1601 St. Bernard Ave.
1621 St. Bernard Ave.

1633 St. Bernard Ave.
1637 St. Bernard Ave.
1643 St. Bernard Ave.
1636 New Orleans St.
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X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X

X

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$7,500
7/2/1964

Lot Number

Address

9

1632 New Orleans St.

B

1628 New Orleans St.

$7,800

7/24/1964

1
pt. 1
Undesignated
L
N
M
B
U
2

1543 N. Claiborne Ave

$36,000
$7,025
$65,000
$33,250
$29,800
$16,200
$49,950
$38,500
$16,000

11/29/1965
10/29/1965
1/19/1966
10/11/1965
9/24/1965
10/12/1965
11/2/1965
11/15/1965
9/30/1965

Square
758

A-1
B
pts. B, C
C
6
5
6, 10, 10-B

1501 N. Claiborne Ave
1509 N. Claiborne Ave
1513 N. Claiborne Ave
1517 N. Claiborne Ave
1523 N. Claiborne Ave
1527 N. Claiborne Ave

$11,800
$27,725
$19,750
$17,750
$22,500
$24,750
$33,000

1/31/1966
11/18/1965
9/13/1965
10/8/1965
9/29/1965
10/8/1965
9/13/1965

Square
767

Y
X
1
B
F
4
5
C
11, 12
A
pt. B

1716 Allen St.
1714 Allen St.
1665 N. Derbigny St.
1661 N. Derbigny St.

$8,544
$10,500
$17,000
$11,000
$12,750
$13,000
$7,500
$7,750
$16,000
$6,500
$5,500

1/14/1965
2/1/1965
12/9/1964
10/27/1964
10/14/1964
2/25/1965
9/23/1964
12/9/1964
2/12/1965
12/14/1964
2/23/1965

A
11
I
9
8
7
6
5
4
18
14B
13A
15
A
13
10
9

1701 Allen St.
1705 Allen St.
1709 Allen St.

$11,750
$8,000
$8,750
$9,250
$11,400
$8,500
$9,500
$9,350
$11,800
$1,650
$11,750
$19,000
$10,000
$10,500
$7,500
$8,500
$8,000

6/25/1964
5/29/1964
6/30/1964
10/13/1964
8/4/1964
5/29/1964
8/25/1964
10/6/1964
9/17/1964
2/15/1964
9/28/1964
10/28/1964
6/22/1964
10/12/1964
9/14/1964
9/17/1964
9/30/1964

Square
755
(cont.)
Square
757

Square
768

1565 N. Claiborne Ave
1561 N. Claiborne Ave
1551 N. Claiborne Ave

1655 N. Derbigny St.
1649 N. Derbigny St.
1645 N. Derbigny St.
1641 N. Derbigny St.

1727 Allen St.
1731 Allen St.
1733 Allen St.

1766 N. Roman St.
1738 Annette St.
1734 Annette St.
1730 Annette St.
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X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

Address

H
6, G
5
3, 4
1, 2
M
N
5
24

1726 Annette St.
1718 Annette St.
1714 Annette St.
1710 Annette St.

1725 N. Derbigny St.
1717 N. Derbigny St.
1715 N. Derbigny St.

Square
769

10
11
8

1733 Annette St.
1737 Annette St.
1741 Annette St.

$7,800
$8,400
$8,750

1/15/1965
1/15/1965
12/28/1964

Square
888

X
10-A
X
8
B
16-A
17, 18
19
20
Y, Z
23
25
26
27
28
24 or 29
A, B
A
2
4

1822 St. Anthony St.
1818 St. Anthony St.

$11,250
$11,000
$13,475
$13,000
$22,500
$20,000
$19,600
$15,000
$20
$17,000
$13,500
$8,750
$10,750
$10,500
$11,000
$10,200
$22,500
$6,000
$13,000
$2,450

2/4/1965
1/22/1965
11/12/1964
12/28/1964
1/20/1965
9/14/1964
6/24/1964
10/15/1964
3/4/1965
2/2/1965
1/18/1965
10/19/1964
10/6/1964
6/19/1964
8/7/1964
8/6/1964
7/24/1964
10/13/1964
10/16/1964
2/19/1965

Q
E
24
D
C
R

1916 St. Anthony St.
1918 St. Anthony St.
1921 N. Prieur St.
1927 N. Prieur St.
1931 N. Prieur St.
1935 N. Prieur St.

$6,500
$10,250
$220
$10,000
$15,500
$12,200

10/15/1964
11/12/1964
5/7/1965
12/7/1964
10/26/1964
7/24/1964

5
6
7
8
9
10
B

2616 Pauger St.
2620 Pauger St.
2622 Pauger St.

$130
$1,353
$16,500
$14,000
$6,500
$24,200
$7,350

2/4/1965
10/28/1964
12/18/1964
1/15/1965
10/13/1964
11/6/1964
6/26/1964

Square
768
(cont.)

Square
909

Square
910

2

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$8,550
11/30/1964
$22,000
9/1/1964
$7,800
10/20/1964
$3,850
9/17/1964
$1,025
8/27/1965
$10,000
11/17/1964
$15,500
8/18/1964
$9,000
6/12/1964
$18,500
7/22/1964

Lot Number

1830 St. Anthony St.
1834 St. Anthony St.
1838 St. Anthony St.
1924 N. Prieur St.

1827 Annette St.
1821 Annette St.
1815 Annette St.
1813 Annette St.
1805 Annette St.
1813 N. Roman St.
1817 N. Roman St.

2638 Pauger St.
1968 N. Johnson St.

Property purchased from the Republic of France.
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2

X

X

X

Square
910
(cont.)

Square
1026

Square
1027

Square
1028

Square
1056

Lot Number

Address

11
12
13, 14
15
16
17
18
19(A)
A(19)
20
1A
2B
C, D

1964 N. Johnson St.
1958 N. Johnson St.

1929 St. Anthony St.

1955 N. Prieur St.

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$12,200
7/22/1964
$8,900
7/1/1964
$23,925
1/18/1965
$14,000
12/22/1964
$16,500
7/9/1964
$12,450
7/6/1964
$12,400
7/27/1964
$6,250
12/9/1964
$10,250
6/18/1964
$11,600
10/16/1964
$9,000
6/29/1964
$9,000
1/4/1965
$19,550
1/7/1965

1, 2
8
5
H, X
4
3

2039 Touro St.
2031 Touro St.
2025 Touro St.
2064 N. Galvez St.
2060 N. Galvez St.
2062 N. Galvez St.

$28,000
$20,000
Exchange
$25,500
$9,750
$7,500

12/28/1964
10/12/1964
10/26/1964

A-2
B, C, 5, 6
pt. C
pt. 3
1
8
3
3
4
1, 2
18
2
A
23, 24
B-3

2013 N. Johnson St.

$9,500
$28,600
$1,500
$2,567
$2,100
$11,000
$10,200
$10,500
$17,400
$32,900
$11,175
$11,000
$13,000
$32,000
$16,000

10/1/1964
2/23/1965
2/19/1965
10/28/1964
2/4/1965
10/21/1964
9/25/1964
9/22/1964
2/4/1965
12/4/1964
1/4/1965
9/23/1964
2/12/1965
1/14/1965
9/30/1964

Y
14
13
H or 12
G
F
E

1961 N. Johnson St.

$9,404
$17,800
$14,000
$16,500
$15,800
$16,000
$9,480

10/23/1964
6/29/1964
9/16/1964
10/6/1964
11/23/1964
11/13/1964
11/19/1964

B
A
41
42
40
13

2120 Touro St.
2114 Touro St.

$50
$10,800
$15,000
$15,000
$32,000
$900

2/19/1965
10/27/1964
10/29/1964
2/25/1965
12/7/1964
2/19/1965

2028 Touro St.
2026 N. Galvez St.
2729 Pauger St.
2721 Pauger St.

2710 Pauger St.
2714 Pauger St.
2718 Pauger St.
2722 Pauger St.

2017 N. Galvez St.
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9/21/1964
1/18/1965

X

X

X

X

Lot Number
Square
1057

Square
1058

Square
1073

3
2
P
1
4, 5
H
M-2
A
X-9
R, Y
16
17
C, D
B
A
F
23, 24
8, 10, 11, 12,
13, 14
9
6
7
1A
H
F, G
D, E
C
B
A
14
Z
X
1
2
6, ½ 11
B
A
9
10
8
13, 14
4
3
1, 2
1, 2
A
B
2A

Address

2067 N. Galvez St.
2116 Frenchmen St.
2126 Frenchmen St.
2136 Frenchmen St.
2118 N. Miro St.
2131 Touro St.

2119 Touro St.
2105 Touro St.
2101 Touro St.
2057 N. Galvez St.

2115 Frenchmen St.
2127 Frenchmen St.
2123 Frenchmen St.
2162 N. Miro St.
2128 Elysian Fields Av
2124 Elysian Fields Av
2120 Elysian Fields Av
2116 Elysian Fields Av

2213 Frenchmen St.
2205 Frenchmen St.
2225 Frenchmen St.
2227 Frenchmen St.

2170 N. Tonti St.

2208 Elysian Fields Av

2159 N. Miro St.
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Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$14,450
9/16/1964
$22,000
1/6/1965
$10,500
9/16/1964
$27,500
10/21/1964
$20,000
11/9/1964
$21,000
7/30/1964
$39,200
9/16/1964
$30,000
10/12/1964
$16,500
9/28/1964
$11,165
10/8/1964
$13,500
9/16/1964
$10,800
7/17/1964
$19,200
9/23/1964
$15,500
12/11/1964
X
$16,000
10/14/1964
$9,800
2/1/1965
$19,000
1/20/1965
X
$88,575

12/22/1964

$10,000
$14,400
$13,500
$14,000
$16,800
$15,000
$23,900
$15,500
$13,700
$13,450
$550

8/4/1964
9/23/1964
7/27/1964
8/4/1964
9/2/1964
10/12/1964
10/14/1964
1/8/1965
1/14/1965
1/19/1965
3/23/1965

$14,300
$14,800
$15,450
$18,000
$22,600
$12,400
$10,500
$15,500
$16,500
$16,600
$31,000
$14,400
$17,500
$25,750
$35,000
$18,000
$18,600
$9,800

8/6/1964
9/17/1964
8/12/1964
12/9/1964
10/12/1964
9/16/1964
10/12/1964
12/4/1964
9/25/1964
10/12/1964
9/4/1964
10/8/1964
9/18/1964
9/28/1964
10/21/1964
1/20/1965
10/5/1964
10/29/1964

X

Square
1073
(cont.)
Square
1209

Square
1172

Square
1210

Square
1211

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date

Lot Number

Address

2B

2163 N. Miro St.

$17,600

9/18/1964

7A, 7B
C
3
Y
X
4
3
2
22
6
F
B
C
B
B

2184 N. Rocheblave St
2334 Elysian Fields Av

$26,000
$18,500
$13,300
$35,000
$17,250
$14,000
$19,750
$26,000
$9,450
$48,800
$10,983
$1,125
$1,152
$500
$1,910

2/19/1965
2/4/1965
10/30/1964
10/29/1964
9/8/1964
8/27/1964
9/9/1964
12/9/1964
2/2/1965
12/7/1965
1/8/1965
3/5/1965
3/8/1965
2/19/1965
3/4/1965

X
X

$15,500
$15,000
$14,500
$18,000
$17,500
$18,250
$16,100
$17,100
$15,000
$150

11/5/1964
11/5/1964
9/23/1964
10/22/1964
9/15/1964
8/25/1964
9/4/1964
11/13/1964
1/22/1965
2/4/1964

X
X

2300 Marigny St.
2217 N. Tonti St.
2213 N. Tonti St.

$13,750
$13,750
$11,000

12/21/1964
7/22/1964
7/10/1964

2301 Elysian Fields Av

$328,724

3/11/1965

2304 Marigny St.

$80,000

1/15/1965

2307 Marigny St.
2311 Marigny St.
2327 Marigny St.
2319 Marigny St.
2323 Marigny St.
2335 Marigny St.
2331 Marigny St.
2315 Marigny St.
2339 Marigny St.
2414 N. Rocheblave St
2418 N. Rocheblave St

$12,825
$11,700
$10,100
$11,450
$13,700
$12,950
$11,500
$12,200
$12,500
$11,250
$11,200

1/13/1965
8/27/1964
7/1/1964
8/3/1964
7/23/1964
12/10/1964
7/16/1964
9/91964
1/15/1965
9/22/1964
8/11/1964

2312 Elysian Fields Av
2310 Elysian Fields Av
2197 N. Tonti St.
2189 N. Tonti St.

M
N
B
P
Q
R
T
U
15
A
1
2
3
4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9,
10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16
A, B, C, D, E,
F, G
C
4
8
6
7
10
9
5
11
12
13
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X

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$9,500
8/5/1964
$18,800
10/16/1964
$3,345
9/22/1964
$239
8/11/1964

Lot Number

Address

Square
1211
(cont.)

14
A
B
C

2422 N. Rocheblave St
2336 Mandeville St.
2334 Mandeville St.
2332 Mandeville St.

Square
1380

M-3
M-2
14
15
16
17-B
18-A
19
20
21
B

2309 N. Dorgenois St.
2507 Mandeville St.
2526 Spain St.
2520 Spain St.
2518 Spain St.
2514 Spain St.
2512 Spain St.
2506 Spain St.
2500 Spain St.
2317 N. Dorgenois St.
2311 N. Dorgenois St.

$9,700
$1,100
$55
$15,500
$8,800
$9,500
$10,750
$9,250
$14,300
$15,750
$6,250

10/1/1964
2/19/1965
2/11/1965
12/29/1964
9/18/1964
10/19/1964
2/4/1964
2/12/1965
10/8/1964
10/30/1964
9/29/1964

1
2
3, 4
5
6
7
8
9, 10, 11
A
B
C
17
18, 19
24

2501 Spain St.
2505 Spain St.

$10,700
$12,000
$23,000
$10,700
$10,000
$14,500
$15,000
$21,500
$20,000
$19,000
$15,700
$9,000
$12,750
$375

10/12/1964
10/20/1964
10/13/1964
11/20/1964
10/16/1964
8/6/1964
7/29/1964
2/18/1965
2/4/1965
1/15/1965
11/13/1964
12/31/1964
1/15/1965
3/3/1965

$26,375
$56,951
$15,050
$34,775

1/12/1965
1/19/1965
12/11/1964
1/28/1965

$50
$11,800
$15,500
$7,500
$6,250
$20,000
$12,500
$5,000
$9,000
$12,125

2/26/1965
1/4/1965
12/31/1964
10/9/1964
3/26/1965
1/11/1965
9/21/1964
1/14/1965
2/23/1965
9/10/1964

$10,500
$18,150
$675

12/14/1964
8/5/1964
8/6/1964

Square
1381

Square
1493

A
B, 4
23, 24
25

Square
1494

8
9
10
11
23
24, B
A
28
U
T

Square
1708

2523 Spain St.

2536 St. Roch Ave.
2534 St. Roch Ave.
2530 St. Roch Ave.
2526 St. Roch Ave.
2520 St. Roch Ave.

2635 St. Roch Ave.
2619 St. Roch Ave.
2632 St. Roch Ave.
2628 St. Roch Ave.
2624 St. Roch Ave.
2620 St. Roch Ave.
2610 St. Roch Ave.
2604 St. Roch Ave.
2600 St. Roch Ave.
2471 Law St.
2465 Law St.

M-8
M-9
M-5

300

X
X

X

X

X

Lot Number

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$21,000
12/13/1963
$17,145
11/13/1963
$13,900
11/18/1963
$15,000
3/12/1964
X
$15,750
12/3/1963
$13,500
11/14/1963
$13,000
12/3/1963
$15,000
10/24/1963
$13,800
10/4/1963
$17,800
3/20/1964
X
$13,750
12/6/1963
$14,500
10/14/1963

Address

Square
1917

4
3
5
7
9
1
2
6
8
11
12
10

Square
1918

N-13
N-14
N-15
N-16
N-7
N-12
N-9

$14,750
$16,000
$14,750
$15,950
$12,300
$2,245
$16,500

9/21/1964
9/16/1964
11/6/1964
8/4/1964
9/2/1964
3/31/1964
9/14/1964

Q-7
Q-9
Q-12
Q-13
Q-14
Q-16
Q-15
Q-6
Q-11

$14,500
$14,500
$15,000
$14,500
$15,600
$16,500
$16,500
$1,945
$750

11/5/1963
11/14/1963
10/17/1963
10/21/1963
10/21/1963
11/13/1963
10/21/1963
10/30/1963
1/9/1964

Square
1978

X

Interstate-610 - Franklin Avenue to Pontchartrain Expressway (At I-610/I-10 Junction)
Square
2095 /
2096
Square
2097

Undesignated

$122,000

7/24/1963

P-1
P-2
P-3
P-4
P-5
P-6
P-7
P-8
P-9
P-10
P-11
P-12
P-13
P-14

$21,500
$14,800
$14,500
$15,000
$15,800
$14,400
$14,200
$14,500
$14,900
$14,300
$12,850
$14,800
$14,700
$12,650

10/21/1963
9/16/1963
1/24/1964
8/9/1963
8/26/1963
8/13/1963
7/31/1963
8/16/1963
8/13/1963
7/24/1963
11/18/1963
6/3/1963
5/22/1963
1/13/1964
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Lot Number
Square
2098

1
2
3
4, 5
6, 7
1-16-A-1
8
9
10,11
12, 13
14
15
16
17, 18
19, 20
21
22

Square
2099

J-1
J-2
J-3
J-4
J-5
J-6
J-7
J-8
J-9
J-10
J-11
J-12
J-13
J-14

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$29,295
10/6/1972
X
$11,500
11/21/1963
$10,800
8/28/1963
$16,200
9/11/1963
$15,650
9/3/1963
$15,680
8/29/1972
$2,500
2/14/1964
X
$18,935
7/21/1972
$19,850
8/22/1963
$20,500
1/2/1964
$14,850
10/18/1963
$12,800
9/3/1963
$11,000
7/25/1963
$13,500
10/31/1963
$14,700
7/8/1964
$19,800
9/6/1963
X
$16,000
12/6/1963

Address

3240 Music St.

3202 Music St.

$23,500
$14,600
$13,450
$15,200
$14,100
$27,982
$18,900
$16,750
$19,560
$14,650
$15,400
$13,225
$13,650
$20,725

6/1/1972
8/12/1963
9/12/1963
8/26/1963
10/9/1963
9/28/1972
11/8/1963
10/24/1963
7/11/1972
11/4/1963
8/8/1963
9/5/1963
10/29/1963
8/30/1972

Square
2100

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14

$16,780
$15,650
$14,000
$17,600
$19,000
$19,400
$20,500
$22,000
$18,000
$15,100
$13,650
$15,000
$37,200
$18,250

8/14/1967
3/21/1966
6/14/1966
3/17/1966
12/28/1965
9/6/1967
7/24/1967
8/9/1967
1/19/1966
12/3/1965
10/25/1965
11/15/1965
8/23/1967
5/11/1967

Square
2101

1
2

$19,550
$13,600

7/8/1968
1/25/1966

302

Lot Number
Square
2101
(cont.)

pt. 3
pt. 3
4
pt. 5
pts. 5,6
pt. 6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Square
2102

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Square
3

3-A
1-B
9
10
11
12
13, 14
15, 16
X
18, 19
20, 21
S
K
22-A

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$2,250
8/26/1968
$12,300
3/18/1966
$15,000
10/31/1966
$12,650
2/28/1966
$7,800
8/22/1968
$26,650
2/2/1966
$17,200
12/9/1965
$13,100
12/9/1966
$16,000
11/8/1965
$12,000
11/6/1967
$19,000
6/1/1967
$23,000
6/21/1967
$21,400
7/26/1967
$21,500
5/31/1967
$20,600
9/18/1967
$18,450
11/8/1967

Address

3305 Franklin Ave.
3301 Franklin Ave.
2620 Sage St.
2622 Sage St.
2626 Sage St.
2628 Sage St.
2630 Sage St.
2638 Sage St.
2644 Sage St.
2654 Sage St.
2666 Sage St.
2672 Sage St.
2670 Sage St.
2641 Bay St.

303

$24,100
$21,400
$22,400
$21,450
$17,100
$19,050
$18,400
$22,075
$19,950
$20,425
$24,650
$19,250
$19,350
$18,825
$22,675
$18,275
$17,250
$21,000

12/14/1965
12/14/1965
11/17/1965
11/15/1965
11/22/1965
10/26/1965
12/11/1965
10/14/1965
10/28/1965
11/2/1965
11/2/1965
10/18/1965
10/12/1965
10/25/1965
11/3/1965
11/16/1965
12/22/1965
12/28/1965

$21,000
$16,400
$3,500
$975
$18,300
$16,300
$20,000
$15,600
$17,700
$17,400
$21,500
$15,700
$15,500
$9,300

10/11/1963
8/22/1963
11/8/1963
10/16/1963
7/8/1963
8/13/1963
11/5/1963
2/4/1963
10/10/1963
6/14/1963
3/18/1963
6/28/1963
4/5/1963
3/26/1963

X

Square
3
(cont.)

Square
4

Square
6

Square
7

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$13,500
4/15/1963
$12,750
4/18/1963
$15,850
4/9/1963
$12,750
3/15/1963
$17,000
3/18/1963
$13,400
7/25/1963
$13,200
6/25/1963

Lot Number

Address

23
24
25, 26
27, 28
29, 30
31
32

2639 Bay St.
2637 Bay St.

1, 2
3, 4
5, 6
7, 8
20

3328 Franklin Ave.
3334 Franklin Ave.
3338Franklin Ave.
3340 Franklin Ave.

$24,650
$20,800
$22,200
$32,000

1/6/1963
11/14/1963
11/22/1963
12/19/1963
10/7/1963

18
19
20, pt. 21
pt. 21, 22
A
K
26, 27, 28
29, 29-A
30
30-A
31-C
31-B
32, 33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40, 41
42, pt. 43
pt. 43, 44

2644 Elder St.
2650 Elder St.
2654 Elder St.
2668 Elder St.
2672 Elder St.
2680 Elder St.
2688 Elder St.
2690 Elder St.
2694 Elder St.
2698 Elder St.
2699 Sage St.
2695 Sage St.
2691 Sage St.
2685 Sage St.
2681 Sage St.
2677 Sage St.
2675 Sage St.

$2,960
$14,400
$14,500
$14,500
$11,900
$16,000
$19,700
$14,800
$5,900
$8,800
$13,000
$13,500
$29,000
$14,200
$10,500
$13,800
$14,350
$14,200
$15,250
$18,000

9/3/1963
8/2/1963
6/10/1963
8/12/1963
12/11/1963
4/29/1963
5/7/1963
5/22/1963
2/27/1963
8/8/1963
7/9/1963
7/11/1963
5/15/1963
7/8/1963
6/26/1963
5/21/1963
5/10/1963
1/29/1962
4/10/1963
4/29/1963

$11,675

12/31/1963

1
2, 3
4
5, 6
9
7, 8
X
X-3
11, 11-A
B
Y
12-A, pt. 13
pt. 13, 13-A

2700 Myrtle St.
2704 Myrtle St.
2714 Myrtle St.
2716 Myrtle St.
2734 Myrtle St.
2730 Myrtle St.

$24,000
$14,450
$5,000
$18,200
$17,800
$17,000
$17,500
$16,750
$15,000
$12,750
$7,800
$13,300
$13,900

10/8/1963
8/1/1963
1/21/1963
7/8/1963
3/4/1963
2/18/1963
2/25/1963
3/14/1963
5/11/1963
1/9/1963
4/3/1963
6/25/1963
6/27/1963

2627 Bay St.
2623 Bay St.
2621 Bay St.
2615 Bay St.

2661 Sage St.
2651 Sage St.
2645 Sage St.
2641 Sage St.

2746 Myrtle St.
2752 Myrtle St.
2725 Elder St.
2715 Elder St.
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X
X

Lot Number
Square
7
(cont.)
Square
12

Square
13

Square
2104

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$23,000
7/17/1963

Address

14, 15
16-B, 18-A
J
11, 12
13
14
15, pt. 16
pt. 16, 17
18, 19
T
21, 22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30, pt. 31
pt. 31, 32
D
18
19, 20
21
pts. 22, 23
X
24, 25
26, 27
28
1
2
3A
4
5, 6
7, pt. 4
8, pt. 4
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

2736 Acacia St.
2742 Acacia St.
2750 Acacia St.
2754 Acacia St.
2756 Acacia St.
2758 Acacia St.
2760 Acacia St.
2764 Acacia St.
2757 Myrtle St.
2755 Myrtle St.
2749 Myrtle St.

2735 Myrtle St.
2729 Myrtle St.
2725 Myrtle St.
2717 Myrtle St.
2715 Myrtle St.
2772 Clover St.

2775 Acacia St.
2759 Acacia St.

3216 Elysian Fields Av
3200 Elysian Fields Av
2165 Benefit St.

305

$30,000

3/1/1963

$3,700
$24,450
$13,200
$13,000
$15,350
$13,550
$19,750
$16,000
$22,200
$8,900
$16,000
$12,000
$12,300
$12,400
$12,300
$11,400
$18,700
$16,650
$2,375

10/21/1963
12/19/1963
5/9/1963
12/4/1963
2/18/1963
2/14/1963
11/7/1962
11/2/1962
3/22/1963
5/24/1963
3/11/1963
12/4/1962
12/14/1962
12/6/1962
8/23/1963
8/8/1963
8/5/1963
6/28/1963
12/19/1963

$250
$12,475
$2,550
$12,750
$12,500
$28,000
$17,800
$13,400

10/22/1963
10/3/1963
1/3/1964
5/23/1963
5/7/1963
5/28/1963
10/25/1963
12/4/1963

$12,500
$26,850
$23,750
$30,000
$41,340
$25,600
$22,600
$18,200
$16,850
$18,400
$16,500
$16,200
$15,650
$16,000
$16,800
$14,350
$25/750

4/11/1967
11/16/1966
9/27/1966
11/23/1966
4/3/1968
8/16/1966
1/30/1967
7/13/1966
9/7/1966
8/4/1966
12/20/1966
12/1/1966
9/28/1966
9/9/1966
10/3/1966
9/26/1966
10/31/1966

X

Lot Number

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$16,250
9/1/1967
$19,500
5/1/1967
$18,000
10/26/1967
$16,800
7/19/1967
$18,600
6/6/1966
$18,900
9/15/1966
$25,350
6/14/1966
$20,900
4/7/1967
$18,700
1/25/1967
$19,700
6/8/1966
$32,000
10/14/1966
$18,100
12/8/1966
$18,200
10/21/1966
$17,700
9/20/1966
$18,000
8/31/1966
$14,500
8/22/1966
$14,750
10/5/1966
$18,000
11/16/1966
$14,500
9/4/1966
$16,500
8/16/1966
$14,300
9/6/1966

Address

Square
2105

C
B
A
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14, 15
16
17
19
20
H
G
18
F
D
E

Square
2106

1
2
3
4, 5
6
7
8
9
10-B
11
12
13
14-A
15-B
16
17, 18
19
20

$7,900
$19,000
$18,500
$37,500
$18,500
$18,500
$18,400
$17,000
$17,750
$17,000
$19,400
$18,450
$29,600
$22,450
$19,300
$38,250
$19,500
$16,800

9/26/1969
10/6/1967
7/13/1967
8/17/1967
7/17/1967
7/24/1967
9/8/1967
9/6/1966
9/27/1966
9/27/1966
1/23/1968
9/6/1967
4/2/1968
4/1/1968
11/2/1967
10/18/1968
12/13/1967
2/7/1968

Square
2107

A
B
C-1
25
26
S
27
28
29

$18,500
$19,100
$15,500
$18,824
$20,000
$22,000
$16,700
$21,350
$18,000

1/20/1967
3/20/1968
9/23/1966
3/4/1969
7/22/1968
2/15/1967
8/10/1967
3/19/1968
1/11/1968
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X

X

Lot Number

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$19,500
6/5/1967
$4,437
2/28/1967
$19,500
4/11/1967
$17,000
1/29/1968
$18,200
4/21/1969
$28,000
11/27/1967
$22,750
4/28/1967
$22,400
7/12/1967

Address

Square
2107
(cont.)

34
35
36
L
K
K-2, N-2
L-2
M-2

Square
2109

1, 2
3
4, 5
6, 7
8
9, 10
11
12, 13
14, 15
16
17, 18
19
C
B
A
24, 25, 26

$30,000
$13,000
$24,000
$20,000
$25,000
$30,000
$17,500
$17,500
$16,500
$13,550
$15,000
$10,880
$18,500
$24,000
$27,700
$35,000

12/11/1967
1/8/1968
9/28/1966
10/14/1966
4/3/1968
2/5/1968
8/9/1966
6/6/1966
2/19/1968
7/27/1966
7/22/1966
10/13/1966
10/26/1967
11/17/1967
1/2/1969
6/7/1967

Square
2110

Q
Z
P
Undesignated
F, K
J
E
11
I
1
N
M
L
J
K
13-A
14, 15
16, 17, O

$27,600
$33,900
$39,000
$8,085
$31,550
$19,600
$26,750
$16,200
$17,850
$29,500
$17,000
$17,500
$17,500
$16,500
$17,000
$20,500
$20,000
$36,700

4/5/1968
1/30/1967
5/10/1968
10/31/1969
2/23/1967
12/7/1966
1/26/1967
2/2/1968
1/3/1967
5/16/1968
2/13/1967
2/28/1967
1/25/1967
5/12/1967
1/17/1968
3/1/1967
7/13/1966
12/6/1967

$18,400
$17,500
$16,000
$19,000
$11,250

1/14/1967
6/22/1967
10/10/1966
9/6/1966
10/7/1966

Square
2111

D
E
4, pt. 3
5
6

3200 New Orleans St.
3206 New Orleans St.
3216 New Orleans St.
3220 New Orleans St.
3224 New Orleans St.
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X

X

Lot Number

Address

Square
2111
(cont.)

7
A
B
C
11
12
13
14
15
16
T
S
R
Q
21

3228 New Orleans St.
1836 Humanity St.
1830 Humanity St.
1824 Humanity St.
1818 Humanity St.
1816 Humanity St.
1808 Humanity St.
1806 Humanity St.
1800 Humanity St.
1803 Benefit St.
1807 Benefit St.
1811 Benefit St.
1815 Benefit St.
1819 Benefit St.
1823 Benefit St.

Square
2137 /
2289

C
D-1
E
F
G, H
I, pt. K
L, pt. K
M, N
O-1

3426 Live Oak St.
3420 Live Oak St.
3416 Live Oak St.
3414 Live Oak St.
3408 Live Oak St.
3401 Live Oak St.
3409 Live Oak St.
3419 Live Oak St.
3423 Live Oak St.

Square
1966

pt. 2
2B
pt. 1
3, 4
5, 6
pts. 7, 8, 9
pt. B
24
25
26

Square
2112

1, 2, 3
4
5
6
7
8
9, 10, 11, 12
13, pt. 14
X
16, 17
T
W
X

1736 Humanity St.
1746 Humanity St.
1756 Humanity St.
1760 Humanity St.
1762 Humanity St.
1778 Humanity St.
1781 Benefit St.
1779 Benefit St.
1775 Benefit St.
1771 Benefit St.
3201 Havana St.
3207 Havana St.
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Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$18,500
2/16/1967
$15,300
10/20/1966
$16,300
7/27/1966
$19,000
10/12/1966
$13,800
8/1/1966
$13,700
10/26/1966
$15,000
7/25/1966
$17,000
7/21/1966
$15,500
8/3/1966
$10,500
5/18/1967
$13,000
7/10/1967
$15,000
6/12/1967
$13,600
6/14/1967
$13,500
7/7/1967
$14,000
7/6/1967
$17,900
$21,200
$19,900
$21,000
$44,750
$29,820
$32,450
$32,000
$23,500

1/30/1967
3/29/1967
6/5/1967
3/28/1967
12/13/1966
7/18/1968
6/15/1967
12/22/1966
12/12/1966

$12,125
$12,500
$19,075
$35,000
$28,300
$15,920
$11,600
$11,900
$14,600
$15,321

2/16/1968
3/9/1967
1/9/1967
8/29/1967
4/24/1967
6/10/1968
5/26/1967
9/12/1967
5/26/1967
6/1/1967

$26,000
$14,200
$6,400
$14,000
$14,500
$17,700
$30,000
$13,600
$23,700
$13,300
$17,000
$19,700
$19,500

9/22/1967
12/27/1967
12/1/1967
9/1/1967
9/15/1967
8/28/1967
3/25/1968
11/3/1967
7/29/1967
9/26/1969
7/10/1967
12/4/1967
12/8/1967

X

X

Lot Number

Address

Square
2112
(cont.)

Y
Z
V

3211 Havana St.
3215 Havana St.
3223 Havana St.

Square
2113

1, 2, 3, 4, 8
5-A, 7-A
9
11-A
14-A
15, 16

2210 Gentilly Rd.
2216 Gentilly Rd.
1731 Benefit St.

Square
2114
Square
2115

Square
2116

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$19,500
1/25/1967
$22,600
2/28/1967
$26,000
9/14/1966
$120,000
$152,650
$31,000
$91,850
$102,230
$25,110

7/17/1967
5/15/1967
5/6/1968
6/27/1967
3/10/1967
3/18/1968

$64,500

2/7/1968

2137 Gentilly Rd.

$23,500

11/7/1968

3223 Bruxelles St.

$61,800

1/4/1968

1654 Humanity St.
1660 Humanity St.
1664 Humanity St.
2135 Gentilly Rd.
2133 Gentilly Rd.
2129 Gentilly Rd.
2123 Gentilly Rd.

$12,000
$10,300
$13,750
$22,500
$25,500
$33,800
$51,500

3/31/1967
4/27/1967
3/23/1967
6/14/1967
10/21/1966
10/11/1966
10/28/1966

$38,500

2/19/1968

Full Square
A
10-A, 10-B,
10-C, 10-D
9
6
5
B
4
7
8
Full Square

Square
2133

14
15
16
17, 18, 19
20
21
22
23
24

3323 Bruxelles St.
3319 Bruxelles St.
3313 Bruxelles St.
3301 Bruxelles St.
1659 Humanity St.
1661 Humanity St.
1665 Humanity St.
1671 Humanity St.
1675 Humanity St.

$12,227
$10,300
$11,498
$40,500
$10,350
$8,940
$10,900
$8,650
$7,350

9/25/1967
7/10/1969
1/21/1970
12/12/1967
8/10/1967
4/11/1968
2/27/1969
9/10/1969
7/8/1969

Square
2132

1
2
3
4
5
6, 7
8
9
10
11, 12
13
14
15
16, 17

3324 Bruxelles St.
3326 Bruxelles St.
3332 Bruxelles St.
3336 Bruxelles St.
3342 Bruxelles St.
1616 Pleasure St.
1622 Pleasure St.
3339 Paris Ave.
3335 Paris Ave.
3323 Paris Ave.
3321 Paris Ave.
3317 Paris Ave.
3311 Paris Ave.
3307 Paris Ave.

$14,550
$11,550
$12,800
$16,900
$3,250
$22,000
$12,250
$13,250
$22,250
$24,200
$11,100
$12,600
$13,600
$16,000

7/7/1966
7/8/1966
9/11/1967
9/13/1967
2/11/1969
1/25/1967
5/4/1967
11/30/1967
9/28/1967
12/7/1967
6/27/1967
11/30/1967
4/24/1967
6/18/1968
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X

Square
2132
(cont.)

Square
2131

Square
2295

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$14,500
4/29/1968
$11,500
7/29/1968
$13,750
3/2/1967
$12,500
1/23/1967
$24,000
6/19/1967
$29,950
7/1/1969
X
$5,850
2/10/1967
$14,500
3/2/1967

Lot Number

Address

18
19-B
20, pt. 19
21
22
23, 24
25
26

3301 Paris Ave.
1623 Humanity St.
1625 Humanity St.
1627 Humanity St.
3300 Bruxelles St.
3304 Bruxelles St.

Undesignated
A, B,
Undesignated
C, D
E
F

1568 Pleasure St.

$46,300

7/29/1969

1570 Pleasure St.

$35,000

8/10/1967

3310 Paris Ave.
3304 Paris Ave.
3300 Paris Ave.

$34,000
$17,325
$5,650

6/27/1968
4/24/1970
8/10/1967

15
16
B
C
D
A
20, 21, 22

3417 Hamburg St.
1541 Pleasure St.
1547 Pleasure St.
1549 Pleasure St.
1551 Pleasure St.
1545 Pleasure St.

$665
$19,482
$10,951
$11,536
$12,802
$10,963
$578

4/8/1970
1/22/1970
5/11/1970
3/11/1970
5/1/1970
3/10/1970
3/24/1971

3322 Bruxelles St.

X

Square
2296

Full Square

$294,730

7/1/1969

Square
2297
2298
2313
2314
2315

Full Squares

$405,000

12/1/1969

$29,900
$12,900
$11,865
$8,751
$7,727
$100
$9,755

8/22/1969
3/6/1969
4/7/1970
1/21/1971
5/7/1970
1/27/1970
1/27/1970

X

$120,000

10/17/1969

X

$27,500
$23,000
$21,500
$21,900
$18,519
$20,300
$19,250
$22,375

11/6/1967
8/9/1966
5/15/1967
5/16/1967
4/10/1968
8/6/1968
9/12/1967
8/23/1968

Square
2316

Square
402-B
Square
400

1
2
3
4
5
6
25

1453 Lafreniere St.
1457 Lafreniere St.
1461 Lafreniere St.
1465 Lafreniere St.
1469 Lafreniere St.
1473 Lafreniere St.
3517 Duplessis St.

Full Square
1, 2
D
C
B
E
2
4
1

5757 Marshal Foch St.
5739 Marshal Foch St.
5747 Marshal Foch St.
5751 Marshal Foch St.
5733 Marshal Foch St.
5728 Argonne St.
5714 Argonne St.
5734 Argonne St.
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X

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$19,800
7/8/1966

Lot Number

Address

Square
400
(cont.)

3

5722 Argonne St.

5

5710 Argonne St.

$19,300

9/12/1967

Square
399

A
B
C
8, 9
10, 11
B
30, ½ 29
31, 32
33, 34
35, 36
37, 38

5757 General Diaz St.
5747 General Diaz St.
5739 General Diaz St.
5733 General Diaz St.
5731 General Diaz St.
5728 Marshal Foch St.
5740 Marshal Foch St.
5748 Marshal Foch St.
5754 Marshal Foch St.
5760 Marshal Foch St.

$38,500
$31,000
$30,000
$29,000
$29,000
$19,000
$20,500
$20,500
$29,500
$24,500
$22,800

9/22/1966
1/5/1968
5/18/1966
3/16/1967
7/15/1968
2/19/1968
5/31/1967
12/5/1967
6/17/1966
6/20/1966
9/29/1967

Square
398

1, 2
3, 4
5, 6, 7
8, 9
10, 11
28, 29
32, 33, 34
30, 31
35, 36
37, 38

5761 Memphis St.
5755 Memphis St.
5753 Memphis St.
5737 Memphis St.
5731 Memphis St.
5730 General Diaz St.
5748 General Diaz St.
5732 General Diaz St.
5754 General Diaz St.
5768 General Diaz St.

$26,500
$26,100
$41,000
$27,000
$27,000
$24,400
$38,650
$26,500
$42,000
$40,500

6/11/1966
10/30/1967
6/7/1967
6/22/1966
11/29/1966
8/8/1968
6/6/1968
10/7/1966
11/6/1967
8/21/1968

Square
397

1, 2
3, 4
5, 6
7, 8
11, 12
13
9, 10
26, 27
28, 29
30, 31
32,33
34, 35
36, 37, 38

5759 Vicksburg St.
5755 Vicksburg St.
5751 Vicksburg St.
5737 Vicksburg St.
5725 Vicksburg St.
5721 Vicksburg St.
5729 Vicksburg St.
5724 Memphis St.
5730 Memphis St.
5738 Memphis St.
5744 Memphis St.
5750 Memphis St.
5770 Memphis St.

$30,150
$31,600
$30,500
$30,000
$26,950
$16,174
$29,000
$23,608
$29,000
$23,000
$23,500
$23,500
$37,500

6/26/1967
6/6/1966
7/5/1966
7/13/1967
7/1/1968
4/26/1968
5/19/1966
6/6/1968
12/15/1967
9/6/1966
6/15/1966
7/25/1966
7/26/1967

Square
396

1,2
3, 4
5, 6
7, 8
9, 10, 11
14, 15
12, 13
27, 28
29, 30
31, 32

5757 Canal Blvd.
5751 Canal Blvd.
5749 Canal Blvd.
5737 Canal Blvd.

$40,000
$42,500
$42,000
$39,000
$46,000
$5,000
$47,000
$32,000
$25,500
$25,500

3/7/1968
5/20/1968
5/2/1968
4/8/1968
7/18/1968
4/30/1971
3/13/1968
11/16/1967
4/5/1967
10/9/1967

5717 Canal Blvd.
5725 Canal Blvd.
5726 Vicksburg St.
5734 Vicksburg St.
5740 Vicksburg St.
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X

X

Lot Number

Address

Square
396
(cont.)

33, 34
35, 36
37, 38

5750 Vicksburg St.
5754 Vicksburg St.
5760 Vicksburg St.

Square
395

1, 2
3, 4
5, 6
7, 8
9, 10
11, 12
13, 14
R, S
29,30
31, 32
33, 34, 35, 36
37, 38

Square
5 or
394

Square
4 or
393

Square
3

Square
2 / 392

6, 7
8, 9, 10
11, 12, 13, 14
15, 16
17, 18
19, 20, 21, 22
T
U
V
pt. W
pt. W

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$23,600
12/8/1966
$23,300
4/27/1967
$28,600
9/6/1967

5741 Louis XIV St.
5737 Louis XIV St.
5735 Louis XIV St.
5731 Louis XIV St.

5734 Canal Blvd.
5736 Canal Blvd.
5740 Canal Blvd.
5758 Canal Blvd.

5725 Woodlawn Pl.
5735 Woodlawn Pl.
5720 Louis XIV St.
5728 Louis XIV St.
5742 Louis XIV St.
5760 Louis XIV St.

$31,097
$22,750
$25,250
$32,000
$29,000
$26,000
$28,339
$40,000
$49,500
$37,450
$50,700
$38,200

6/29/1960
5/21/1959
9/18/1959
10/18/1960
8/23/1961
2/18/1960
11/10/1959
8/1/1961
8/10/1961
8/29/1961
10/13/1961
9/21/1961

$11,000
$39,700
$28,200
$22,000
$27,400
$50,331
$24,400
$26,000
$31,400
$31,000
$33,250

2/18/1960
9/13/1961
9/11/1961
2/8/1960
5/12/1959
1/29/1960
10/30/1961
11/2/1959
9/20/1961
6/15/1959
10/23/1959

$26,625
$26,900
$31,900
$26,500
$23,375
$19,300
$31,700
$20,725
$16,993
$18,800
$18,500
$23,500
$25,000
$25,393

11/9/1959
10/8/1959
10/22/1959
6/23/1959
9/15/1960
6/8/1959
8/14/1959
9/30/1959
3/4/1960
8/28/1959
8/22/1961
10/13/1961
9/15/1959
8/25/1959
5/31/1966
7/31/1961
12/7/1959
9/29/1959
10/1/1959
1/27/1960
1/20/1960

A
K
J
7, 8
9, 10
11, 12
13, 14
15, 16
17, 18
19, 20
21, 22
23, 24
25, 26
27, 28

441 Bakewell St.
435 Bakewell St.
5736 Woodlawn Pl.

pt. A
B
15, 16
17, 18
19, 20

5722 Woodlawn Pl.

5729 Rosemary Pl.
5727 Rosemary Pl.

$11,180
$25,498
$27,600
$17,150
$17,850

13, 14
15, 16

5728 Rosemary Pl.
5732 Rosemary Pl.

$22,200
$21,600

420 Kenilworth St.
414 Kenilworth St.
5753 Rosemary Pl.
5751 Rosemary Pl.
5747 Rosemary Pl.
5743 Rosemary Pl.
423 Bakewell St.
427 Bakewell St.
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X

X

Lot Number
Square
2 / 392
(cont.)

Square
1

Square
391

Square
390

17, 18
19, 20
21, 22
23, pt. 24
pt. 24, 25,
pt. 26
pt. 26, 27
28, 29
30, 31
F
G
H
37, 38
39, 40
41
1
B
C
D
E
13, 14
15, 16, 17
18, 19
20, 21, 22
1, 2, 3, pt. 4
5-A
8-B
9, pt. 10
pt. 10, 11,
pt. 12
pts. 12, 13
or C
pt. 13, 14
15, 16
Undesignated
B
pt. 4, 5
6, pt. 7
F
pt. 8, 9, 10
B
C
H
15, 16
17, 18
19
20
21, 22

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$29,700
9/2/1961
$17,000
9/2/1961
$24,000
7/22/1960
$21,350
2/10/1960

Address

5754 Rosemary Pl.

$24,100

7/26/1961

$23,761
$19,250
$19,300
$19,285
$18,275
$18,630
$26,550
$25,650
$20,350

6/30/1959
11/8/1961
11/19/1959
9/5/1961
9/1/1959
8/13/1959
5/28/1959
5/28/1959
5/11/1959

$3,996
$6,842
$25,500
$21,725
$19,300
$17,023
$16,700
$21,150
$16,875

11/17/1961
10/13/1961
9/20/1961
6/27/1960
8/25/1961
9/8/1961
9/1/1959
8/7/1959
7/27/1961
1/26/1960

5721 Catina St.

$31,350
$32,200
$30,630
$22,701

10/20/1959
9/15/1959

5717 Catina St.

$21,800

3/30/1961

$17,460

8/25/1959

$20,850
$32,750

8/19/1959
10/28/1959

$36,350
$20,180
$41,050
$27,600
$13,475
$38,650
$20,250
$18,872
$26,450
$50,156
$38,300
$23,388
$21,128
$26,400

6/29/1959
9/21/1959
8/19/1959
2/24/1960
4/20/1960
10/28/1959
7/13/1959
6/2/1959
7/1/1959
10/19/1960
1/29/1960
4/28/1959
9/22/1959
7/30/1959

5771 Ridgeway St.

5749 Ridgeway St.
5743 Ridgeway St.
5737 Ridgeway St.
5727 Ridgeway St.
303 Florida Ave.
5720 Ridgeway St.
5730 Ridgeway St.
5740 Ridgeway St.
5744 Ridgeway St.
5750 Ridgeway St.
5754 Ridgeway St.

5747 Catina St.

5757 West End Blvd.
5753 West End Blvd.
5741 West End Blvd.
5739 West End Blvd.
5733 West End Blvd.

5701 West End Blvd.
5714 Catina St.

313

X
X

Square
390
(cont.)

Lot Number

Address

X
Y
27, 28
29, 30
31, 32

5726 Catina St.
5740 Catina St.
5746 Catina St.

Square
427

1-A
2-A

Square
428

1, 2
Undesignated
rear 5, 6, 7, 8
front 5, 6, 7, 8
9, 10, 11
12, 13
14, 15
16, 17
X
pt. 19, 20,
pt. 21
pt. 21, 22
Y
pt. Z
pt. 27-A
B
44, 45
46, 47
48, 49
50, 51
52, 53

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$25,350
2/18/1960
$37,500
8/5/1959
$25,250
4/12/1960
$25,500
8/20/1959
$26,703
10/15/1959

5762 Catina St.

$35,000
$27,800

11/2/1959
7/23/1959

5645 West End Blvd.

$36,900
$35,975
$33,300
$50,850
$42,350
$28,150
$13,200
$28,600
$26,000

7/23/1959
12/16/1959
11/30/1959
11/17/1960
1/21/1960
8/29/1960
2/1/1961
5/30/1960
9/15/1959

5639 West End Blvd.

$27,400

11/4/1959

$26,673
$18,550
$38,000
$28,000
$327
$1,250
$15,200
$21,998
$24,050
$22,614

8/13/1959
7/9/1959
12/3/1959
7/17/1959
2/24/1960
5/19/1961
7/15/1959
9/8/1959
5/7/1959
7/22/1959

126 Florida Ave.
120 Florida Ave.

5673 West End Blvd.
5665 West End Blvd.
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Appendix 5.4 – Comparison of Active Businesses Along N Claiborne Avenue from Canal Street
to St. Bernard Avenue, 1950 to 1996.
Address
107 N Claiborne Ave.
133 N Claiborne Ave.
141 N Claiborne Ave.
201 N Claiborne Ave.
211 N Claiborne Ave.
215 N Claiborne Ave.
217 N Claiborne Ave.
301 N Claiborne Ave.
325 N Claiborne Ave.
401 N Claiborne Ave.
405 N Claiborne Ave.
419 N Claiborne Ave.
419 N Claiborne Ave.
425 N Claiborne Ave.
435 N Claiborne Ave.
503 N Claiborne Ave.
514 N Claiborne Ave.
612 N Claiborne Ave.
708 N Claiborne Ave
710 N Claiborne Ave.
714 N Claiborne Ave.
716 N Claiborne Ave.
717 N Claiborne Ave.
720 N Claiborne Ave.
721 N Claiborne Ave.
722 N Claiborne Ave.
724 N Claiborne Ave.
728 N Claiborne Ave.
732 N Claiborne Ave.

Business Name (1950)1
N. O. Motor Co. Inc.
Bettcher Bros. Bodies
Schulingkamp’s Serv. Sta.
Schulingkamp’s Used Cars
Gen’l Truck Co.
Canal Auto Pntng & Body
Wks.
Claiborne Shell Service Sta.
Mack Motor Co.
N. O. Motor Co. Inc.
Greco Sam Beer
Schmidt Jno. A. Sheet Met
Wks
Alaska Ice Cream Co
Bassil’s Refrigeration Sales
& Service
Smith Rudy Body Fender &
Wrckr Serv
Manno’s Service Station
Colonial Buick Co.
Bologna A & Co Liqr
Betat Gus & Son Bicycles
Valentino J. F. Dr Ofc
Majestic Ind Life Ins Co
Supreme Industrial Life Ins
Co Inc
LaBranche Drug Store
Douglas Restrnt
Douglas K. L. Dr Dent
Blanks Herbert C. Dr. Dent.
LaBranche Hernandez G Dr
Ofc
Two Sisters Beauty Shop
Original Orleans Club
Joseph Harry S Dept Store

757 N Claiborne Ave.
801 N Claiborne Ave.
1

Business Name (1996)2

Chun King Chinese Food
Precise Collision Center

BBCL Auto & Truck Sales

Energy Management
Systems, Inc.
G&M Electric Sales Co.
Rudy Smith Svc. Inc.

Cohen’s Formal Shop
Geno’s Lounge
Maurice’s Barber Shop

Basin Street Club
Duke’s 24 Hours Liquor
Store
J&G Furniture Co

Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company (1950). New Orleans, LA Street Address Telephone Directory,
March 1950.
2
Polk Cross-Reference Directory for New Orleans, LA (1997).
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812 N Claiborne Ave.
816 N Claiborne Ave.
817 N Claiborne Ave.
817 N Claiborne Ave
824 N Claiborne Ave.
827 N Claiborne Ave.
830 N Claiborne Ave.
841 N Claiborne Ave.
900 N Claiborne Ave.
901 N Claiborne Ave.
906½ N Claiborne Ave.
910 N Claiborne Ave.
912 N Claiborne Ave.
913 N Claiborne Ave.
913 N Claiborne Ave.
914 N Claiborne Ave.
915 N Claiborne Ave.
924 N Claiborne Ave.
926 N Claiborne Ave.
926 N Claiborne Ave.
930 N Claiborne Ave.
930 N Claiborne Ave.
934 N Claiborne Ave.
938 N Claiborne Ave.
943 N Claiborne Ave.
943 N Claiborne Ave.
1000 N Claiborne Ave.
1001 N Claiborne Ave.
1003 N Claiborne Ave.
1004 N Claiborne Ave.
1004 N Claiborne Ave.
1005 N Claiborne Ave.
1015 N Claiborne Ave.
1016 N Claiborne Ave.
1018 N Claiborne Ave.
1018 N Claiborne Ave.
1020 N Claiborne Ave.
1020 N Claiborne Ave.
1022 N Claiborne Ave.
1025 N Claiborne Ave.
1028 N Claiborne Ave.
1028 N Claiborne Ave.

Grand Super Market
Excel Finance Co.
Claiborne Wholesale Candy
Co.
N. O. Amusement Co.
O’Brien’s Mattress Wks
Peters Joseph R. Furn
Pearl’s Beauty Shoppe
Guichard Pharmacy
Continent Wine & Liqr Co.
People’s Ind Life Ins Co.
Moderne Beauty Salon
Moore’s Pie Shop
Smith Norman Studio phtgr

Women Entrepreneurs for
Dev.

Jackie & George’s Lounge
Olivier’s Beauty Salon
Suzanne’s Dress Shop
Dandy Ice Cream Co.
Sehrt Wm & Son Confry
Citizen Flower Shop
Williams Camilla Mrs. Flrsts
Gosserand Superior Printers
Gosserand V. Mrs. Ofc
West’s Watch Repair Shop
Green Spot Restaurant
Reed’s Pharmacy
Venus Industrial Life Ins Co
Green O Liqr Store
Katz Manuel Grocery
Wong’s Barber Shop
Commerce Cash Grocery
Curtis M. J. Ofc.
Superior Cocktail Lounge
Wong’s Barber Shop
Elaine’s Beauty Shop
Darril’s Barber Shop
Morales N. J. Roofer
Bernissant E. F. & E. S.
Hdwr
Claiborne Hdwe & Paint Co.
Joubert Ernest Rl Est
Bernadas Charles Sr. Auto
Serv
Fox Hole Bar & Liqr Str
Matassa Joseph A. liqr
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Holly’s Auto Repair

1031 N Claiborne Ave.
1032 N Claiborne Ave.
1038 N Claiborne Ave.
1100 N Claiborne Ave.
1100 N Claiborne Ave.
1101 N Claiborne Ave.
1108 N Claiborne Ave.
1108 N Claiborne Ave.
1115 N Claiborne Ave.
1120 N Claiborne Ave.
1125 N Claiborne Ave.
1125 N Claiborne Ave.
1128 N Claiborne Ave.
1136 N Claiborne Ave.
1137 N Claiborne Ave.
1139 N Claiborne Ave.
1200 N Claiborne Ave.
1208 N. Claiborne Ave.
1210 N Claiborne Ave.
1210 N Claiborne Ave.
1212 N Claiborne Ave.
1214 N Claiborne Ave.
1214 N Claiborne Ave.
1216 N Claiborne Ave.

Clabon Theatre
Albright’s Sewg Mch Repr
Johnnie’s Bar
Elite Pharmacy
Heliam Inc Drugs
Jim’s Bar
Acme Life Ins Co.
Robin Labasse J. Dr Ofc
Stern Sales Co. Auto
Ben’s Bicycles
Sheffield J. O. Dr Ofc
St John Berchman’s Ind Life
Ins Co.
Safety Ind Life Ins & Sick
Ben Assn
Paul’s Spot Café
Walter’s Body & Fender
Wks
N. O. Floor Covering Co.
Eumont Gustave Groc
Matassa John J. Ofc.
Sixth Ward Civic
Improvement Assn.
Massicot for Councilman
Hdqtrs
Antonia’s Beauty Parlor
Toca Gladys H Bty Shp
Claiborne Poultry Mkt

Industrial Demolishers MBE
SVC of Louisiana, Inc.
Claiborne Auto Repairs
Dominick’s Liqr Store
Tom’s Pool Hall
Tedesco’s Oyster Bar
Swan Cleaners

1418 N Claiborne Ave.
1418 N Claiborne Ave.
1433 N Claiborne Ave.
1433 N Claiborne Ave.
1441 N Claiborne Ave.

New Orleans Jazz & Entrtn.
Safety Industrial Insurance

La Parisienne Liquor & Food

1240 N Claiborne Ave.
1250 N Claiborne Ave.
1251½ N Claiborne Ave
1410 N Claiborne Ave.
1412 N Claiborne Ave.
1413 N Claiborne Ave.
1414 N Claiborne Ave.
1418 N Claiborne Ave.
1418 N Claiborne Ave.

Church of God in Christ

Magner E. S. Dr. Dent
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Manchu Food Store
Elite Burial Plans
Gallery of Braids
Latitude 31 Communications
Special Touch Home Health
Care
Golden Comb
Kern Reese (Attorney)
Michelle Diaz, CPA
Magic World Hair Design

1449 N Claiborne Ave.
1449 N Claiborne Ave.
1455 N Claiborne Ave.
1468 N Claiborne Ave.
1471 N Claiborne Ave.

Francois Bobbie Funrl Dir
LA Undertaking Co. Inc.
LA Industrial Life Ins Co.
Southern Sch of Cooking &
Baking
Crescent Tractor &
Implement Co.

1476 N Claiborne Ave.
1479 N Claiborne Ave.
1500 N Claiborne Ave.
1501 N Claiborne Ave.
1506 N Claiborne Ave.
1509 N Claiborne Ave.
1512½ N Claiborne Ave
1514 N Claiborne Ave
1520 N Claiborne Ave.
1523 N Claiborne Ave.
1525 N Claiborne Ave.
1527 N Claiborne Ave.
1529 N Claiborne Ave.
1530 N Claiborne Ave.
1530 N Claiborne Ave.
1536 N Claiborne Ave.
1540 N Claiborne Ave.
1544 N Claiborne Ave.
1548 N Claiborne Ave.
1556 N Claiborne Ave.
1565 N Claiborne Ave.
1571 N Claiborne Ave.
1575 N Claiborne Ave.
1575 N Claiborne Ave.
1600 N Claiborne Ave.
1608 N Claiborne Ave.
1610 N Claiborne Ave.
1611 N Claiborne Ave.
1623 N Claiborne Ave.
1624 N Claiborne Ave.
1624 N Claiborne Ave.
1627 N Claiborne Ave.

Lou’s Restrnt & Bar

Louisiana Undertaking Co.

Robert Magee, MD
Cottman Transmission Ctr.
Ernie K-Doe’s Mother-inLaw Lounge

Puelo Joseph Groc
Steve’s Poulty Place
Darlene’s Beauty Salon
Lillie’s Beauty Salon
N. O. Informer
Little Beck’s Restrnt & Bar
Classis Nails of Hollywood
Ho Ho Chinese Restaurant
Hair Station
United States Government
Haydel C. C. Dr Ofc
Standard Ind Life Ins Co. Inc
Steve’s Restaurant
Saltalamachia Frank Pltry
Heckmann’s Shoe Store

M&C’s Sports Page Lounge
Equal Care Medical
Transportation

Levata A. A. Restrnt
Dixie Dept Store
Levachez Drug Store
Dad’s Café
Buras R. A. Contr
Serve Your Self Station
Gabriel H. Fruits
Galle Furniture Store
Echo Wine Cellar
Claiborne Circle Garage
St. Bernard Hdw & Supply
Co.
Afro House Hair Care Clinic
Bejae’s Skin Care Salon
Rimbolt Finance Serv Inc.
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Appendix 6.1 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Cultural Center Site1

Square
113

Square
114

Lot Number

Address

A
B
C
T
4
15
Undesignated
Undesignated
C or 7
A
8
A
L
A&K
C
B&H
A
S or Undes.
A or Undes.
16
D or Undes.
Undesignated
Undesignated
2
1
Undesignated
2
X
25

901-03 N. Rampart St.

1
2
6
S
Undesignated
9
10
A
2
4 or 1
Undesignated
Undesignated
Undesignated

915 N. Rampart St.
917 N. Rampart St.
919-21 N. Rampart St.
923-25 N. Rampart St.
931 N. Rampart St.
935 N. Rampart St.
937 N. Rampart St
941-45 N. Rampart St.
1108-10 St Philip St.
1112-14 St Philip St.
1120 St Philip St.
1122 St Philip St.
1126-28 St Philip St.
1130 St Philip St.
940-42 St Claude St.
938 St Claude St.
934 St Claude St.
928-30 St Claude St.
926 St Claude St.
922 St Claude St.
1141-43 Dumaine St.
1137 Dumaine St.

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost
8/5/1971
$50,000
X
$58,250
$65,000
$60,000
$49,500

3/19/1971
12/14/1970
10/9/1970
12/30/70

$100,000

10/20/1970

$70,200

12/14/1970

X

$32,000
$15,600
$13,000
$18,700
$18,200
$14,000
$28,000
$6,300

4/22/1971
11/30/1970
12/9/1970
1/11/1971
10/23/1970
11/13/1970
10/1/1970
1/18/1970

X

$73,400

9/25/1970

$16,250
$29,000
$17,000
$20,000

12/14/1970
12/29/1970
11/10/1970
11/21/1970

1131 Dumaine St.

Fire House

2/28/1913

1123-25 Dumaine St.
1119-21 Dumaine St.
1111-13 Dumaine St.

$16,650
$17,400
$10,300

11/13/1970
11/10/1970
10/9/1970

1134-36 Dumaine St.
1130-32 Dumaine St.
1126-28 Dumaine St.
1120-22 Dumaine St.

$12,500
$17,000
$19,200
$18,250
$18,900

4/14/1969
8/1/1968
6/20/1968
6/21/1968
5/30/1968

839 N. Rampart St.

$82,600

5/21/1968

841-43 N. Rampart St.
827-29 N. Rampart St.
825 N. Rampart St.
821 N. Rampart St.
815-17 N. Rampart St.

$71,000
$45,000
$44,000

8/15/1968
1/14/1969
1/14/1969

$290,000

10/17/1968

1

†

X

City of New Orleans Department of Property Management, Division of Real Estate and Records, City Property
Files for indicated Squares, Second Municipal District, Seventh Assessment District.
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Square
114
(cont)

Square
137

3
Undesignated
C
B
Undesignated
Undesignated
Undesignated
C or 8,9,10
Undesignated
Undesignated
14 or Undes.
13 or Undes.
B
F
E&6
S
X
A
I&5
2
20
4
18
17
6
D
H
G&D

Square
138

Undesignated
Undesignated
Undesignated
2
9
Undesignated
10
8
7
6
5
X
3-A
2
1
Undesignated
20
19
5
7
pt 10

811-13 N. Rampart St.
801 N. Rampart St.

$61,000
$331,000

826 St Claude St.

Land swap
with School
Board
$34,000
Land swap
with
Catholic
Church

809-11 St Claude St.
817 St Claude St.

833 St Claude St.
839-41 St Claude St.
1218-20 Dumaine St.
1222 Dumaine St.
1226-28 Dumaine St.
822 S. Liberty St.
820 S. Liberty St.
818 S. Liberty St.
1225-27 St Ann St.
1217-21 St Ann St.
907 St Claude St.
919 St Claude St.
921 St Claude St.
923-25 St Claude St.
931-33 St Claude St.
1216-18 St Philip St.
929 St Philip St.
1200-02 St Philip St.
1204-06 St Philip St.
1208-10 St Philip St.
1212-14 St Philip St.
1224-26 St Philip St.
1228 St Philip St.
1230 St Philip St.
1232-34 St Philip St.
926-28 N. Liberty St.
922 N. Liberty St.
918-20 N. Liberty St.
914-16 N. Liberty St.
1231-33 Dumaine St.
908 N. Liberty St.

320

7/30/1968
9/24/1968
9/24/1968
8/2/1968
7/19/1968

8/15/1957

$13,000
$27,000
$25,000
$22,175
$45,700
$24,000
$18,300
$19,000
$11,500
$19,250
$7,000
$9,000
$12,500
Land swap
(C. Tessier)
+ $3,700
$18,900

5/28/1959
3/11/1960
1/6/1960
6/1/1959
12/29/1958
8/4/1959
8/4/1959
5/19/1959
10/21/1958
4/3/1959
6/26/1958
4/28/1958
7/24/1958

$101,250

11/10/1970

$19,800

12/29/1970

$175,000

1/28/1971

‡

$39,400
$15,750
$12,000
$14,000
$11,000
$33,200

10/22/1970
9/18/1970
10/9/1970
9/18/1970
10/21/1970
3/9/1971

♦

$16,275

10/5/1970

$15,325
$16,500
$12,000

10/22/1970
9/25/1970
10/5/1970

$53,400

11/30/1970

$16,000

10/5/1970

X
X
X
X
X

9/20/1957
10/1/1958

Sq 138

Undesignated

1225-27 Dumaine St.

$36,000

12/29/1970

Square
147

1-B
Undesignated
4-B
4
5
C
X
Undesignated
A
B
8
7-A
pt 6
A
B
5
10-A
Undesignated
Undesignated
3-A
4-A
2
21
2
1-A

1300 St Philip St.
1304-06 St Philip St.
1308-10 St Philip St.
1312-14 St Philip St.
1318-20 St Philip St.
1325 Dumaine St.
1321 Dumaine St.
1322-24 St Philip St.
1332-34 St Philip St.
928 Marais St.
924 Marais St.
920 Marais St.
918 Marais St.
1331 Dumaine St.
1329 Dumaine St.
1315 Dumaine St.
1309-11 Dumaine St.
1305-07 Dumaine St.
1301 Dumaine St.
911-13 N. Liberty St.
915 N. Liberty St.
919-21 N. Liberty St.
923-25 N. Liberty St.
927-29 N. Liberty St.

$25,000
$15,000
$14,000
$19,550

12/14/1971
10/27/1970
10/9/1970
11/23/1970

$135,000

11/23/1970

$17,000
$175,000
$13,000
$10,000
$13,000
$8,000
$23,000
$26,000
$37,500
$36,000
$37,500
$17,000

10/5/1970
1/28/1971
12/14/1970
2/22/1971
11/13/1970
12/15/1970
9/18/1970
12/14/1970
11/23/1970
12/29/1970
11/15/1970
10/8/1970

$26,000

11/23/1970

$12,375
$33,200
$11,000
$11,000

10/27/1970
3/9/1971
2/17/1971
10/8/1970

1
1
2
5-B
5-A
6
6-B
7
pt 7
A
1
2 or B
1
2
3
4
5
6
19
20
B
A

1300-02 Dumaine St.
1306-08 Dumaine St.
1312-14 Dumaine St.
1318-20 Dumaine St.
1322-24 Dumaine St.
1332 Dumaine St.
828-30 Marais St.
822 Marais St.
818 Marais St.
812-14 Marais St.
1331-33 St Ann St.
1327-29 St Ann St.
1321-25 St Ann St.
1317-19 St Ann St.
801-03 N. Liberty St.
805-07 N. Liberty St.
809-11 N. Liberty St.
815-17 N. Liberty St.
819-21 N. Liberty St.
823 N. Liberty St.
827 N. Liberty St.
831-33 N. Liberty St.

$33,000
$16,500
$26,500
$21,125
$14,200
$39,175
$12,000
$16,500
$6,750
$12,000

3/11/1966
3/10/1966
3/11/1966
2/11/1966
3/10/1966
3/18/1966
2/11/1966
2/18/1966
3/10/1966
5/27/1966

$31,200

2/25/1966

$22,000
$24,750
$55,000
$13,150
$14,125
$23,045
$19,400
$13,000
$18,000
$24,000

4/29/1966
3/4/1966
4/21/1966
8/29/1966
2/11/1966
6/17/1966
3/17/1966
3/4/1966
3/24/1966
3/10/1966

Undesignated
2

1401-03 Orleans St.
1405-07 Orleans St.

$22,500
$13,250

3/21/1966
5/4/1966

Square
148

Square
167
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♣
X

♦

X

Square
167

2
3
3
2
1
6
5
Undesignated
4
10 or B
B
A

Square
168

Undesignated
Undesignated
Undesignated
9-A
6
5
1
2
2 or 8
1-A
22
23
Undesignated
Undesignated
Undesignated
Undesignated
E
15
16
Undesignated
Undesignated
5
Undesignated
20

Square
169

1
B
Undesignated
1
2
A
Undesignated
pt 4
Undesignated
A
B

1409-11 Orleans St.,
1408-10 St Ann St.
1419-21 Orleans St.
1423-25 Orleans St.

1430-32 St Ann St.
1426-28 St Ann St.
1424 St Ann St.
1422 St Ann St.
1416-18 St Ann St.
1406 St Ann St.
1400-02 St Ann St.
1405-07 St Ann St.
1409-11 St Ann St.
1415 St Ann St.
1417-19 St Ann St.
1425 St Ann St.
1427-29 St Ann St.
1431-33 St Ann St.,
806-10 N Villere St.
814-16 N Villere St.
818-20 N Villere St.
822-24 N Villere St.
826-28 N Villere St.
830-32 N Villere St.
834 N Villere St.
1428 Dumaine St.
1422 Dumaine St.
1414-16 Dumaine St.
1410-12 Dumaine St.
1400-02 Dumaine St.
827-29 Marais St.
1408 Dumaine St.
823-25 Marais St.
819-21 Marais St.
815-17 Marais St.
811 Marais St.
1432 St Philip St.,
936 N Villere St.
923-34 N Villere St.
926-28 N Villere St.
922-24 N Villere St.
918-20 N Villere St.
916 N Villere St.
910 N Villere St.
1431-33 Dumaine St.
1427-29 Dumaine St.
1423-25 Dumaine St.
1421 Dumaine St.
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$73,000

7/26/1966

$1,500.60

7/26/1966
3/11/1966

$39,500

8/24/1966

$10,000

2/25/1966

$9,175

7/14/1966

$10,200

5/26/1966

$19,500

7/29/1966

X

$16,000
$19,400
$11,600
$15,500

X
X
X

$14,500

10/27/1966
7/8/1966
10/24/1966
11/9/1966
5/24/1966
3/24/1966

$16,000

3/10/1966

$15,000
$14,000
$12,600

7/18/1966
3/25/1966
3/4/1966

$35,857

2/25/1966

$16,500
$37,200
$14,122

2/25/1966
3/3/1966
2/25/1966

$37,500

7/14/1966

$6,800
$13,500
$13,000
$14,500
$21,000

3/3/1966
3/3/1966
7/14/1966
3/10/1966
1/25/1967

$24,000

10/8/1970

$11,000
$11,000
$29,000
$18,000
$12,000

10/22/1970
11/16/1970
9/25/1970
3/8/1971
10/22/1970

$21,000

9/18/1970

$15,850
$21,250
$40,500

10/8/1970
9/18/1970
10/8/1970

X

X

X

Square
169

4 or C
Undesignated
Undesignated
15
X
Undesignated
2-B
3D
3C
3A
3B
4-A
24
A
Undesignated
D

1415 Dumaine St.
1409-11 Dumaine St.
1405-07 Dumaine St.
1401-03 Dumaine St.,
913-15 Marais St.
919 Marais St.
921 Marais St.
923-25 Marais St.
927-29 Marais St.
931-33 Marais St.
935 Marais St.,
1400-02 St Philip St.
1404-06 St Philip St.
1410 St Philip St.
1414 St Philip St.
1418-20 St Philip St.
1422-24 St Philip St.
1426-28 St Philip St.
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$12,000
$15,000

10/8/1970
4/22/1971
11/24/1970

$12,000

10/23/1970

$14,000
$17,000
$18,000

12/15/1970
11/23/1970
10/23/1970

$36,000

12/29/1970

$11,750
$9,000
$16,000
$11,300
$13,000

12/15/1970
11/23/1970
5/14/1971
12/14/1970
11/30/1970

Appendix 7.1 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Medical Center of Louisiana at
New Orleans Site.1

Square
433

Lot Number

Address

C
13
14
15
16
A
17
18
3
4
11
A
B
2, 3, 4, 5,
7, 8, 9

1709-11 Tulane Ave.
1731 Tulane Ave.
1725 Tulane Ave.
1727 Tulane Ave.
1729 Tulane Ave.

10, 12, 13,
14, B
Square
434

14, 15
15, 16, C,
D-1, E, F
C, D
26
12
A, B, C
E
4, 5
G
14, 15
19, 21, 28, 7
14
2, 3

$190,449

3/11/2011

X

113,218

4/27/2011

X

$97,000

3/16/2011

X

$98,000

3/23/2011

X

$34,500

4/21/2011

X

$116,500

4/28/2011

X

1714-1722 Palmyra St.

$104,500

4/29/2011

X

310-14 S. Derbigny St
1724 Palmyra St.
1734 Palmyra St.

$95,000

5/24/2011

X

$11,300

6/8/2010

$235,345

10/11/10

X

$80,000
$433,449
$4,700

9/28/2010
10/18/2010
10/11/2010

X

$119,000

2/15/2011

X

$43,350
$42,500
$135,000
$198,827
$18,600
$33,500
$13,700

2/10/2011
2/15/2011
11/9/2010
3/9/2011
3/31/2011
2/15/2011
4/4/2011

251 S. Claiborne Ave.
253 S. Claiborne Ave.
1728 Palmyra St.
1705 Tulane Ave.
1701 Tulane Ave.

1729 Palmyra St.
1722-30 Cleveland Ave
221 S. Claiborne Ave.
216-22 S. Derbigny St.
209-11 S. Claiborne Av
1723 Palmyra St.
228-30 S. Derbigny St.
201 S Claiborne Ave.
1708 Cleveland Ave
213 S. Claiborne Ave.
227 S. Claiborne Ave.
1716 Cleveland Ave.
1729 Palmyra St.
1718 Cleveland Ave

Square
435
Square
436

1732 Canal St.
26, 27, 28
2
X
11, 12, 13, A

1

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost
$56,000
5/5/2011

1813-19 Cleveland Ave
127 S. Derbigny St.
1801 Cleveland Ave
1820-24 Canal St.
120 S. Roman St.

Orleans Parish Conveyance Records
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♦

†
X
X

10/18/2010

X

$175,094
$37,966
$18,848

5/13/2010
10/7/2010
2/15/2011

X
X

$446,456

3/1/2011

X

Lot Number
Square
436
(cont.)

13, 14, 15
29, A
X
14, 15, A, B
11, 16
28, 4, 8-B, E

Square
437

Undesignated
12
16, 21
17, 18, 28, 29,
30, A
R
24
11, 13, 14, 15
10, B, 11
7, S
25
A
24
23

Square
438

23
B
16, 17, 18
E
15, A
2

Square
466

6, 7
C
1
25, 26, 27, A,
B, C
8, 9
B, 21
4, 5, 6
2, 3
10, 11, 12, 13,
17, 18, 24,
pt. 9, A, A-1,
A-2, B, C, D

Square
467

C
C

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost
1830-34 Canal St.
$279,657
2/23/2011
1805-11 Cleveland Ave
$55,000
2/23/2011
131 S. Derbigny St.
$23,391
3/17/2011
X
122-26 S. Roman St.
$91,563
9/28/2010
1838 Canal St.
$25,496
3/21/2011
X
127 S. Roman St.
1806 Canal St.
$772,157
2/10/11
Address

1836 Cleveland Ave
1822 Cleveland Ave
1837 Palmyra St.
228-30 S. Roman St.
216-18 S.Roman St.
219 S. Derbigny St.
211 S. Derbigny St.
1827 Palmyra St.
1826-34 Cleveland Ave
210-12 S. Roman St.
1812-20 Cleveland Ave
1800-04 Cleveland Ave
1823 Palmyra St.
1808-10 Cleveland Ave
1827 Palmyra St.
1829-31 Palmyra St.

$18,700
$33,400

5/18/2010
10/7/2010

X

10/19/2010

X

$550,600

10/29/2010

X

$4,250
$138,600

10/29/2010
2/14/2011

X

$118,612

2/23/2011

$90,600
$41,000
$65,000
$35,700
$180,000

2/23/2011
2/25/2011
3/21/2011
4/8/2011
3/9/2011
3/29/2011

1809 Tulane Ave.
1805-07 Tulane Ave
1831-35 Tulane Ave
1829 Tulane Ave
1837 Tulane Ave
318 S. Roman St.
1800-02 Palmyra St.
313 S. Derbigny St.

$65,000
$82,000
$365,000
$46,000

2/22/2011
3/11/2011
3/11/2011
3/21/2011

X
X

4/25/2011

X

5/24/2011

X

1910-12 Palmyra St.
307. Roman St.
301 S. Roman St.
1901-09 Tulane Ave.
315-19 S. Roman St.
1914-16 Palmyra St.
1933 Tulane Ave
318, 330 S. Prieur St.
311-13 S. Roman St.
303-05 S. Roman St.

$13,400
$6,400
$49,202

1/25/2010
1/25/2010
7/27/2010

$3,277,150

2/17/2011

$42,880

3/21/2011

$118,734

3/11/2011

$272,946
$83,000

3/28/2011
5/3/2011

1919-39 Tulane Ave.
314-24 S. Prieur St.
1918-38 Palmyra St.
1931 Palmyra St.
228 S. Prieur St.

5/19/2011

$7,500
$4,600
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1/25/2010
1/25/2010

X

X

Lot Number
Square
467
(cont.)

18
17
B
25, A, B, D
1, 2, 3, A, B,
24, 28
26
C
11, A
29, 30
19, 20, A, B

Square
468

P-1
14, 15, 6, 7, D
A
13, 14, 15
B
18
23
B, 27
22
29, 30
16
A, B

Square
469

19, 20, B, C
X
A
22-B
A, B
A
17, 23, 24

Square
470

X
33, X
13-D, 14-C
B, C, P
7
16-A
15-B
A
17
A
Y

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost
218 S. Prieur St.
$165,000
4/22/2010
216 S. Prieur St.
$240,297
6/2/2010
1926-28 Cleveland Ave
$330,000
10/7/2010
1921-27 Palmyra St.
$433,449
10/18/2010
1933, 1939 Palmyra St.
1901-13 Palmyra St.
$360,000
10/28/2010
X
223, 231 S. Roman St.
1919 Palmyra St.
$6,935
10/27/2010
X
1915-17 Palmyra St.
$200,000
2/15/2011
1918-24 Cleveland Ave
$49,000
2/23/2011
217-21 S. Roman St.
$84,000
2/28/2011
1932-38 Cleveland Ave
$883,214
3/28/2011
220-22 S. Prieur St.
Address

1837-39 Cleveland Ave
130-36 S. Prieur St.
1900 Canal St.
1905-07 Cleveland Ave
1926-34 Canal St.
128 S. Prieur St.
118 S. Prieur St.
1927 Cleveland Ave
1909-11 Cleveland Ave
1917 Cleveland Ave
1933-35 Cleveland Ave
122-26 S. Prieur St.
1936 Canal St.
1919-23 Cleveland Ave
2024-30 Canal St.
126 S. Johnson St.
116 S. Johnson St.
2020 Canal St.
2035 Cleveland Ave
2032 Canal St.
2014 Canal St.
2023-31 Cleveland Ave
220-22 S. Johnson St.
2014-20 Cleveland Ave
2030 Cleveland Ave
215-21 S. Prieur St.
2008-10 Cleveland Ave
2024 Cleveland Ave
2038-40 Cleveland Ave
2034-36 Cleveland Ave
2000-02 Cleveland Ave
216 S. Johnson St.
223-25 S. Prieur St.
224-26 S. Johnson St.
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$131,985

5/13/2010

$2,000,000
$198,260
$535,000
$25,272
$40,843
$21,211

1/27/2011
2/14/2011
2/28/2011
2/28/2011
2/25/2011
2/25/2011

$62,000

2/25/2011

$198,827
$84,613
$461,100
$65,252

3/9/2011
3/14/2011
3/9/2011
3/15/2011

$825,705

3/11/2011

$94,500
$203,975
$34,100
$325,000
$246,000
$106,000

3/9/2011
3/21/2011
3/25/2011
4/1/2011
5/26/2011
5/26/2011

$214,000
$55,000
$401,652

10/13/2010
10/14/2010
9/28/2010

$433,449

10/18/2010

$164,000
$120,000
$89,000
$160,000
$61,000
$331,457
$190,000

11/9/2010
2/10/2011
2/28/2011
3/1/2011
3/14/2011
3/28/2011
4/7/2011

♦

X

†

X

X

X
X
♦

X

Lot Number
Square
470
(cont.)
Square
471

1, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, A, B,
C, Undesig.
16-C
10, 11, 12, 14,
16, 17, 17-B,
19, 2, 20, 3, 4,
5, 6, 9, A, B,
C, D, E, F
9

Square
520

Square
521

30-B
1
10, 11, 12, 13,
14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 2, 20,
21, 22, 23, 24,
27, 28, 29, 4,
5, 7, 8, 9,
B, C
25, 26
3
9, 18
A
31
16, 26
A, B
Undesignated
1, 17, 18, 2
Y
15
19
25
23
24
13, 20, 21, 5
25
20
1
19
8
W
X
14, 24,
Undesignated

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost

Address
236 S. Johnson St.

$2,430,000

6/14/2011

212 S. Johnson St.

$8,000

6/17/2011

$2,400,000

3/25/2011

0

6/7/2011

2107-09 Banks St.
2010 Banks St.

$84,000
$368,272

11/12/2010
3/11/2011

X

2111-19 Banks St.
2131 Banks St.
2100-14 Palmyra St.
304-28 S. Galvez St.
315-29 S. Johnson St.

$4,450,000

3/25/2011

X

2121 Banks St.
325 S. Johnson St.

$345,000
$178,000

3/11/2011
3/28/2011

2110 Cleveland Ave
240 S. Galvez St.
236 S. Galvez St.
226 S. Galvez St.
223-27 S. Johnson St.
2118 Cleveland Ave
230-32 S. Galvez St.
2104 Cleveland Ave
224 S. Galvez St.
2114 Cleveland Ave
2105 Palmyra St.
2113 Palmyra St.
2107-09 Palmyra St.
2119-21 Palmyra St.
217-21 S. Johnson St.
2115 Palmyra St.
2123 Palmyra St.
2101-03 Palmyra St.
237 S. Johnson St.
2127 Palmyra St.
2106-08 Cleveland Ave
213 S. Johnson St.
2100-02 Cleveland Ave
200-20 S. Galvez St.
2122 Cleveland Ave

$10,000
$20,293
$8,104
$165,300
$20,118
$43,226
$200,000
$185,000
$106,177
$130,000
$14,405
$62,640
$14,185

1/25/2010
3/25/2010
3/25/2010
6/4/2010
6/9/2010
7/19/2010
10/14/2010
10/14/2010
10/12/2010
10/18/2010
10/26/2010
10/26/2010
10/27/2010

$140,000

10/27/2010

X

$70,470
$290,000

10/26/2010
11/12/2010

X
X

$197,000

9/20/2010

$171,800
$140,000
$10,000
$37,800

2/14/2011
3/2/2011
2/28/2011
2/25/2011

$517,100

5/5/2011

2008-26 Palmyra St.
2032-38 Palmyra St.
312-22 S. Johnson St.
315-29 S. Prieur St.
2001-05 Tulane Ave
2017 Tulane Ave
2028-30 Palmyra St.
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X

X
X
X
X

Square
522

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Date
Cost

Lot Number

Address

5, 6, 7, 8, A,
B, C, 1, 10,
11, 13, 14, 2,
3, 4, 8, 9

2115 Cleveland Ave.

2, X, Y
12, 13
1, 14

2100 Canal St.
121-25 S. Johnson St.
2109 Cleveland Ave.
2105 Cleveland Ave.
133 S. Johnson St.
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10/18/2010

$550,000

3/17/2011

$195,000

4/25/2011

$375,000

4/25/2011

X

Appendix 7.2 – Addresses, Cost and Dates of Acquisition of Veterans Administration Medical
Center Site.1

Square
523

Lot Number

Address

5, 6

2216-18 Canal St.
2201-03 Cleveland Ave
127-29 S. Galvez St.
2200-12 Canal St.
2220-26 Canal St.
2205-33 Cleveland Ave
122-26 S Miro St.
121 S. Galvez St
125 S Galvez St.

23
1, 2, 3, 4
Undesignated,
5, 6, 7, 9-A,
10, 11, 12, K,
L, R, X
8
14, 15,
Undesignated,
Undesignated

Square
524

21
B
20, A, B, S
F, F-1, G
3
1, 10, 11-A,
12, A
5, 6, 9
Undesignated
4, 14, 15
4
E
7
pt. 16, 17
A, B
18-A
D
8

Square
525

1

11
A
1, 2
5
C
X
22
3
A
K

2201-03 Cleveland Ave
127-33 S Galvez St.
229 S. Galvez St.
232-34 S Miro St.
233-37 S. Galvez St.
2211-13 Palmyra St.
217-19 S. Galvez St.
2208-10 Cleveland Ave
2225-29 Palmyra St.
218-40 S. Miro St.
201-05 S. Galvez St.
228-30 S. Miro St.
2212 Cleveland Ave.
223 S. Galvez St.
2224 Cleveland Ave
2217-19 Palmyra St.
200-08 S. Miro St.
239-41 S. Galvez St.
227 S. Galvez St.
2226-28 Cleveland Ave
321 S. Galvez St.
310-12 S Miro St.
300-02 S Miro St.
2216 Palmyra St.
2213-15 Banks St.
2209-11 Banks St.
314-16 S Miro St.
2224 Palmyra St.
309 S. Galvez St.
325-27 S. Galvez St.
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Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$500,000
4/26/2010
$130,848

5/18/2010
7/9/2010

X

7/22/2010

X

$235,151

8/6/2010

$1,500

9/27/2010

$95,000
$227,051

4/22/2010
4/22/2010

$141,415

5/27/2010

$267,000
$160,927

6/23/2010
7/1/2010

$151,500

7/16/2010

X

7/22/2010
7/22/2010
8/5/2010
8/23/2010
8/23/2010
8/30/2010
8/30/2010
8/25/2010
8/31/2010
9/1/2010
10/18/2010

X
X
X
X
X
X

$295,010
$223,532
$141,933
$229,150
$38,250
$244,552
$29,150
$37,900
$210,000
$135,000
$40,000
$169,600
$225,000
$210,000
$187,728
$50,000
$238,140

2/26/2010
4/16/2010
4/5/2010
5/20/2010
5/27/2010
6/15/2010
7/19/2010
7/22/2010
7/29/2010
8/4/2010

X

X

X
X
X

♦

Square
525
(cont.)

Lot Number

Address

14
X, Y
10
7
pt. 8, 9

2217 Banks St.
2205-07 Banks St.
319 S. Galvez St.
305-07 S. Galvez St.
311-13 S. Galvez St.
2212-14 Palmyra St.
301-03 S. Galvez St.
2220 Palmyra St.
2223-27 Banks St.
2201-03 Banks St.
331-37 S. Galvez St.
318-20 S. Miro St.
2221 Banks St.
305-07 S. Galvez St.
2231 Banks St.
330 S. Miro St.
322-24 S. Miro St.

6
4
16, 17, 2
Undesignated
21
15
7
1, 1-L, 19
20
Square
526

1, 2, 3, 4, 5, C
A, B

Square
549

A
5, 6-A
7
8, B
1, 2, 3, 4

Square
550

4
D
A
7
1, A, X, 10,
11, 9,
Undesignated
5, 6
Undesignated
11
2
17
B
18
1A
1
B, C

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$47,000
8/13/2010
$200,000
8/4/2010
$54,568
8/20/2010
$18,150
8/30/2010
$162,000
8/31/2010
$110,000

8/30/2010

$150,000

8/24/2010
8/30/2010

X
X

9/7/2010

X

9/7/2010
9/20/2010
9/14/2010

X

10/19/2010

X

$220,762
$230,000
$18,150

X

$43,000

10/20/2010

$230,000

8/23/2010

X

$230,000

8/23/2010

X

$45,299

8/11/2010

X
X

$82,000

8/23/2010
8/25/2010

$241,200

8/13/2010

X

$697,858

8/23/2010

X

2322 Palmyra St.
323-25 S. Miro St.
315 S. Miro St.
2314 Palmyra St.

$38,960
$42,600
$140,628
$239,624

5/19/2010
6/23/2010
7/14/2010
7/19/2010

2335-37 Banks St.
318-20 S. Tonti St.

$138,590

7/20/2010

X

$162,645
$379,318
$14,230

7/27/2010
7/28/2010
8/5/2010

X

8/23/2010

X

8/25/2010
8/25/2010
8/25/2010
8/26/2010
8/13/2010
8/13/2010

X
X
X

2231 Tulane Ave.
2201-09 Tulane Ave
349 S. Galvez St.
2202 Banks St.
2337-39 Tulane Ave.
414 S. Tonti St.
2319-21 Tulane Ave.
2323 Tulane Ave.
408-12 S. Tonti St.
2327 Tulane Ave.
2301-09 Tulane Ave.

2320 Palmyra St.
2321-23 Banks St.
2330 Palmyra St.
2338 Palmyra St.
310 S. Tonti St.
2315-17 Banks St.
2307-09 Banks St.
2311-13 Banks St.
2300 Palmyra St.
2332-34 Palmyra St.
2325-27 Banks St.
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$443,795
$404,854
$72,413
$73,736
$189,510

♣

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$143,357
8/26/2010
X
9/1/2010
X
$350,083
8/31/2010
9/10/2010
X
$147,515
10/11/2010
X
$88,824
10/11/2010

Lot Number

Address

Square
550
(cont.)

X
29
6
A
2A
1, 11, 2

329 S. Miro St.
319-21 S. Miro St.
2316 Palmyra St.
2301-03 Banks St.
2310 Palmyra St.
314 S. Tonti St.

Square
551

7
M
33
H
6
23, 24
42
25, 26, 27
24 or 25
8
1, 2
Q
17, 18
43
21, 22
7
pt. 22, 23
16
1, Q,
Undesignated
19
3, 4
19
5
B, B-1
R

2322-24 Cleveland Ave
2336-38 Cleveland Ave
218-20 S. Tonti St.
2328-30 Cleveland Ave
2318-20 Cleveland Ave
227-29 S. Miro St.
2310-12 Cleveland Ave
219 S. Miro St.
223 S. Miro St.
2326 Cleveland Ave.
201 S. Miro St.
2333-35 Palmyra St.
2319-21 Palmyra St.
2314-16 Cleveland Ave
2305 Palmyra St.
2323 Palmyra St.
2301-03 Palmyra St.
2327 Palmyra St.

$295,000
$65,000
$65,000
$220,000
$150,000

$230,000
$70,192
$45,000
$250,000
$82,000
$6,655

2/26/2010
4/21/2010
6/16/2010
7/1/2010
7/19/2010
7/22/2010
7/27/2010
8/3/2010
8/5/2010
8/5/2010
8/11/2010
8/10/2010
8/20/2010
8/25/2010
8/26/2010
8/31/2010
8/31/2010
8/27/2010

2339 Palmyra St.

$140,057

8/27/2010

X

9/1/2010
8/28/2010
9/10/2010
7/16/2010
9/15/2010
10/25/2010

X

7/22/2010

X

Square
552

Square
553
Square
554

1, 2, 3, 21-A,

2313 Palmyra St.
228-30 S. Tonti St.
2317 Palmyra St.
224 S. Tonti St.
212-14 S. Tonti St.
2329 Palmyra St.

$250,000
$28,080
$280,000
$265,000

$51,000
$143,068
$226,512

2300 Canal St.

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

‡

7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18

2324-30 Canal St.
2317 Cleveland Ave

19, 5-A

2322 Canal St.
2313-15 Cleveland Ave

10/5/2010

X

Full Square

2400 Canal St.

3/11/2010

X

C, D
B
H
13

2410-14 Cleveland Ave
2415 Palmyra St.
2400 Cleveland Ave
218 S. Rocehblave St.
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$3,942,000

$72,500
$120,000
$198,000
$33,000

8/23/2010

12/7/2009
6/16/2010
7/1/2010
7/1/2010

♦

Square
554
(cont.)

Lot Number

Address

28
23
1, 2
6
25
14
1, 2
29, 30
20
7
15
19

21, pt. 22
8
9
11
5
10
24
12

223 S. Tonti St.
2411 Palmyra St.
213 S. Tonti St.
2418-20 Cleveland Ave
2405 Palmyra St.
222 S. Rocheblave St.
2402 Cleveland Ave
217 S. Tonti St.
2423-25 Palmyra St.
2422 Cleveland Ave
224-26 S. Rocheblave
2427-29 Palmyra St.
2401 Palmyra St.
227 S. Tonti St.
2419-21 Palmyra St.
2426 Cleveland Ave.
2430 Cleveland Ave.
2436-38 Cleveland Ave
2416 Cleveland Ave.
2434 Cleveland Ave.
2407-09 Palmyra St.
214 S. Rocheblave St.

28
27-B
6A
30
7-A
4
C
B
8
31
32
27
5
1
16
2
26
pt. 12
15
9, 11
A
29
H, F
14

325 S. Tonti St.
327 S. Tonti St.
2420 Palmyra St.
319 S. Tonti St.
2422-24 Palmyra St.
2412 Palmyra St.
2421-23 Banks St.
2415-17 Banks St.
2426 Palmyra St.
317 S. Tonti St.
313 S. Tonti St.
2401-03 Banks St.
2414 Palmyra St.
2400 Palmyra St.
328 S. Rocheblave St.
2404 Palmyra St.
2405-07 Banks St.
314-16 S. Rocheblave
324 S. Rocheblave St.
2434 Palmyra St.
2411-13 Banks St.
323 S. Tonti St.
2433-35 Banks St.
320-22 S. Rocheblave

26, 27

Square
555

332

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
$40,000
7/9/2010
$233,000
7/9/2010
$176,000
7/28/2010
$165,000
8/5/2010
$236,000
8/5/2010
X
$15,000
8/11/2010
X
$36,000
8/11/2010
X
$164,304
8/20/2010
8/19/2010
X
8/19/2010
X
8/23/2010
X
8/13/2010
X
$173,000

8/26/2010

$136,000

8/30/2010
8/31/2010
9/8/2010
9/7/2010
9/15/2010
10/11/2010
10/4/2010
10/20/2010

$164,520
$136,000
$140,000
$116,259
$39,500
$8,300
$124,000
$135,000
$248,000
$37,000
$178,000
$42,000
$127,000
$105,000
$274,763
$138,590
$125,000
$110,000
$13,929
$156,407
$236,000
$114,000
$74,000
$230,000
$160,000
$36,500
$268,109
$13,500

11/12/2009
11/12/2009
3/5/2010
3/9/2010
4/16/2010
4/19/2010
4/23/2010
5/20/2010
6/2/2010
6/29/2010
6/30/2010
7/20/2010
7/27/2010
7/29/2010
8/5/2010
8/5/2010
8/5/2010
8/20/2010
8/23/2010
8/26/2010
8/30/2010
8/31/2010
10/15/2010
10/13/2010

†

X
X

X
X

X

♣

X
X
X

†

X

X

Square
555
(cont.)
Square
556

Lot Number

Address

D

2425-27 Banks St.
2409 Banks St.
2408 Palmyra St.

25, 3, A
Full Square

Acquisition Acquisition
Expropriation
Cost
Date
10/21/2010
‡

10/25/2010

2401 Tulane Ave

$52,285
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2/25/2011

X

Appendix 8.1 – Louisiana Legislature, Act No. 851 of the 2006 Regular Session
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Vita
Jared E. Munster was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, and has lived in the Greater New Orleans
area all his life. He graduated in the class of 2000 from Archbishop Shaw High School in
Marrero, Louisiana, a suburb of New Orleans.
Jared earned his Bachelor of Science in Urban Studies and Planning from the College of Urban
and Public Affairs at the University of New Orleans in 2004. While an undergraduate at UNO,
Jared was elected Student Government President, and served in that role for the 2002 – 2003
academic year. He also served in the University Senate and on the University Athletic Council as
a Student Representative. Additionally, he served as a student member of the University of New
Orleans International Alumni Association’s Board of Directors from 2002 – 2004.
Jared attained his Master of Urban and Regional Planning from the University of New Orleans in
2006. While a graduate student, Jared held an internship with the Planning Department of the
City of Sanford, Florida during the summer of 2005. He was also awarded a Mayoral Fellowship
with the City of New Orleans for the 2006 – 2007 academic year. After completing his
fellowship, Jared remained with the City of New Orleans as a full-time employee, and worked
with the City Planning Commission before taking his current position as Assistant Zoning
Administrator in the City’s Department of Safety and Permits.
After attaining his Master’s degree, Jared entered directly into the Doctorate in Urban Studies
program in the School of Urban Planning and Regional Studies at the University at New Orleans,
and will earn his Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Studies in December of 2012.
He currently lives in the Gentilly Terrace neighborhood with his husband, Brandon Robb, and
their cats, Gingerbread, Dodecanesel and Dreidel.
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